The first war of the missile era. This is how some sources described the Malvinas War, and I was not an outsider in it. Our people are emotionally familiar, rather than precisely informed.
It was an atypical conflict, in the sense that the International Red Cross described it as the only one in which, on both sides, International Humanitarian Law was respected and
no war crimes were recorded.
After the recovery of the islands - on April 2, 1982 - and throughout the month, the United Kingdom (UK) simultaneously employed a strategy of attrition: threat and naval blockade, diplomatic demarches, effective psychological action and economic sanctions together with its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The inaction of the Argentine government was notorious.
The United States (US) provided Sidewinder air-to-air and anti-radar air-to-ground missiles, use of the Ascension Island Naval Air Base in the South Atlantic, and satellite information. France canceled the shipment of 10 Exocet (air-sea) missiles, which our Navy had purchased before the crisis.
Chile provided air bases to the British who used their spy planes with the insignia of the Chilean air force.
The UK had the largest expeditionary force since the Second World War: more than 28 thousand men and 100 ships, 2 aircraft carriers with more than 40 machines, and 4 nuclear submarines.
The Argentine Navy (Sea Fleet) marginalized itself
and did not dispute maritime control. The Army had less than 10% of its operational, weapons and logistics capacity.
The attempt to recover the Malvinas by force was an absurd act that had never been thought of
. The ailing Military Junta (General Galtieri, Admiral Anaya and Brigadier Lami Dozzo), discredited internationally for the violation of human rights - and a group of obedient sycophants - privileged two erroneous assumptions: the non-reaction of the UK, and having the support or neutrality from the US
Furthermore, they lacked the necessary political, geographical, historical and military knowledge, and their decisions were
an insult to the basic concepts of strategy
, among others: they were convinced that there would be no confrontation; fighting in an island area without having air and naval superiority; sending several units without appropriate training and without mobility; and generals who showed a lack of leadership and
paralyzing obedience to Galtieri's ridiculous orders.
In short, they reached the nadir of incompetence and stupidity. The goal, if successful, was to galvanize society around her and perpetuate the illegitimate government:
a just cause in bastard hands.
The conflict - which lasted forty-four days - had two phases: the first from May 1 to 20, in which the enemy formed an air-naval encirclement; the second, terrestrial, from May 21 to June 14. During the first we were subjected to psychophysical exhaustion in the humid and cold trenches.
We began the second aware of our own limitations, and the inability to receive support from the continent, which led to the inevitable land encirclement, psychological dislocation and perfect annihilation.
Despite this,
the British losses were significant:
around 280 dead, 5/6 ships sunk and 8 damaged, 14 planes shot down by the Army's anti-aircraft artillery and 23 helicopters in different circumstances.
The Armed Forces commanders who visited the islands in April and posed for the media were erased when the noise of combat and shrapnel began.
Upon our return, in the Army, generals Galtieri, Nicolaides, Trimarco and Bignone began a humiliating process of demalvinization and did not value those who fought for a feeling. Not so the British, worthy adversaries:
* General Anthony Wilson said:
“There is no doubt that the men who opposed us were tenacious and competent soldiers and that many have died at their posts (…) We have lost many men.”
* General Julián Thompson said:
”The press reports that the officers fled, leaving the conscript soldiers to be massacred or surrender like sheep, are inaccurate. Officers and non-commissioned officers fought hard.”
* General Jeremy Moore:
“I praise the behavior of BIM 5 and the artillery.”
* American sociologist Nora Kinzer Stewart observed:
“Several Argentine units fought with professional efficiency and bravery.”
The renowned Rattembach Report stated:
“It is important to note that there were units that were led with efficiency, courage and decision. In those cases, whether waiting, in combat or during breaks, performance was always high.
Such is the case of the Air Force, the Naval Aviation, the air assets of the three Forces stationed on the islands, the Air Transport Command, the Artillery Groups 3 and 4 of the Army, the Anti-Aircraft Artillery of the three Forces, effectively integrated , the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion, the 10th Armored Squadron, the 601st and 602nd Commando Companies and the 25th Infantry Regiment. As has always happened in critical circumstances,
the behavior of the troops in combat was a direct function of the quality of the controls
.
The greatest experience I gained was:
an essential restructuring in the Army with priority in the educational system and voluntary military service.
War is not a work of God.
The path of peace is always better. All the dead of the Malvinas - Argentine and British - continue to live not only in the island peat and in the southern sea, but also where true humanity maintains its high value. ■