Documentation from the destruction in the city of Aleppo after the attack tonight, March 29, 2024/documentation on social networks according to Article 27 A of the Copyright Law
Iran accuses Israel of assassinating the Lebanese and Syrian commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Reza Zahidi, who was killed in an airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Damascus. His lieutenant and five other members of the Revolutionary Guards were also killed in the attack. Iran claims that Israel damaged a consular structure, and in fact on Iranian sovereign territory, while violating international treaties, and promises that revenge will come. At the end of an emergency meeting of the Supreme National Security Council in Tehran, Leader Khamenei threatened that Israel would regret it, and President Raisi promised that the "crime" it had committed would not go unanswered.
Following the assassination, Iran is also working to increase diplomatic pressure on Israel, and demanded an urgent meeting of the Security Council, which at Russia's request is indeed expected to convene to discuss the attack in Damascus.
The action attributed to Israel is a step up in two aspects: the seniority of the target (the most senior since the assassination of Quds Force commander Soleimani by the US in 2020), and the proximity to the Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus (although apparently not within its borders). And yet, this is not the first time since the outbreak The war in Gaza and the military friction in Lebanon is attributed to Israel for harming members of the Revolutionary Guards, who assist in intelligence, guidance and force-building for the terrorist elements working against it. Thus, for example, in December, Seyed Razi Mousavi, a Quds Force general who had been stationed in Syria for years, was killed in Damascus.
He was well known to Israeli intelligence. The executive who was eliminated Reza Zahidi/documentation in social networks according to Article 27 A of the Copyright Law
Damage to Tehran's property. The results of the attack in Damascus near the Iranian embassy/Reuters
Therefore, the assassination reflects, on the one hand, a serious security-security failure by Iran, which knew full well that the Revolutionary Guards operating in the area have been targeted by Israel since October 7; On the other hand, this is further evidence of the Israeli intelligence's ability to penetrate the depth of the Iranian terrorist enterprise in the region and close a circle on its leaders precisely.
Zahidi is well known to Israeli intelligence. This is a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guards, who has been stationed in Beirut for more than two decades, is close to Nasrallah, and is responsible for the current operational and military relationship with Hezbollah - and in particular for the building of the organization's military power and its strengthening processes, including through the smuggling of ammunition to Lebanon through Syria. The depth of his ties with Hezbollah is illustrated by his A member of the organization's Shura Council.
Although he is a senior, veteran and experienced operative in the system of relations between Iran and Hezbollah, his elimination is not a blow that Iran and Hezbollah will have difficulty recovering from (unlike the vacuum left by the deaths of Imad Mornia and Qassem Soleimani). Even if the freedom of action of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria is temporarily limited And in Lebanon, for fear of further complications, and his operational experience and personal connections will be lacking - it is likely that a worthy replacement will be found for him, and possibly no less talented than him.
Iran's horrendous security failure. The destruction at the scene of the attack in Damascus/Reuters
As in similar events in the past, the American administration was quick to distance itself from the action attributed to Israel. Officials told the American media that the U.S. was not involved in the assassination "in any way", and could not have prevented it. Unlike the U.S. and the U.S. Army's Central Command - which threatened to attack the Revolutionary Guards, which provide the Houthis and the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias with intelligence and weapons - Israel clarifies through operative actions, such as the elimination, that Iran will not be able to arm and activate its agents without being "scratched" and paying a price for its neck-deep involvement in the terrorism used against Israel.
Now, the ball is moving to Tehran's court, which will have a hard time getting on the agenda. The various courses of action she faces are not without dilemmas. One can think of a series of reaction scenarios available to Iran, which is not expected to "act from the gut" and may even choose to combine several ways at once:
Evidence of Israel's ability to penetrate deep into the Iranian terrorist enterprise. The scene of the attack in Damascus/Reuters
A. Measure against measure: attacks on diplomatic compounds around the world
Iran will attack official Israeli targets around the world, such as embassies, senior security officials and Jewish targets. Iran enjoys accessibility and effective terrorist capabilities in its immediate vicinity - in the Gulf or in Central Asia - and this, even though its terrorist network has carried out many foiled attacks in Europe, Asia and Latin America.
It is also possible that Iran will ask for help in Hezbollah's array of overseas attacks, whose terrorist attacks against Israeli missions in Argentina in the 1990s are badly remembered by all of us. A scenario of "measure against measure" is a reasonable possibility, which requires Israel's security system in missions abroad to enter a special standby, and for a long time.
B. A response from the territory of Iran - an attack by the TKK
Iran can launch precision ballistic missiles from its territory at Israeli missions in its vicinity, as it did following the ISIS attack on the Qassem Soleimani memorial last January, when it attacked targets in Pakistan, Syria and Iraq. With a lower probability, it is also possible to fire precision missiles into Israeli territory. An attack from its territory would be an exception to Iran's course of action, which usually strives to avoid direct involvement in conflicts and to use its proxies against Israel and the United States, while maintaining a reasonable ability to deny its involvement. Opening a direct front against Israel may bring Iran into unfamiliar territories, where it may suffer a reaction against facilities on its territory or "draw" an intervention by the US, which is determined to prevent a regional escalation.
third. More (a lot) of the same - increasing the supply of weapons to the arms of the Iranian octopus
Iran will increase the supply of weapons to its proxies in the region - Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Shia militias, which came out to condemn the assassination and threaten Israel - and urge them to increase the scope of attacks and launches against targets inside Israel. It is possible that the attacks will be carried out from several arenas at once, and it is possible that they will also be directed against American targets (as happened in the past in Syria).
Tehran will continue to distribute weapons to them with a generous hand. The funeral of Houthi fighters who were killed in an American attack/Reuters
d. Hizbollah activation - response from Lebanon
Iran will encourage Hezbollah to escalate the military confrontation with Israel. The organization, which is at a large "deficit" with Israel in terms of casualties, strives anyway to carry out as many deadly attacks as possible. Therefore, in order for them to feel the difference, it will be required to step up in terms of the depth and scope of the damage to Israel. In doing so, he may be clearly marked in Lebanon as doing Iran's bidding, and as someone who is ready to degenerate his country into war and destruction for the benefit of foreign Iranian interests. It is doubtful whether Iran would want to put the organization to this test.
It is not certain that Iran will want to put him and his organization to the test. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah/ShutterStock
Grandiose promises of revenge must be fulfilled. Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi/Reuters
God. The red button: nuclear response
In such a scenario, Iran seeks to increase the pressure on the United States so that it restrains Israel, and signals an intention to expand its nuclear program as an "adequate Iranian response" to annihilation.
Bottom line, Iran's need to respond - alongside the public commitment of the regime's senior officials to take revenge on Israel - illustrate the escalation potential inherent in the assassination in Damascus, which Israel probably took into account, assuming that it was the one who carried it out. Any successful attempt to significantly harm the enemy, which is also supposed to create deterrence, can also achieve the opposite effect - of escalation. Israel must prepare, intelligence-wise and operationally, for any The Iranian response alternatives, even if the probability of their occurrence is low. The growing tensions with Iran, and the dynamics of escalation in the northern arena - where for some time more intense fighting has been going on than in Gaza - illustrate that the war is changing and expanding. The focus is shifting from the Gaza Strip to an intensifying confrontation with Iran and its proxies, in the north and east Col.
(res.) Amos Yadlin is the former head of the National Army, president and founder of MIND ISRAEL
Col. (res.) Udi Abenthal is an expert in strategy and policy planning, MIND ISRAEL
More on the same topic:
Gaza war
War of Iron Swords
Iran
Hezbollah
Hassan Nasrallah
Revolutionary Guards
Syria