Jean Lévy is a former student of ENA, diplomat and former French ambassador. He was notably deputy diplomatic advisor to François Mitterrand.
To what extent can we, and must we, tolerate that an allied country, victim of an armed invasion by its powerful neighbor, can sometimes free itself from the principles of the rule of law in name of which we support him in his fight for independence, sovereignty and freedom? After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine experienced a process of privatization more or less similar to that which, in Russia, saw it fall under the control of a small number of oligarchs (often Russian-Ukrainian or Ukrainian- Russians) entire sections of its very rich economy. And the key Ukrainian sectors such as cereals, iron ores and even metallurgy were, from 1992, in turn caught in a movement of generalized predation on the part of “made in Ukraine” oligarchs.
"Oligarchized" by force thanks to post-Soviet chaos, the Ukrainian economy is suffering, thirty years later, from the ultimately predictable ills to which a system dominated by a small number of individuals holding most of the economic power is exposed, financial, media and political - foremost among which corruption undoubtedly represents the greatest challenge. Even before the Russian invasion, 7% of Ukrainians lived below the poverty line, compared to 1% in neighboring Poland; Since the start of the war, 30% of the population has been in urgent humanitarian need; at the same time, the privileged people whom the Ukrainians nicknamed the “battalion of Monaco” – or of Marbella – escaped, through their money and their influence, both the war and its consequences, such as the conscription of men on the front.
If there are real efforts, they are currently clearly insufficient. Ranked 116th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index established annually by Transparency International, Ukraine remains in the second part of the table of the most corrupt states. And unsurprisingly, one of those with one of the largest labor emigrations. Not that President Volodymyr Zelensky did not, at least before the war and in response to the pressing demand of Ukrainian civil society, make de-oligarchization and the fight against corruption his main priorities: a law of 2021 provides for the creation of a register of oligarchs by the Security and Defense Council and another law requires political and administrative decision-makers to make public their declarations of interests and assets; a National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NACP) and a National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) were established; several systemic reforms have been initiated; cases, trials and purges are taking place; etc. Virtuous steps and positive signals sent to the European Union that every observer must welcome.
To prevent the just and necessary fight against corruption from being diverted from its primary objective and being used for political purposes, Ukrainian leaders must, in these difficult times for their country, hear the grievances of their entrepreneurs.
Jean Levy
But the overall picture is not enough. The 2021 law did not resolve everything; the NACP and the NABU face competition from the all-powerful SBU, the Security Service of Ukraine, itself riddled with corruption; tens of thousands of conscripts continue to escape mobilization through bribes. While Ukraine's membership in the European Union is dependent on the country achieving European standards in this area, Ukraine is still struggling to get rid of its Soviet past and the endemic corruption it inherited. from the former USSR. Ukraine is not alone in its situation, including among the States already members of the European Union.
But certain affairs tarnish the image of Ukraine. Revealing, in this regard, is the way in which certain procedures are carried out in Ukraine aimed, paradoxically, at fighting corruption and which sometimes take on the appearance of a “Moscow trial” 2.0. At the start of the year, investment banker Igor Mazepa was detained, arrested while trying to cross the Polish border, as part of an investigation into a real estate project. Without a court order, the offices of his investment fund were searched, as well as the homes of several of his employees - an abuse of power which calls into question the respect, by the Ukrainian judicial authorities and law enforcement, of the rule of law. In the same vein, the metallurgical group Ferrexpo, the world's third largest exporter of iron ore, also suffered the wrath of Ukrainian anti-corruption agencies who attacked its founder and former majority shareholder, the oligarch Kostyantin Zhevago, suspected of leading to the bankruptcy of the UAH bank.
If it is difficult to presume the guilt or innocence of these economic actors, it is the way in which the investigations are carried out which leads to criticism. These two recent cases have in common that they illustrate the excesses of a hunt for oligarchs orchestrated by Kyev in defiance of the law, the rule of law and international rules governing business. At a time when Ukraine desperately needs help from its allies, they undermine the confidence of both its European partners and potential foreign investors who are essential to its reconstruction. Finally, these political-judicial scandals maintain unease among Ukrainian entrepreneurs themselves who, like these forty business leaders, signed a manifesto condemning the arbitrariness of the police and urging the authorities to clean up and calm the business climate in their own country.
It is also appropriate to hear the grievances of Ukrainian entrepreneurs. As demonstrated, unfortunately, by the arbitrariness which seems to have governed the establishment of the list, devoid of formal selection criteria, of "war sponsors" entities drawn up by the NACP, the fight against corruption in Ukraine is and will remain a path paved with pitfalls - first and foremost the corruption which plagues the anti-corruption agencies themselves. To prevent the just and necessary fight against corruption from being diverted from its primary objective and being used for political purposes, Ukrainian leaders must, in these very difficult times for their country, hear the grievances of their entrepreneurs, clarify the criteria governing the tracking down of offenders and the sanctions imposed on them, and exclude certain services, such as the SBU, from the fight against this phenomenon which is not within its remit. In other words, Ukraine will have to win a double war, externally, and that which will consist of strengthening its candidacy for the European Union. Despite its enthusiasm, the European Union very strongly encourages Ukraine to move in the direction of consolidating its efforts, before being able to concretely claim integration as a member state.