The revenge (with political wormwood) of the south of the EU

In

Christ Stood at Eboli

, Carlo Levi describes an eclipse that occurred in the 1930s. With the profound beauty of his style—the maturity of a style that is not trying to seduce, that knows that not everything has to be said, leaving room for the imagination, for reflection, for the reader's dream, who knows that in that space the author and reader dance in the most beautiful way—Levi points to the perception of the peasants of southern Italy, who see in that astronomical episode a disastrous sign, an emblem of a sin “of those for whom everyone pays, innocent together with guilty.”

It makes sense to reread that passage in these days of eclipse and risks. These are days in which southern Europe shows the great progress made since the times of misery in Levi's narrative. Several analysts highlight how the latest economic data compose an unusual picture in which the southern countries of the EU show a better trend than the northern flank of the Union, with more solid GDP growth than that of Germany and other surrounding countries. , and with a positive consolidation of public finances.

There are reasons to be happy about these results, which are substantial, good for these countries and good for the cohesion of the EU, without which the project is in danger. If it doesn't work for everyone, bad business. However, as the IMF pointed out this Friday for the specific case of Spain, in much of the southern flank this economic revenge comes with serious political rot. Let's see.

When a topic has a lot to talk about, read everything that has to be said.

Subscribe here

Starting with Italy, the largest of the group, it is worth noting that the Meloni Government has pursued more pragmatic policies than some thought. The mere instinct of survival indicated, from the beginning, that far-right Rome would not have risked radical policies that would earn it the animosity of Brussels and Frankfurt. The galaxy of the European far-right is not a homogeneous bloc. It does share nationalist and anti-immigration rhetoric and policies, but then there are differences. Meloni is an Atlanticist, Le Pen is suspicious of NATO; French far-rightists can support the inclusion of the right to abortion in the Constitution, something unthinkable for Spaniards; some are pro-tax and welfare state, others ultra-liberal.

Although this performance of Meloni must be recognized, as well as this diversity of approach - the cartography of which is necessary to precisely counteract the ultra wave - the political wormwood that the exercise of power by Meloni's party cannot be overlooked. It represents. These days we are witnessing a shady attempt to pave the way for government propaganda in the public media. We saw efforts to deport immigrants rescued at sea to Albania, or those to prevent homosexual couples from registering their children in the Civil Registry. There was contention; there is no conversion regarding certain retrograde values. You cannot let your guard down in the face of ultra groups, even if they are more pragmatic or have put a cosmetic layer over their discourse.

The second is Spain. Their data—GDP growth, labor market, fiscal path—is clearly good. There are nuances: GDP is partly due to demographic growth;

per capita

income –

like those of Italy and Greece – is still not at the level of 2007 (very far from the OECD average); There is a slowdown in investment and poverty levels higher than before the pandemic. But the path is clearly positive, and only a spurious political intention can deny it.

What is undeniable, however, is the very serious deterioration of the political landscape. The PP – a party which there are strong arguments to maintain is among those with the worst record of corruption in Western Europe in this century – practices a constant policy of delegitimization of the adversary and filibustering obstructionism. Vox appears at the most radical end of the heterodox far-right galaxy. They are mainly responsible for an irresponsible political climate. The other side, of course, is not immaculate. And the PSOE, in particular, is sending discouraging signals, with appointments that seem inspired above all by the criterion of loyalty; with flashes of very polarizing rhetoric; with the emergence of signs of a possible case of corruption that, although not systemic like that of the PP, would be very serious if confirmed in court, and with the decision to maintain power at the price of a measure that, while justified as pacifying in Catalonia is perceived as an outrageous surrender due to self-interest in much of Spain. The first are the promoters of a perverse spiral; the other sometimes seems to feed it instead of stopping it.

Greece, after a long decade of ordeal due to the economic crisis, is beginning to see a path of improvement. Its prime minister, the moderate conservative Kyriakos Mitsotakis, has recently obtained an important revalidation at the polls, and governs without the ultras. Without a doubt, merits can be recognized. It would be advisable, however, not to forget the elements indicated in a resolution of the European Parliament of February that warns of disturbing symptoms regarding the erosion of the independence and pluralism of the media environment, espionage on opponents and journalists, abuses of police force or mistreatment of immigrants and pressure on human rights activists.

In this framework, Portugal stands out. Of course, it also has problems: a shady case that has forced the resignation of former Prime Minister Costa or the rise of the extreme right. But the political climate seems better than in other countries. Among many elements, it can be noted that the new conservative Government has taken on 60 opposition measures in its program.

Pointing out the political problems of the South does not mean that the North is exempt from them. On the contrary, they abound there too. But many of these societies have assets that mitigate their impact: greater prosperity, a greater culture of political dialogue, etc.

In the pages of the eclipse, Levi talks about the gang of little children who surrounded the narrator sent by the fascists to exile in that remote corner of Italy. One of them, Giovanni Fanelli, about eight or ten years old, becomes passionate about painting when he sees the narrator practicing it. He was a shy little boy, who often blushed, attentively observed the art of the exiled intellectual and, out of modesty and humility, did not dare to show him the small works that he had secretly begun to create, despite the great desire he had to do so. Noticed by other children, the narrator saw the works. “They were not the usual children's paintings, nor imitations. They were formless things, not devoid of charm. I don't know if he has become a painter (…): but I certainly never saw in anyone that faith in a revelation that came alone, from work,” writes Levi. Hopefully, in the gloom of the eclipse, the luminous example of that humility, of that unwavering confidence in the effort, of devotion to the path more than to the gang, would prosper.

_