The Spanish team took the lead when they were playing their best, but after Morata's goal their problems increased.
The German team, finding itself out of the World Cup, continued to press the defense.
Balde had poor control, Laporte was inaccurate in the pass and Flick's men recovered the ball in a place that was not excessively dangerous, at least until the Spanish defense became a mess.
As can be seen in the previous images, Füllkrug wins over the two Spaniards, indecisive and ineffective, and after a good play by his teammate Musiala, he ends up scoring the final goal.
The turn of the game can be seen in the following graph: the minutes where Spain generated the most danger appear in red, and those of German danger appear in green.
Spain loses on points
The game was even on occasions, although Luis Enrique's men added fewer dangerous shots.
La Roja tried it with seven shots, to add 0.6 expected goals (by their probability of ending in success), and turned them into a goal.
Germany shot 11 times, added 1.1 expected goals and some effective.
Spain
goals 1
Shots 7 (3 on goal)
0.6xG
expected goals
Germany
goals 1
Shots 11 (4 on goal)
1.1xG
expected goals
Spain
goals 1
Shots 7 (3 on goal)
0.6xG
expected goals
Germany
goals 1
Shots 11 (4 on goal)
1.1xG
expected goals
Spain
Germany
goals 1
Shots 7 (3 on goal)
goals 1
Shots 11 (4 on goal)
0.6xG
1.1xG
expected goals
expected goals
Spain
Germany
goals 1
Shots 7 (3 on goal)
goals 1
Shots 11 (4 on goal)
0.6xG
1.1xG
expected goals
expected goals
Spain turns to the left
The team braided their attack game on the left, from the departure of Laporte, through Jordi Alba, Pedri and even connecting with Dani Olmo.
It is not surprising that Morata's goal came from a play from that side.
The two teams coincided in getting the ball played from behind, almost every time, despite being under intense pressure from the opponent practically every play.
Unai Simón took it to the extreme: he shot on average just 12 meters from his goal, almost always to connect with Laporte, but also playing with the wings, risking mistakes, but surely following Luis Enrique's instructions.
Spain
J. Alba
laporte
Daniel Olmo
Dani Olmo was the most advanced of Luis Enrique's men.
Germany
Raum
musiala
Gundogan
The German midfielders played very compact.
Spain
J. Alba
laporte
Daniel Olmo
Dani Olmo was the most advanced of Luis Enrique's men.
Germany
Raum
musiala
Gundogan
The German midfielders played very compact.
Spain
Germany
Daniel Olmo
musiala
Gundogan
Raum
J. Alba
laporte
Dani Olmo was the most advanced of Luis Enrique's men.
The German midfielders played very compact.
Spain
Germany
Daniel Olmo
musiala
Gundogan
Raum
J. Alba
laporte
Dani Olmo was the most advanced of Luis Enrique's men.
The German midfielders played very compact.
Hyper elm;
final musila
The first graphic shows all the touches of Dani Olmo, who occupied the entire band, projecting himself in attack and also helping in defense.
At the end of the first part he changed his position with Ferran Torres, hence the touches that the Leipzig player gave on the right wing.
The second infographic represents those of Jamal Musiala, a decisive player.
With a similar average position of both players, Musiala's field width is much greater.
Daniel Olmo
Position
half of
Daniel Olmo
Jamal Musiala
Position
half of
Jamal Musiala
Daniel Olmo
Position
half of
Daniel Olmo
Jamal Musiala
Position
half of
Jamal Musiala
Daniel Olmo
Jamal Musiala
Position
half of
Jamal Musiala
Position
half of
Daniel Olmo
Daniel Olmo
Jamal Musiala
Position
half of
Jamal Musiala
Position
half of
Daniel Olmo
Musiala demonstrated his technique with millimeter controls.
He also the tactics in the play of the German goal, in which he undid the defense of La Roja, on the wrong foot after his own mistake in leaving the ball.
His
sprint
from him surprised Rodri, who won the position;
but also to Laporte and Balde, who turned their backs on both him and Füllkrug, who ended up shooting Unai Simón.
sources and glossary
expected goals
The goals that a player or a team should have scored with their shots, adding the probability that each one had of ending in a goal.
The calculation of the statistics takes into account the position of the shot, the type of shot or the position of the goalkeeper.
Momentum of the party
Which team is creating more dangerous situations in each minute.
It is calculated from the recent ball possessions of each team and their probability of ending in a goal.
Controlling the ball has a different value depending on the position: it is not the same danger to retain the ball between your central defenders as it is to take it into the opponent's small area.
Data source: Opta.
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