On June 12, 2021, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, said that the families of the millions who have died from COVID-19
"deserve to know what the origin of this virus, so that we can prevent it from happening again ”
.
In line with this wish, the G7 leaders issued a joint statement the next day calling for
"a phase 2 study into the origins of COVID-19, which is transparent, established within a reasonable period of time, led by experts, on science, convened by the WHO and also carried out, as the experts' report recommends, in China ”
.
To discover
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As scientists and scientific mediators who have called for a full investigation into the origins of the pandemic in three open letters, published this year (# 1, # 2 and # 3), we welcome these statements and ask again a full scientific investigation into all plausible original hypotheses, with unrestricted access to all relevant records, samples and personnel in China, and elsewhere if necessary.
“All people and nations, including China, have a vested interest in the origin of the pandemic being identified and our greatest vulnerabilities addressed.
"
Open letter
All people and nations, including China, have a vested interest in ensuring that the origin of the pandemic is identified and that our greatest vulnerabilities are addressed.
It is therefore particularly regrettable that no comprehensive investigation into all plausible origins has yet been carried out, and none is currently planned.
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For the reasons set out in previous letters, we believe that the joint study process convened by WHO, in its current form, does not qualify to be credible due to serious structural shortcomings
(read below the Annex A)
.
Although the joint study convened by the WHO was described by many as a
“WHO investigation”
, it was neither led by the WHO nor intended to be an investigation.
As Dr Tedros recently clarified:
“There is a misunderstanding.
The
[study] group
came from different institutions and different countries, and it is independent.
Only two WHO staff joined them.
The group then proposed their study. ”
The head of this independent expert committee, Peter Ben Embarek, has also repeatedly explained that the joint study process is neither an investigation, nor designed to be one.
Read also: Covid-19: Does the WHO really have the means to investigate the origin of the virus?
In addition, the notorious measures taken by the Chinese government to cover up the traces and prevent Chinese experts from sharing certain essential information and detailed data, clearly show that the current process, without significant changes, has no possibility of establishing a full and credible investigation of all plausible scenarios.
Failure to fully investigate the origins of a pandemic poses unnecessary risks to everyone and to future generations.
That's why we call on leaders around the world to take a
two-option
approach
to ensure that the origins of a pandemic are as fully investigated as possible.
Option one: invite China to cooperate fully
The
first option
is to call on China to cooperate fully in an improved investigation, convened by the WHO, that is independent, evidence-based, and meets the essential conditions of a credible process.
Such a survey should:
Be based on an explicit mandate to fully investigate all hypotheses
of plausible origin, including all possible scenarios, either from a zoonotic spread (in the wild, on a farm, or in a market), or from a research-related accident. It is important to note that a research-related accident does not necessarily have to involve an unnatural virus, as many research-related accidental infection scenarios are compatible with a virus collected from nature, and not intentionally genetically modified. in a laboratory. These could be researchers infected during a bat sampling expedition, researchers infected during their work in one of the various laboratories in Wuhan, or people outside the laboratories, infected as a result of an accidental leakpathogens due to improper wastewater treatment, failure of an air filter, or other source of environmental contamination
(read appendix B below
);
Be led by a multidisciplinary team of international experts
, bringing together the areas of expertise necessary to examine the pathways of spread of both a zoonosis and a research-related accident, in particular virology, epidemiology, zoology, but also the traditional skills of scientific investigation, experience of laboratory audits, skills in engineering, analysis and data acquisition;
Avoid any conflict of interest or unjustified bias
within the expert team, which may manifest itself in unsupported statements, repeated rejection of hypotheses related to a non-zoonotic origin, or a previous and proven research partnership with parties affected by the investigation;
Provide the team of experts with the means to conduct a full scientific investigation
, which should include full access to all relevant records, samples and personnel, upon request (on condition of anonymity if necessary) and the ability to organize confidential interviews with Chinese experts without Chinese government oversight or control, with the help of freelance translators;
Share raw data
with international experts for further studies, where possible, for constructive feedback and respect for transparency.
“An inflexible deadline of two months after the formulation of these terms should be set for their acceptance by the Chinese authorities and for the start of a full investigation on the ground.
"
Open letter
As these are the most basic conditions for any credible process to be completed, full acceptance of all these terms by the Chinese government should be a necessary precondition for any further phase of the study. joint convened by WHO.
Read also: A year later, the investigation into the origins of the Covid is progressing with difficulty
In order to prevent the negotiation and planning process from spanning several months or even years, an inflexible deadline of two months after the formulation of these terms should be set for their acceptance by the Chinese authorities and for the commencement. a full field investigation in China.
We sincerely hope that, for the sake of mankind, the Chinese government will join such a comprehensive and scientific investigation process as a full partner.
Option two: an alternative science-based investigation
However, if the Chinese authorities did not allow this type of full investigation within this time limit, then it would be obvious that a
second option
should be adopted, in which groups of nations, co-ordinating around a other organization or mechanism, should establish an alternative science and data-based survey.
While the decision on how best to mandate and coordinate such an investigation should be left to interested governments and partners, possible entities could include the OECD, the G7, the Quad (Quadrilateral Dialogue for Security) or others. structures and institutions.
“A lot of very relevant information could be gathered without the participation of the Chinese authorities.
"
Open letter
This type of alternative investigation, which would unfortunately be conducted without the full participation of the Chinese government, would suffer from a lack of access to many important records, samples and personnel in China.
Nevertheless, a great deal of very relevant information could be gathered without the participation of the Chinese authorities.
In fact, many government and individual investigators around the world have already gathered and begun to analyze significant amounts of relevant data.
A well-organized and concerted effort, free of interference, drawing on all available sources of information and involving a large number of experts, may well end up providing unambiguous evidence supporting one particular hypothesis or another concerning the origins of the pandemic.
An investigation conducted without the assistance of Chinese authorities should include:
Careful testing and analysis of
hospital and environmental
samples
from various countries to better understand the initial emergence and early spread of SARS-CoV-2 around the world;
An in-depth assessment
of the livestock and wildlife trade between Southeast Asia and China, and within China, and their potential role in the pandemic;
A detailed analysis of all known coronaviruses related
to SARS-CoV-2 in order to reconstruct the evolutionary history of SARS-CoV-2 (its geography and phylogenetic relationships);
A systematic quantitative assessment of the main characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 in
order to clarify claims regarding its origin;
A general semi-quantitative assessment of the current weight of evidence in favor of each
possible
scenario
, in order to foster rational debate and to help further research efforts on key points;
A systematic search for information and missing documents on key viral sequences
, including:
- The
Wuhan Institute of Virology
(WIV)
main database of
pathogens, samples and isolates, which was taken offline in September 2019 and never reinstated, and the other databases managed by the WIV which have been taken offline;
- Information from the NCBI GenBank Sequence Database, including emails exchanged regarding the submission of the first genomic sequence of SARS-CoV-2 (MN908947.1) by Zhang et al., Made available on Genbank on January 12, 2020;
- Information from the GISAID database, including the viral sequence and metadata associated with the accession number EPI_ISL_402122, which is no longer available on GISAID and which probably corresponds to a patient in the early phase of the COVID epidemic- 19;
Acquisition and review
, in accordance with joint statements in support of a full and transparent investigation by the United States and the European Commission,
of relevant communications, documents and data from the following parties
:
- North American partners of the WIV:
EcoHealth Alliance
, in particular regarding studies in Asia on bats and on the pangolin trade.
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), in particular with regard to their work in China within the framework of the "PREDICT" and "PREDICT-2" projects, and the collection of samples in Asia;
National Institutes of Health
, in particular with regard to projects 1R01AI110964-01 and 2R01AI110964-06 entitled "
Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence
".
- The European partners of the WIV: the European Commission, in particular the documents relating to the funds allocated to the WIV within the framework of Horizon 2020 and EVA-G, including those reserved until the period of 2023, correspondence with the WIV, as well as the interim report of the WIV which was mentioned by the European Commission; French research institutions (Inserm, Institut Pasteur, Fondation Mérieux), concerning the documentation relating to their cooperation established in 2014 with the WIV, as well as the funds that have since been allocated to the WIV;
Inspection of documents
(submitted manuscripts, submitted sequences, cover letters, comments from reviewers and editors, responses from authors)
associated with the peer review process of key scientific articles
, which are listed in Appendix C (see below), and which may allow the recovery of additional data, as well as relevant information;
The creation of a secure program for whistleblowers
to safely share information from China and abroad;
Examination of scientific-legal evidence gathered by intelligence agencies and Open Source Intelligence specialists
, including a detailed mapping of the main research teams, their stated objectives, their work at the time of the epidemic, of their resources, and an assessment of the safety conditions in their laboratories, as well as of any interesting event within or around these laboratories.
“We must not give [the Chinese government] a veto over whether or not the rest of the world conducts as full an investigation as possible.
"
Open letter
The Chinese government needs to be given every opportunity to participate in a comprehensive investigation into the origins of the pandemic, but it should not be given a veto over whether or not the rest of the world is investigating as well. complete as possible.
The two-option process proposed here encourages China to participate in a full, scientific, and data-driven investigation, if it chooses, as other countries have already done with zoonotic outbreaks and laboratory accidents.
However, in the event that, unfortunately, the Chinese government chooses not to join this process, a full investigation into the origins of SARS-CoV-2 will still remain possible, will have realistic chances of success, and will need to be continued for the good. common.
Signatories
:
Parise Adadi
, PhD
Student , Department of Food Sciences, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
Rahul Bahulikar
, PhD, Senior Scientist, BAIF Development and Research Foundation, Pune, India.
Colin D Butler
, Honorary Professor of Population Health, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
Jean-Michel Claverie
, Emeritus Professor of Medicine, virologist, Aix-Marseille University, France.
Fabien Colombo
, PhD student, Communication and sociology of science, MICA, University Bordeaux Montaigne, France.
Virginie Broker
, Evolutionary geneticist, Research director, Jacques Monod Institute, CNRS, Paris, France (co-organizer).
Francisco A. de Ribera
, Industrial engineer, MBA, MSc (Res), Data scientist, Spain.
Yuri Deigin
, Youthereum Genetics Inc, Toronto, Canada.
Gilles Demaneuf
, Engineer and Data Scientist, Auckland, New Zealand (co-organizer).
Richard H. Ebright
, Professor of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, Rutgers University, USA.
Andre Goffine
t, Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Medicine of the University of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium.
François Graner
, biophysicist, research director, CNRS and University of Paris, France.
Jose halloy
, professor of physics, biophysics and sustainable development, University of Paris, France.
Sk Sarif Hassan
, PhD, Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Pingla Thana Mahavidyalaya, West Bengal, India.
Makoto Itoh
, Full Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan.
Bernd Kaina
, Emeritus Professor of Toxicology, University of Mainz, Germany.
Hideki Kakeya
, Associate Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan.
Milton Leitenberg
, Principal Investigator, University of Maryland, USA.
Kenneth Lundstrom
, Ph.D., CEO, PanTherapeutics, Lutry, Switzerland.
Rodolphe de Maistre
, MSc, engineer, MBA, France.
Jamie metzl
, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, United States (co-organizer).
Kazunobu Oyama
, Professor, University of Kanagawa, Japan.
Giorgio Palù
, MD, Professor of Microbiology and Virology, Former Head of European and Italian Society of Virology, Department of Molecular Medicine, University of Padua, Italy.
Steven Quay
, MD, PhD, formerly Assistant Professor, Department of Pathology, Stanford University School of Medicine, USA (
0000-0002-0363-7651
).
Monali C. Rahalkar
, Dr.rer.nat. Scientist D, Agharkar Research Institute, Pune, India.
Rossana Segreto
, PhD, Department of Microbiology, University of Innsbruck, Austria.
Ángel Serrano-Aroca
, professor of biotechnology, Universidad Católica de Valencia San Vicente Mártir, Spain.
Koichi Sumikura
, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan.
Günter Theißen,
Dr. rer.
nat., professor of genetics, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany.
Jacques van Helden
, Professor of bioinformatics, Aix-Marseille University, France.
Roland Wiesendanger
, Dr. phil., Professor of Physics, University of Hamburg, Germany.
Annex A: Gaps in the WHO-China Joint Study Process
The main weaknesses of the joint study process, and the resulting Phase 1 report, are as follows:
The World Health Assembly's mandate called for a joint study of the "zoonotic origin of the virus" rather than a full investigation of all plausible origins, which paved the way for a largely review-oriented process. assumptions about natural origins, with very little effort devoted to a research accident;
The terms of reference (TOR) for this essential process were negotiated behind closed doors between China and WHO, with no known input from Member States other than China, and were not made public until several months after their finalization;
The ToRs granted the Chinese government an effective right of veto over persons likely to participate in the international committee of experts;
The selection process for the international committee of experts was not transparent;
Several members of the international committee had significant conflicts of interest;
No provision has been made to ensure that international experts have access to all relevant files, data and personnel;
Raw data was not provided to the international expert committee, including on request;
No provision has been made to allow Chinese experts to provide confidential information to international experts without fear of reprisals from Chinese government authorities;
Of the 120 pages of the Phase 1 main report, only two paragraphs were devoted to a possible research origin;
The likelihood of each scenario was determined by a show of hands in front of Chinese government officials;
Multiple inconsistencies were noted in Annex D7 of the report and were listed in the supplement to our letter 2.
Appendix B: Three accidental infection scenarios
The hypothesis of a laboratory-related accident includes three accidental infection scenarios which have been detailed in appendix A of our letter n ° 3:
1. A researcher or assistant is infected at a bat sampling site and brings the infection back to Wuhan.
2. A researcher, student or employee is infected in one of the various laboratories in Wuhan known to work on bat coronaviruses, usually at P2 or P3 (laboratory acquired infection - LAI) level. Here are some examples of laboratory-acquired infections: an outbreak of hantavirus in a university in Yunnan (China) in 2003, associated with laboratory rats and lax safety practices (article by Shi Zhengli et al.). SARS-related LAIs in a Singapore P3 and Taiwan P4 in 2003, which were fully investigated by the WHO. Several SARS-related LAIs in a top P3 in China in 2004, with a limited investigation from which the WHO ultimately withdrew. IAL of Brucellosis in Harbin (China) in 2011 due to lax safety practices.
3. A person outside a laboratory is infected with an escaped pathogen, without anyone in the laboratory itself becoming infected - for example due to improper wastewater treatment or air filter failure (a lab leak without LAI).
Examples: respiratory anthrax accident in Sverdlovsk (ex-USSR) in 1979, concealed for many years.
Foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Great Britain in 2007. Brucellosis outbreak in Lanzhou, China, in November 2019.
For the different scenarios concerning the virus (natural or resulting from research), see appendix B of our letter n ° 3.
Appendix C:
a
scientific interest rticles
Here is a list of articles for which documents associated with the peer review process can help to retrieve additional data and information, for example regarding the early sequences of SARS-CoV-2 and related viruses: Andersen et al. 2020, Calisher et al. 2020, Hong Zhou et al. 2020, Lam et al. 2020, Latinne et al. 2020, Li et al. 2020, Liu et al. 2019, Xiao et al. 2020 Xiao et al. 2021, Zhang et al. 2020, Zhang & Holmes 2020, Zhou et al. 2020.
