The strength of Hamas's fighting and Hezbollah's determination to continue fighting in the north raises the question in the Israeli discourse: How did we let this threat develop before our eyes, and why did we not launch a preemptive attack much earlier?
After all, in the first years after the Second Lebanon War, like the beginning of the period of Hamas rule in Gaza, it was probably easier to achieve a decisive and crushing victory over these organizations, and to prevent or significantly delay their growth and strengthening.
And yet, with the required mental calculation, it is appropriate to look honestly at the circumstances that prevented the idea of an Israeli pre-emptive war.
It is easy to place the blame on the hesitancy of the leadership, but it was Israeli society in general that became addicted to peace and prosperity, and that consciously and subconsciously denied the intensification of the threats of war.
Not only did the security system demonstrate overconfidence in its capabilities, but the technological response to the threats of the terrorist armies made it difficult for any Israeli leadership to obtain national agreement to launch a proactive preventive war against Hamas or Hezbollah
The strategic assessment of the situation that prevailed in the last decade presented the security situation of the State of Israel as stable and immune to existential threats.
Thanks to the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, alongside the collapse of the Syrian army in the civil war, the disappearance of the threat of attack by the regular state armies was noted with satisfaction.
According to this reassuring assessment, only terrorist threats remain, so to speak.
They all admitted that they were disturbing, but came back and mentioned that they don't amount to an existential threat.
Here lies a starting point for analyzing the terrible failure of Simchat Torah morning, October 7.
Two false assumptions are intertwined: one is trapped in the underestimation of the military capacity of Hamas and Hezbollah, which over the years have become real armies.
The former Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi was rightly careful to call them "terrorist armies". The second incorrect assumption stems from an archaic definition of the term "existential threat". It is true that Hezbollah and Hamas did not equip themselves with classical military capabilities such as armored units, an air force and a fleet of warships; but similarly to the Houthis In Yemen, they developed new capabilities and creatively expressed the exploitation of the technological opportunities of the 21st century. This is how an innovative strategic threat was built against the State of Israel, cheap, available and largely immune to the superiority of classic armies like the IDF.
The Israeli security paradox
The Israeli security concept has run into a paradox.
On the one hand, it continued to assess the strength of the existential threat according to the standards of the last century, established the perception of the IDF as representing a regional power, and created the illusion of the certainty of Israeli existential security. On the other hand, huge budgets were invested in defending against the capabilities of terrorist armies. Defense systems were developed and an iron dome against the threat of the rockets, and border walls with a lot of sensors were built, which implies that this is nevertheless a strategic threat, many times more powerful than what has been presented up until now as nothing more than "terrorist threats." That is, not only has the security system demonstrated overconfidence in its capabilities, but the tactical response And the technology for the threats of the terrorist armies has made it difficult for any Israeli leadership to obtain national agreement to launch a proactive preventive war against Hamas or Hezbollah.
IDF spokesperson
This paradox was already revealed in Operation Cast Lead at the end of 2008, in the dispute between Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Olmert pushed for a broad operation with the aim of overwhelming Hamas, ending its rule in the Strip and placing a multinational force there. Ehud Barak asked for nothing more than a round of fighting Successful, in the pursuit of a quick end. At least this is how Olmert describes things in his book "In the first person": "We could tattoo the power base of Hamas, undermine and perhaps even crush its rule in the Strip, bring an international force to this bloody region and change the reality in the south for many years.
Inappropriate political considerations led several key figures to form an opposition to the Prime Minister in the Cabinet and the General Staff, and thwart this important move."
Beyond the political considerations that Olmert alludes to, the opposition of Defense Minister Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi can also be explained from a military professional point of view. Apparently, both understood that leading the operation to achieve the Prime Minister's extended goal would involve a long war, which would exact heavy costs. They preferred Limited time reward promotion, which does not go out of control.
The aerial temptation
Even then, in the second year of its rule in the Strip, Hamas had in its hands a combat capability and rocket fire capability in an amount that allowed it to wage a war lasting months, and it even made two notable changes in its fighting pattern.
One was manifested in the transfer of the war to the densely populated urban area, which led to the inevitable result of the IDF hitting civilians, a loss of international legitimacy and the Goldstone report. The second return was manifested in the organization of the force for distributed combat, in a way that deprived the IDF of a quick decision in a classic depth maneuver to centers of gravity.
In these complex conditions of a new type of war, the political decision to use military force became much more complicated and difficult.
Therefore, in the predicament of strategic uncertainty, which involved the decision to start a war, the Israeli leadership tended to be satisfied with the use of air power.
This is the only power she had at her disposal in immediate availability for action.
Also, the decision to activate it necessarily involves leading the people to war.
The planes will take off from their bases, they are there anyway, without the separation events of fathers and sons being sent somewhere and who knows when they will return.
Above all, the important attraction of using air power lies in the fact that it is not seen as an event of no return.
By its very physical nature, the aerial action is conducted under complete control, can be stopped at any given moment and does not involve maneuvers to cut off contact and withdraw.
But over the years, the terrorist armies learned the threats of aerial fire, and steadily adapted an effective defensive response.
They went into action from built-up areas and underground spaces, in the trend of disappearing and hiding which gives them a high survivability.
From this also arose the renewed necessity for the use of ground forces in the friction centers of the fighting.
But in the face of the well-prepared enemy in all dimensions of the city, the defense of the ground force needs support accompanied by aerial fire, a situation that causes destruction and harm to civilians.
This combination proves to be destructive for the international legitimacy that Israel needs in all dimensions of its existence, and under these conditions, a decision to launch a pre-emptive strike became almost impossible.
More than expressing leadership hesitation, the avoidance of a pre-emptive strike is the result of a new, complex and complicated strategic situation.
From this recognition must grow a new Israeli security concept.
And at this time, precisely from the understanding of the difficulty of starting a preemptive war, it becomes clear the magnitude of the necessity of exhausting the war in Gaza until the decision of Hamas and its rule.
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