SPIEGEL: Mr. Siebert, China imprisons millions of Uighurs in camps in Xinjiang according to the "China Cables", VW builds cars there. Why do you decide on such a location?
Siebert: That was not a VW decision. In 2011, Volkswagen wanted to increase the plant's capacity in Shanghai and build another plant in Nanjing. The necessary permits were given to the group only in exchange for the construction of the plant in Xinjiang. VW went into that, although the plant is economically useless there.
SPIEGEL: What do you mean?
Siebert: The site is a Completely Knocked-Down plant where prefabricated parts are merely assembled elsewhere. There is no real production in Xinjiang with a press shop or a paint shop. As a rule, this type of production is worthwhile only if customs duties can be avoided in this way. But there are no customs duties within China. I know of no other case in which a plant is operated within a country in addition to a normal production. Carrying parts of over 3,000 kilometers through the country and then assembling them into cars makes no sense. Since it would be much cheaper to bring finished cars to Xinjiang. Incidentally, the theoretical capacity of the plant of 50,000 pieces per year has never been achieved, as far as I know.
SPIEGEL: Does VW only operate the site to buy the expansion of other locations?
Siebert: That's the way it is. And so absurdly the operation appears at first glance: in the overall balance, 20,000 unprofitable cars with a total of ten million cars produced simply fall below the "other costs".
SPIEGEL: Could Volkswagen simply close the plant in light of the revelations about the internment camps?
Siebert: No. The corporation would be asked by the government to keep the plant. Of course, not public, that would be clarified at the top.
SPIEGEL: Do other automakers in Xinjiang produce as well?
Siebert: No, the other companies were most likely relieved that it did not hit them. However, there is a similar example - at least from an economic point of view: Ford had to go all the way to northern China, to Harbin. This is also completely nonsensical economically, because it is far away from the companies of the suppliers. But without this move, Ford would not have been allowed to build a third plant in Chongqing.
"In every third office sits a party member"
SPIEGEL: Has VW made itself blackmailable with the construction of the plant there and must now be silent, where the allegations are publicized?
Siebert: The decision for the plant in Xinjiang was made in 2011. However, the government's extreme approach in the region has only existed since 2014. At least there is no obvious correlation here. In fact, from the point of view of the government, it was actually a question of economically strengthening the region by bringing the best-known manufacturer there. VW knows everyone in China.
SPIEGEL: So VW was sent there as the most famous manufacturer, while General Motors or Toyota were spared?
Siebert: They were obliged to do other things. For example, General Motors had to found the development company Patac with SAIC and to involve them in the conception of vehicles. The Chinese partner company gained insight into its core business - vehicle development. By contrast, the construction of an unprofitable work is the lesser evil.
SPIEGEL: Why does Volkswagen even cooperate with the Chinese partner company SAIC?
Siebert: Volkswagen went to China in 1983 to build the Santana in a joint venture with SAIC. This model has proven itself. From then on, China made joint ventures with state-owned companies a mandatory requirement for foreign automakers who want to produce in the country. The partner company could not choose either. Some, like SAIC, belong to the respective city government, others, for example Dongfeng, belong to the army. Half of SAIC Volkswagen, the operating company of the plant in Xinjiang, is thus owned by the city government of Shanghai.
SPIEGEL: How big is the influence of the Communist Party on the auto industry?
Siebert: The state is always involved, there are party cells in all companies. In every third or fifth office, depending on the company, someone who has no qualifications, except that he is a member of the Communist Party and speaks the language of the foreign partner, understands what the bosses say. The Communist Party always decides on SAIC Volkswagen.
SPIEGEL: Do all manufacturers cooperate equally strongly with the state?
Siebert: That depends on the Chinese partner companies. In northern China, the party tends to be more present. This can be seen in Toyota, whose partner Guangzhou Auto comes from the south of China and stands out from almost everything. That VW cooperates more with the state is also historically conditioned. SAIC Volkswagen has always been the flagship company and is therefore particularly in the focus of the central government. In the future, the compulsion to partner is to be dissolved. At VW but the state probably will not give up its influence. These are not only economic but also political entities.
SPIEGEL: According to information from the "Süddeutsche Zeitung", SAIC Volkswagen is working with the armed people's police in Xinjiang to train and train new factory employees in "patriotic education". Is this normal for automakers in China?
Siebert: No, it is not. I also do not know if the processes are transparent for local German employees. I myself have not spoken to any VW employee who has ever been there. One way or another, VW has a problem: The plant was built to some extent under duress, but can not publicly explain this case and hardly do anything. Because you can not work against the Communist Party in China.
more on the subject
SPIEGEL: So are all car manufacturers in China loyal to the line?
Siebert: Yes, because that is by far the most important market worldwide. In China, 22 million cars are sold, in Germany about three million, in the US about 17 million. As a manufacturer they have to be successful in China. The Communist Party knows this and secures influence in key sectors. These are virtually all from the perspective of the state.
SPIEGEL: And the Chinese business is so important that VW has to accept the damage to its image in the rest of the world?
Siebert: VW sells from four million vehicles worldwide four million in China, including many high-margin cars in full equipment. This makes China the most profitable market ever, even for BMW and Daimler. VW has just had the misfortune to be condemned to the construction of the plant in Xinjiang. At that time the situation was already borderline, but far from the present conditions. Today, Volkswagen would certainly not accept this and propose another solution.