The election of Hong Kong's chief executive, which was postponed due to the epidemic, officially entered the election cycle after Carrie Lam announced that she would not seek re-election. Whether it was the popularity of public opinion, or the imagination and expectations of all parties for the second half of the "One Country, Two Systems" policy, they all overcame the urgent epidemic.
Extending the time line, from the turmoil of amendments in 2019 to today, it is difficult for people to imagine a series of large and small events in Hong Kong. It is even more difficult to predict in the time cycle from the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China to the time of Hong Kong's return to the present.
What happened to Hong Kong?
Where is Hong Kong going?
This is a proposition that many people who are concerned about the fate of Hong Kong are always thinking about.
As the future leader of Hong Kong, facing the turbulent internal and external changes, the new Chief Executive is particularly critical.
When Lam Cheng announced that he would not seek re-election, and Chief Secretary Li Jiachao resigned in preparation for the election of Chief Executive, "Hong Kong 01" hereby interviewed Tian Feilong, associate professor of the Law School of Beihang University and director of the National Hong Kong and Macau Research Association.
The election of the chief executive, which was postponed due to the epidemic, officially entered the election cycle as the chief executive, Carrie Lam, announced that he would not seek re-election, and the chief secretary for administration, Li Jiachao, resigned to prepare for the election.
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Hong Kong 01: With Carrie Lam's announcement that she will not seek re-election, Hong Kong has officially entered the first chief executive election cycle under the new electoral system.
Before the outbreak of the fifth wave of the epidemic, many people were still optimistic about Carrie Lam, believing that she was very likely to be re-elected.
But according to Lam's own words, his "will not to seek re-election was actually expressed to the central government as early as last year, in early 2021, and it has been understood and respected by the central government."
How would you rate Carrie Lam's performance over the past five years?
In particular, Lam Cheng's tenure ran through all kinds of major events in Hong Kong, which is what you call "three years of Hong Kong reform". Compared with the previous Hong Kong chief executives, how much score can Lam Cheng score?
Tian Feilong:
"Three years of Hong Kong change" exceeded everyone's expectations, including the central government.
From the perspective of minimum cost and minimum governance risk, the policy line that the central government has implemented for a long time since Hong Kong's return is to respect and even allow Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, and to exercise a high degree of restraint on its own power.
Such an indirect governance model is the least cost to the central government and the least friction with the West.
However, such a governance model has a premise that the SAR government can achieve good governance, be able to handle most things, maintain Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, and safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests.
The illegal occupation of Central China in 2014 was the first time that the SAR government's governance capacity was severely challenged, but it basically stood firm.
The turmoil over the amendments in 2019, the riots in Hong Kong, the loopholes in the governance capacity of the SAR government have been completely exposed, and the authority of national security and the rule of law has been reduced to an extremely dangerous situation.
The center is forced to assume the role of the basic legislator and the ultimate responsible person.
As a result, the top-down "Hong Kong National Security Law" and the new election law were born.
Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor performed her duties and assumed responsibility in such a structural conflict, and faced what she self-identified as "the greatest challenge since entering politics".
Carrie Lam's five-year term was barely satisfactory overall.
I think she, as a representative of the elite civil servants who have been trained and grown under the tradition of the Hong Kong British system, can be professional and effective in understanding and coping with ordinary governance tasks within the system, but when encountering major social movements or external interventions beyond the scope of the system Lack of the necessary knowledge and experience to deal with it.
This is not her personal limitation, but the limitation of the entire Hong Kong civil service.
In addition, the SAR government under her leadership is in a difficult governance situation both at home and abroad. I call it the "Four Mountains", namely, the malicious pull of the Legislative Council, the conservative resistance of the civil service, the active restraint of the judicial system, and the radical pressure of social movements. Coupled with the numerous obstructions from external forces and their proxy networks, as well as the internal pressure from vested interest groups in Hong Kong, if we want to stand up to protect our national interests, we must carry out radical reforms, rewrite the pattern of interests, and establish a new style of governance.
I think she has carefully planned, pushed forward, and reviewed in depth, but throughout the governance period, she has not really broken the situation and established a new governance line, and has failed to become a company that is highly compatible with the "patriots ruling Hong Kong" in the new era. Being the chief executive is the result of the combined effect of subjective and objective factors.
From the perspective of maintaining the security of the "One Country, Two Systems" system with a five-year term, undertaking the tasks assigned by the central government and cooperating with the transformation of the Hong Kong governance line, there are reasons for Lam's performance to be affirmed: first, in the riots of the whole society in the 2019 amendment scandal , she has always been consistent with the basic position of the central government, assumed front-line governance responsibilities, and performed basic governance duties in "stopping violence and chaos", including the formulation of the "Anti-Mask Law", which has withstood severe political tests; secondly In the process of formulating the "Hong Kong National Security Law" and revising the new election law, she was able to understand and implement the central government's governance intentions and institutional plans, and made Hong Kong's local institutional cooperation to gradually restore the rule of law and order and an orderly democratic ecology in Hong Kong. Thirdly, the 2021 Policy Address proposes an unprecedented strategic plan for the "Northern Metropolitan Area", which will implement specific policies and blueprints for integrated development, and actively plan for the future of Hong Kong. This is a governance thinking revolution worthy of high recognition. .
Of course, as the chief executive of Hong Kong's local training and growth, she also has a series of deficiencies in knowledge structure, political will, execution, solidarity, indecision in major events, missed opportunities, and failure to advance or retreat. Accumulation and confrontation become the focus and venting point.
The failure of the fifth wave of epidemic prevention and control once again exposed the above shortcomings.
But anyone who is in the position, the temperature changes suddenly, and it is difficult to talk to others, he must grit his teeth and persevere.
Based on the overall performance in all aspects, I am still willing to give her a passing score.
She is the "Crisis Chief Executive" and "Transformation Chief Executive" of the "One Country, Two Systems" transition from the first half to the second half. She has no significant progress, but has basic protection.
Tian Feilong believes that Carrie Lam is the "Crisis Chief Executive" and "Transformation Chief Executive" who transitioned from the first half to the second half of the "one country, two systems" principle.
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Hong Kong 01: It was the current Chief Secretary for Administration of Hong Kong, Li Jiachao, who entered the field of public opinion almost at the same time as Carrie Lam did not seek re-election.
According to the exclusive information we received, on Wednesday (April 6), the Liaison Office met with the election committee to convey the latest instructions of the Chief Executive. The meeting revealed that Li Jiachao would announce his resignation on the same day (which has been confirmed). After the approval and dismissal of the State Council, the official Announcing his candidacy, and Chief Secretary for Administration Li Jiachao is the only candidate to support it, calling on the election committee to support it.
What do you think of Li Jiachao as the only candidate for Beijing's chief executive?
Many voices believe that if Li Jiachao becomes the new chief executive, it means that Hong Kong has entered the era of "hard chief executive", and national security is paramount.
Tian Feilong:
Actually, there are two "hard core" principles in the rational elements of "One Country, Two Systems", which are basically consistent with the principles of governance in the Mainland: First, stability prevails; second, development is the last word.
Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy means that the central government is not worried about Hong Kong's instability in the system design, but that Hong Kong cannot maintain development.
The central government once highly trusted the advanced nature of the Hong Kong system and the effectiveness of governance, but the governance practices of the past decade have proved that the Hong Kong system has serious structural flaws. The system owes too much in terms of national security and election security, and finally accumulated into 2019 The chaos of revisions of the year.
After 2019, "security governance" has become the most important theme of Hong Kong governance. The "Hong Kong National Security Law" and the new election law originated from this, and the social transformation of Hong Kong under "patriots ruling Hong Kong" and "integrated development" The reconstruction of "one country, two systems" is the leading governance project in the second half.
The central government has learned from the painful revision of the bill and based on the overall national strategy, and believes that without a safe Hong Kong, there will be no development of Hong Kong and better reform and opening up of the country.
It is not surprising that Li Jiachao became the official candidate, which is closely related to the security governance idea of "Three Years of Hong Kong Change".
However, security governance does not end with the institutional completion of the "Hong Kong National Security Law" and the new election law. On the contrary, the security rule of law in Hong Kong society and the reconstruction of the social and political foundation of "patriots ruling Hong Kong" have just begun. .
At the same time, in the turmoil of the amendment bill in 2019, the Hong Kong police force and the entire disciplined forces system are the most loyal and reliable governance force. Other branch systems, including the Legislative Council, civil servants, and the judicial system, all have serious "loyalty deficits", while Li Jiachao Is an outstanding political representative of the disciplined forces.
In terms of this year's governance tasks and Hong Kong's future risks and challenges, there are still many issues related to security governance that need to be undertaken: first, the local legislation of 23 articles forms a strict legal network with the "Hong Kong National Security Law"; second, Anti-foreign interference and illegal sanctions require corresponding system construction and legal actions by the Chief Executive and the SAR government; thirdly, integrating into the overall development of the country requires a more loyal and executive chief executive and his governance team; fourth, national education and The reconstruction of the social and political foundation of "patriots ruling Hong Kong" requires a more loyal chief executive to firmly implement it; fifthly, to resolve the deep-seated social conflicts in Hong Kong, solve the economic and people's livelihood, especially the housing justice issue, and draw a clear line with foreign forces, disciplined forces Political representatives from one's background can be more detached and more fighting spirit, and will not follow the line of two-faced factions.
The Li family is beyond the line. Compared with the previous chief executives, it can indeed be said to be a "hard chief executive", but it does not mean that national security is overriding everything.
For Hong Kong under "One Country, Two Systems", the purpose of security governance is to promote united and effective development.
An unsafe Hong Kong is a threat to the country, but an undeveloped Hong Kong is of no benefit to the country.
Therefore, Li Jiachao's mission is, of course, first and foremost, safety, but the direction is still development. In particular, Hong Kong should continue to play its role as an international financial center to serve the country's high-level reform and opening up and the development of the high-end service industry in the Greater Bay Area, while promoting the effectiveness of Hong Kong's own economic structure. Transformation and benefits across all classes.
Moreover, he will most likely continue to push forward the strategic plan for the reform of the Hong Kong SAR government and the "Northern Metropolitan Region".
The "National 14th Five-Year Plan" has a strong role for Hong Kong. Anyone who is a special capital must take this as an important task and hand over a qualified report card.
Therefore, the "hard chief executive" must also have "soft governance" and "great development" in order to meet the common expectations of the central government and Hong Kong society.
Lee Ka-chao resigned as Chief Secretary for Administration in preparation for the election of Chief Executive.
(Photo by Zheng Zifeng)
Hong Kong 01: Regarding Li Jiachao, Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor has publicly described that he is "less involved" in poverty alleviation, youth, and ethnic minorities, while Li Jiachao, as a "attorney", served in the police force for a long time before becoming Chief Secretary for Administration in 2021. In 2017 In 2018, he was promoted to Secretary of the Security Bureau. In 2018, he led a delegation to Xinjiang to inspect counter-terrorism facilities, and said that Xinjiang's counter-terrorism experience is worthy of reference for Hong Kong.
After the turmoil of Hong Kong's amendments to the law broke out in 2019, Li Jiachao also showed a tough stance, repeatedly made "supporting the police" remarks, and repeatedly stated that Hong Kong had "raised the alarm on terrorist activities" and asked the police to prepare and review counter-terrorism contingency plans. .
Can such "attorneys" be up to the task of reforming Hong Kong in the new stage?
Can it lead Hong Kong from chaos to governance, from governance to prosperity?
Does it meet the requirements of the "five good" and "five have" requirements of the Hong Kong government by Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office?
Tian Feilong:
The reform task of Hong Kong in the new stage is to continue to deepen security governance, focus on solving economic and people's livelihood problems, and pioneeringly promote integrated development.
Security governance provides the premise and foundation for all other reforms. Only with "stability" can there be "prosperity." In this sense, Li Jiachao has a comparative advantage.
In addition, Li Jiachao's understanding and recognition of the rule of law based on his leadership positions and work experience in the disciplined forces, as well as his learning of the national system and experience, may be more in-depth than those of ordinary civil servants.
Comparing and evaluating Li Jiachao with other chief executives or other candidates as "civilian" and "attached officer" may seem unfair, but it may be a continuation of the inherent cultural and psychological habits of Hong Kong society.
The mainland has experienced the "Military Control Commission" period since the founding of the People's Republic of China. The status and role of soldiers in the governance system is prominent, and the people's police system transformed from the army also has a historical aura and authority that goes beyond the institutional mandate itself.
However, Hong Kong is a society ruled by law and an elite professional society. The military and police are regarded as ordinary executive departments under the rule of law system, and not the department with the most prominent professional ability. They are in the middle level in terms of social status. , violent identity and other factors, and are degraded by the society to a certain extent.
This makes the status of "attorney" a disadvantage in politics.
I think this is a matter of social cognition and habits, and it does not mean that "attorneys" cannot take on the task of governing Hong Kong well.
Moreover, the governance performance of the SAR government is the comprehensive performance of the team including the chief executive. The chief executive does not necessarily need to be comprehensive in his personal abilities, but he needs to have the key ability to select and employ people, make decisive decisions and implement them effectively. Effective implementation, the overall governance efficiency will be greatly improved.
Regarding the "five good" and "five have" requirements put forward by Director Xia Baolong, it is a general and overall requirement for "virtuous patriots", not specifically for the Chief Executive.
As for whether the new chief executive in the future will meet the corresponding high standards and high requirements, it is too early to draw conclusions. It is necessary to observe words and deeds, give time for performance, and make objective judgments based on specific facts.
Hong Kong 01: Regarding the election of the chief executive, you mentioned in the article "New Chief Executive and New Hong Kong: Openness in the Second Half" that as the chief executive of Hong Kong under the constitutional order of "One Country, Two Systems", he has an "executive-led" constitution. It is not easy to be a person and do things because it is subject to multiple structural pressures from inside and outside Hong Kong, and is constrained by the traditions of the Hong Kong-British system and the network of interests.
Judging from several chief executives since the handover, there have been business leaders, elite civil servants, and professionals, but it cannot be said that "executive leadership" has really been established in governance, nor can it be said that "patriots ruling Hong Kong" are worthy of the name .
Otherwise, where would the black riots come from?
Where did the epidemic chaos come from?
In fact, the chief executive of Hong Kong after the chaos of the black riots and the epidemic is particularly critical to the next internal and external changes in Hong Kong.
Why hasn't "executive leadership" been truly established in governance over the past 25 years?
Didn't it make the "patriots ruling Hong Kong" mentioned by Deng Xiaoping live up to its name?
Next, can it really be established?
Can it live up to its name?
What are the biggest variables and resistances?
How can we avoid "loyal waste"?
Tian Feilong:
The chaos of the black riots is the chaos of Hong Kong society and the overall governance, and the chaos of the epidemic is mainly the chaos of the civil servants' "A0 Party" (administrative officers, administrative officials). Naked challenge or even denial.
"Executive leadership" is an institutional requirement, not a political reality.
Since the return of Hong Kong, every chief executive has basically failed to achieve the "executive leadership" that meets the expectations of the system. The main reason is that Hong Kong's governance system and social foundation cannot support this system well.
From the point of view of the governance system, the anti-China chaotic forces have infiltrated and controlled relevant positions and policies in large numbers, resulting in the inability of the SAR government to manage effectively.
From a social basis, the opposition through election campaign mobilization and cultural hijacking has caused serious distrust and resistance of the Hong Kong society to the government, and structurally weakened the SAR government's leading and executive capabilities.
The "four mountains" that I have repeatedly mentioned are the Rabbling of the Legislative Council, the boycott of the civil service, the pressure of judicial review, and the attack by social movements. Since the return of the People's Republic of China, they have alternated and formed a political effect of "encircling the government." The lack of executive leadership Hands, authority, and counter-strength, passively give in everywhere, and finally bear the turmoil of amendments and expose the extreme constitutional risk of governance failure.
The fate of "patriots ruling Hong Kong" is similar to that of "executive-led", and both are regarded by the Hong Kong opposition as a discourse symbol and institutional gripper for the central government to control Hong Kong.
Different from the visible and trapped "executive-led", "patriots ruling Hong Kong" is even invisible and floating. It has long existed in the Hong Kong governance system as a verbal symbol rather than a specific and clear political and legal standard.
As long as it is profitable, it can be "salty and patriotic".
However, those who rely on slogans to enter the patriot camp have neither loyalty nor virtuous qualities in key political struggles, and even have serious "duplicity" tendencies and dangers.
In the 2016 Legislative Council election, the oath of independence for Hong Kong was turbulent. The National People's Congress interpreted the law to focus on the oath clause (Article 104) of the Basic Law. Only then did the "patriots ruling Hong Kong" have a preliminary legal standard. The electoral law makes "patriots ruling Hong Kong" a clearer legalization, and a full-time institutional qualification review committee has been set up for legal review.
In the second half of "One Country, Two Systems", to achieve "executive leadership" that truly meets the requirements of the Basic Law and to truly "patriots ruling Hong Kong", institutional conditions are only the first step, and the building of a social and political foundation is crucial.
As far as the governance system is concerned, it is necessary to vigorously cultivate political talents, cultivate a national vision and a strategic vision, and truly understand and apply "one country, two systems" to deal with problems.
As far as the education system is concerned, it is necessary to truly implement national education, establish a patriotic identity at the source and the dominance of patriotism in the social and cultural space.
As far as the chief executive and the governance team are concerned, it is necessary to reshape the governance culture and the supervision and accountability mechanism according to the legalized "patriot" standard and the governance requirements of worthy patriots, and carry out a reborn system reform and capacity building. The bad habits of "loyal waste".
The protracted turmoil over amendments that broke out in 2019 has completely changed the political situation in Hong Kong.
(AP)
Hong Kong 01: We know that this year marks the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China, and it is also a mid-term moment when the "one country, two systems" promised by Deng Xiaoping will remain unchanged for 50 years.
With Hong Kong ushering in a new chief executive, people also have high hopes for whether Hong Kong can turn a new page.
Can you briefly talk about your summary of the practice of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong over the past 25 years, and your hopes for a "New Hong Kong"?
For the new Chief Executive, what is the top priority besides preventing and controlling the epidemic?
What is the biggest challenge you face?
Tian Feilong:
"One country, two systems" is an institutional experiment in the modernization and internationalization of a country, and its cycle is "fifty years".
The real meaning of "fifty years unchanged" is not that all specific institutional contents or rules remain unchanged, but the basic constitutional order and orientation of this experiment remain unchanged.
Over the past 25 years, Hong Kong's "One Country, Two Systems" has had its own advantages and disadvantages.
The 2014 white paper "The Practice of "One Country, Two Systems" in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" made a comprehensive summary of the 17 years since the return of the People's Republic of China, and put forward the key proposition of "comprehensive governance." Where, it is necessary to carry out legal correction and system supplementary lessons.
The 2021 White Paper on "Democratic Development of Hong Kong under "One Country, Two Systems" further examines the advantages and disadvantages of Hong Kong's "One Country, Two Systems" experience from the perspective of democratic development.
In the past 25 years, Hong Kong's system has been well maintained, and its prosperity and stability have been basically guaranteed. However, the authority of the national system has not been well established, the project of returning people's hearts has not been well completed, and the social consensus on integration and development and the connection of specific policies have not been successfully realized. There are serious risks and loopholes in the security of the "one country, two systems" system.
These "remaining issues" had to be left to the second half to undertake and solve.
The new Hong Kong needs to restructure the institutional system of "one country, two systems" with "one country" as the focus, reconstruct Hong Kong's economic structure and industrial system with the guidance of "integration", reconstruct the local system and policy system with security and development as the core values, and focus on people's livelihood. and social justice as the focus to reconstruct the government responsibility and governance accountability system.
The new Hong Kong must fully and effectively implement "patriots ruling Hong Kong" in governance, guide patriotic recognition and integration into the overall national development in social solidarity and social construction, and highlight the importance of advancing and retreating with the country in terms of its international status and global role. Firmness, calmness and wisdom.
This is another unprecedented historical opportunity and challenge for Hong Kong society.
For the new chief executive, epidemic prevention and control is a top priority, which tests the ability of comprehensive governance and compliance with the high standards of "patriotic governance of Hong Kong".
I have pointed out many times that Hong Kong's fight against the epidemic is a key test for "patriots ruling Hong Kong".
In addition, Hong Kong also faces a series of deep-seated issues and tasks that need to be addressed:
First, Article 23 of the Basic Law is enacted to complete the local weaving task of the National Security Law Network, which is also the implementation responsibility of the Basic Law; Hong Kong's legitimate rights and interests in development; thirdly, the substantive initiation of the "Northern Metropolitan Region" and the structural advancement of integrated development; Give a qualified answer sheet; Fifth, the policy of economic and people's livelihood will break through the barrier, effectively solve the social justice problem of housing and youth development, heal social scars, and promote social reconciliation and solidarity.
There are urgent tasks as well as structural and medium-to-long-term problems. These are the problems left over from the first half of the "One Country, Two Systems" policy in Hong Kong. We must sort out and formulate policies and plans one by one, and implement them effectively, so as to reflect the new order, new capabilities and new results.
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