Elisabeth Borne will speak this Wednesday, July 5 before the National Assembly and then the Senate as part of her general policy statement.
But the outcome of this speech remains uncertain.
Vote of confidence, motion of censure or simple debate, the options open by the Constitution are diverse and so are the political issues.
The vote of confidence
This is the great uncertainty that hovers around the declaration of Elisabeth Borne: will the head of government submit her newly formed troops to a vote of confidence?
Set out in Article 49 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, this procedure consists of the Prime Minister committing “
before the National Assembly the responsibility of the government on its program or possibly on a declaration of general policy
”.
Concretely, if it wishes, a simple majority of deputies can therefore notify its lack of confidence in the government and force it to overthrow.
Read alsoDid seven prime ministers refuse to submit to a vote of confidence under the Fifth Republic?
If Elisabeth Borne dithers on this option, the opposition insists.
“
The Prime Minister must submit to a vote of confidence
”, jointly hammer Adrien Quatennens and Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
But the operation proves to be risky for the government, whose party does not have an absolute majority within the hemicycle.
Read alsoThe Republicans settle in opposition to Macron
Moreover, this procedure is quite traditional under the Fifth Republic but is not compulsory.
In their time Édith Cresson like Pierre Bérégovoy did without it, for example.
"
Most governments benefited from an absolute majority under the Fifth Republic and were able to trigger this vote of confidence without too much concern
", observes the constitutionalist Benjamin Morel.
"
But article 49 paragraph 1 was drafted in order to allow the most fragile majorities to survive, this is the case of Elisabeth Borne
", he continues.
The motion of censure
If Elisabeth Borne decides not to submit her government to a vote of confidence, the opposition still has the possibility of a motion of censure.
The Nupes has already announced that it will file one on July 5.
Paragraph 2 of article 49 of the Constitution indeed provides that the deputies can, of themselves, put “
into question the responsibility of the government
”.
Its tabling first requires the signature of one tenth of the members of the National Assembly, that is to say 58 deputies.
If this condition is met, a debate is then fixed two days later, at the end of which the deputies vote in favor or against the government.
The motion of censure must obtain 289 votes, i.e. an absolute majority, to force the Prime Minister to resign.
Read alsoSylvain Waserman: “National Assembly, why the return of obstruction is possible”
But this procedure, often acclaimed by the opposition, is a priori less dangerous for the majority, even weakened.
“
No-confidence motions often represent a targeted political current that prevents the rallying of opposition from other parties
,” observes Benjamin Morel.
“
The arguments used by the Nupes will perhaps not be shared by the deputies of the National Rally, who may refuse to vote for this motion
”, he continues, specifying that it is rather customary to see “
motions of censure in dispersed order than a consensual motion
".
It is therefore more of a symbolic procedure for expressing one's opposition rather than a real tool of constraint.
Moreover, in the history of the Fifth Republic, only a motion of censure succeeded.
In 1962, the government found itself in the minority while the rights were fractured over the situation in Algeria and the parliamentary majority was torn apart over the issue of direct universal suffrage.
Article 50-1 of the Constitution
Another possibility after the speech of Elisabeth Borne: the organization of a vote which would not engage the responsibility of the government.
A path made possible by article 50-1 of the Constitution, but unlikely.
Because if this procedure seems a priori harmless for the executive, it can also harm its credibility.
"
In the event that the vote turns out to be unfavorable to the government's policy, the latter would not be forced to be overthrown, of course, but it would find itself in a comical situation where it would still be in office while a majority of parliamentarians contests it
”, analyzes Benjamin Morel.
Read alsoA strong renewal in key positions in the Assembly
According to the constitutionalist, “
from the point of view of political communication
”, the Prime Minister therefore has little interest in using this route.
On the other hand, it may be beneficial for him to make the motion of censure a "
default weapon
": "
it is the least bad of the solutions: if it does not trigger a vote of confidence but the motion of censure fails, it will otherwise obtain a form of legitimacy
,” concludes the specialist.
