Samantha Gross: "The embargo on Russian oil has worked surprisingly well"

He is one of the most heard voices in the US energy sector.

With a long history of more than 25 years linked to energy, Samantha Gross (Ilinois, 52 years old), today a researcher at the Brookings Institution, has held relevant positions at the US Department of Energy and at the specialized consulting firm IHS Cera. .

She receives EL PAÍS in Madrid shortly after landing from Florence, where she has given a conference —of course— on energy.

A day later she will do the same in another meeting sponsored by EsadeGeo.

Ask.

The European energy crisis is being less intense than feared.

Answer.

Europe has done a great job, buying liquefied natural gas (LNG, which arrives by ship) in all possible corners: above all from the United States, yes, but not only.

In addition, although in less quantity, some gas has continued to arrive from Russia.

That makes me more worried about next winter than this one.

Q.

If you had to make a forecast, what would it be?

A.

It largely depends on how much you can fill the tanks during the low season [spring and summer].

The new floating regasification plants in Germany, the country that had it the worst, make me optimistic.

But for the stars to align again next winter, you have to have your reserves as full as possible, you have to change fuel in all areas where possible... And you have to cross your fingers so that, as this, the weather accompanies.

Q.

LNG is being the great lifeline, but the competition to get hold of methane tankers is going to be fierce.

R.

There are many countries that are already highly dependent on it or will be in the future.

China, Japan and South Korea are the three largest current markets.

But what about India?

Will it pull from natural gas to shake off its reliance on coal?

Or what about Indonesia, which also uses a lot of coal and is working to reduce it... It will be interesting to see to what extent LNG is able to cover all those needs, and also to what extent renewables can cover a part of them.

In the best of scenarios, these grow fast and the gas only has to be used to maintain the equilibrium of the system.

But there are other scenarios where you have to use a lot of natural gas.

Q.

There is much talk about the need for new regasification plants and little about liquefaction trains so that producing countries can increase the amount of gas they export.

A.

It will take time.

The US is selling all the molecules it can, not out of altruism but because it makes economic sense.

But no new export infrastructure is planned this year: there are quite a few scheduled for 2024, yes, but the main bottleneck is that they can't be built as fast as they would need to be.

Q.

How much does this game of balances change the reopening of the Chinese economy?

R.

It is another of the reasons why I am worried about the next winter.

There has been plenty of LNG available to meet European needs, but if the Chinese economy gets back on its feet and its demand for gas grows, the only way to balance the market will be price.

Q.

Will it go up?

A.

It is probable.

Trying to predict it is always a bit far-fetched, but it should come as no surprise that this is the case.

Q.

The markets, on the other hand, remain lethargic: in Europe, gas costs less today than it did a year ago, just before the start of the war.

And six times less than when it marked its maximum, last summer.

A.

Because the TTF [the benchmark in the EU] only reacts to what is happening right now: that this winter is being quite comfortable, that the reserves are still quite full... We will have to see what happens next autumn: then it will be known how the filling of the tanks in summer has gone and at what cost.

Q.

There is a growing temptation to think that the energy crisis is history.

A.

It would be a mistake.

There's nothing wrong with taking a breather, but let's not be surprised when [the crisis] returns.

Not a rude awakening.

Do not be tempted to stop thinking about additional sources of energy or stop working on conservation, saving gas and everything else that can be done.

Because this is not over: there is still a great battle to be fought next winter.

A new LNG regasification terminal in Wilhelmshaven, Germany.Reuters

Q.

Last Sunday the European ban on Russian diesel came into force.

How much should we worry?

A.

To a large extent, it will depend on [Vladimir] Putin's reaction.

The embargo on crude oil from Russia has worked surprisingly well: the markets have not skyrocketed and it has been arguably a success.

But while the oil market is well supplied, the diesel market is much more stressed: it is a much more difficult puzzle, and that makes Putin more influential.

Q.

Where will the diesel that, until now, Russia sold to the EU go?

R.

It does not have an obvious destination.

There aren't enough tankers to transport it, so I'm not sure what they'll do with it.

It is likely that they will have to reduce the production rate of their refineries.

We will see soon.

Q.

The energy trilemma (security of supply, access and sustainable generation) has changed: until recently little attention was paid to security of supply and now it is the main concern.

A.

Not only did it never go away completely, but now it is more obvious than ever.

80% of the global energy supply continues to depend on fossil fuels, and that is something that is not going to change quickly: we want to leave this resource behind but, at the same time, we must ensure the world's supply of energy.

Ideally, this energy crisis should lead us to a more thoughtful, more realistic transition.

Q.

What will be the deepest transformation that this episode will leave in the way we understand energy?

R.

The crisis has made it very clear that fossil fuels are not dead, that they cannot leave [the energy matrix] immediately.

If there had been a chance, however minimal, for Europe to stop consuming gas in the very short term, it would have done so.

But it will take time.

Understanding this should help in planning.

The really important thing is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and make it possible without the economy collapsing.

Q.

The international energy markets, especially the oil market, have fragmented into a thousand pieces.

What implications does this have?

R.

In some cases, this fragmentation is derived from the sanctions against Russia: some countries do not want to buy its oil and others do not mind doing so.

That is fragmentation.

But, in other aspects, I think we are even more interconnected: in gas, as I said before, the European crisis has also spread to other markets.

We live in really strange days.

Q.

The Inflation Reduction Act seeks to make the US a world power in renewables.

Will he get it?

A.

I think so.

It offers aid so that domestic consumers are increasingly electrified, so that the industry is inclined to install batteries or hydrogen, for the extraction and refining of critical minerals...

Q.

Will it be a turning point?

R.

Above all, in one aspect: it allows the Government to invest in risky but critical companies and sectors.

It is not a bank, it does not have to make a profit: getting back the investment to dedicate it to other projects is enough.

The important thing is that it seeks to test many new technologies to get them out of the laboratory and into the industry.

And that's a good thing.

Q.

To what extent will green hydrogen mark a before and after in the energy world?

A.

I don't know.

I do know that it is not a silver bullet: there is no single solution, but a wide range.

And green hydrogen is just one of them.

Also electrification, efficiency... And carbon [dioxide] capture and storage, controversial as it is in Europe.

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