At the same time as the demonstrations in Jerusalem: families of abductees march in Tel Aviv/Erez Harel
Even before approaching the actual matter, let it be clarified immediately: human life is not a commodity or money and despite phrases like "manpower" or even its more contemporary version "human resources", which is managed in institutions and for-profit organizations with all the required sensitivities, as if it were part of the production process, it is very difficult to treat it like a raw material, fuel or a thing for the customer that is distributed by the sales agents.
And yet, countries, like organizations, are conducted (or at least should be conducted) according to clear goals, and against this background it is tempting to see the POW deal, which is approaching and moving away from us suits, in an exhausting negotiation that causes great suffering to families, whatever the deal is and to examine what they want to achieve, what It is possible to achieve (as we have learned, it is not necessarily the same) and when the desire to complete the transaction causes us to behave in a way that is against the interest of the organization, i.e. the state.
Let's stretch for a moment the organizational behavior of Israel on the timeline, of the years in which the start-up company was militant and mobilized.
The motto among the organization's clients was "It is good to die for our country", the phrase attributed (whether it was said or not) to those who were the starting point for the two political currents that shaped the settlement - and subsequently the State of Israel. Hashomer (which by inclusion and gradually developed into the Hagana and the Palmach, the military arm of the labor movement) and Bitar (Joseph Trumpeldor's alliance) which grew to become the Haaretz Israeli right on its underground organizations (again by inclusion).
The dedication of the soul represented by this narrative also shaped the attitude towards the victims and the captives. Myths of heroism were associated in the name of those who preferred to hold in their bosoms a loose grenade was created so as not to fall into captivity. This trait was cultivated mainly in the elite units. On January 13, 1955 Uri Ilan committed suicide in Syrian captivity. A note was found in his shoes with "I didn't cheat, I committed suicide" written on it. Moshe Dayan (then the Chief of Staff) turned the pair of words into a kind of slogan that shaped the spirit of the IDF.
It is difficult to understand the attitude among the national religious public, for example, regarding the deal (at least according to what we know about the outline that was formulated) compared to the attitude between the clients of the organization known as "the State of Israel" who maintain a secular lifestyle, without understanding this sentiment. Which dictates, subject to this image, a completely different consumer behavior.
Peres and Rabin when the Entebbe hostages arrived in Israel, after Operation Jonathan. An unusual approach by Israel/the Ministry of Defense
From Netanyahu to Netanyahu: between Entebbe and Gaza
We will continue the historical journey: in the 1970s, with the rise of Palestinian terrorism (as part of a wave of global terrorism - from the Japanese Red Army, through the Red Brigades and Bader Meinhoff to the Irish Republican Army. A partial list of course), Israel was the right sign of refusal to negotiate with kidnappers, that this time they not only harmed the soldiers but also kidnapped civilians for the purpose of bargaining.
The peak was of course in Entebbe, an antithesis to the losing German behavior (for example) after the Munich massacre. The heroic action positioned Israel as the spearhead of resistance to any negotiations with terrorists. Looking back, it is amazing to think that the person who became the symbol of the operation, which was even named after him "Operation Jonathan", Yoni Netanyahu, was Benjamin Netanyahu's brother, who later (2011) would become the symbol of surrender to terrorism, at least as far as prisoner deals are concerned.
Throughout the intervening decades, prisoner deals took place mainly as part of cease-fire agreements and truces of wars. Since the negotiations were conducted with sovereign states and not with terrorist organizations, it was (relatively) easy to reach "all for all" deals, which usually took place a few months after the end of the war.
By the way, the attitude towards the returnees gradually began to change: initially, on top of the physical and mental torture of the prisoners of war, there were also stigmas that saw them as second class soldiers, if not actual traitors. Today it is almost hard to grasp, but the captives from Israel's wars in its first 35 years, still carry the scars in their hearts.
The Lebanon War was a turning point, especially as stated in the eight Nahal abductees, six of whom were held by Fatah (an operation by a Joint Chiefs of Staff patrol intended to rescue them was halted in the planning stage, due to a prisoner deal that took place after about two and a half months). The price that Israel "paid" (the second Begin government) was heavy: 4,500 Lebanese detainees, 29 Fatah officers and 65 security prisoners. The other two (Yuska Grof and Nissim Salem) who were held by Ahmed Jibril's organization, were released only in 1985, together with Hezi Shai (captive from the Sultan Yaakov camp) in exchange for 1,150 prisoners.
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A party for the captives of the Yom Kippur war. Some of them had to deal not only with the agony of captivity but also with a double-valued attitude on the part of the Israeli society of those years / IDF spokesperson, photographer: Ron Ilan, courtesy of the IDF Archives at the Ministry of Defense
The deal that didn't happen
The most famous deal from that period is the one that unfortunately never took place: Air Force navigator Ron Arad, who was etched in the collective memory as a great loss (it is estimated that he died in captivity. He was declared an IDF spaceman whose burial place was unknown), certainly after signs of life were received from him, Includes a video clip. Arad's portrait reappeared in the demonstrations for the release of the hostages from the Shiv'a attack in October.
Arad is important for this matter for another key reason: he signaled the civil awakening to an issue that until now was only considered an issue for decision-makers at the political and security level.
Ron Arad's fate also reappeared in the transaction The next significant captivity is the one in which Elhanan Tanenbaum, who was held by Hezbollah, was returned to Israel, along with the bodies of the three IDF soldiers: Bnei Avraham, Adi Avitan and Omar Su'ad. The price (paid by the Sharon government, which was among the pushers for the deal) was the release of 400 Palestinian prisoners, 35 other prisoners (mostly Lebanese) as well as 59 Lebanese bodies.
The deal also included a commitment by Hezbollah to investigate what happened to Ron Arad, after Israel conditioned the release of the murderer Samir Kuntar (who was finally released in the next deal, which sealed the chapter of the Second Lebanon War, in exchange for the return of the bodies of Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser). It is almost needless to say that the information provided by Hezbollah did not change much regarding the fate of the captured navigator.
The three martyrs of Har Dov, whose bodies were kidnapped, as well as Regev and Goldwasser, whose kidnapping ignited the Second Lebanon War, marked another step up in civil pressure on the decision makers to make a deal.
Ron Arad's portrait is carried by demonstrators demanding elections/Roni Knafo
A bad deal for an even worse reason
Indeed, over the years there has been a change in the status of the captives and abductees, whether civilians or soldiers. The price that Israel is willing to pay has increased in direct proportion to the activity of pressure groups in Israeli society.
Things came to a head after the abduction of Gilad Shalit to the Gaza Strip, this time in front of Hamas. The Shalit family operated an effective civil headquarters designed to promote a deal for his release, but it was actually another civil protest that caused the deal to mature - the social protest of the summer of 2011, which pushed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to a position where he desperately needed a major national achievement that would dissolve the awakening against him.
Indeed, in October 2011, a few months after the outbreak of the protest and the huge demonstrations that accompanied it, Shalit was released in the most "expensive" deal in prisoner deals ever: 1027 terrorists, including hundreds of those sentenced to life imprisonment ("with blood on their hands") were released as part of the deal.
It is impossible to examine the value that Israel paid without adding to this terrible price the loss of the lives of many Israelis as a result of the activities of those released from the Shalit deal who returned to engage in terrorism. Some of them (headed by Yahya Sinwar, of course, later the best-known freedman in the Shalit deal) even became leaders who led the murder attack of October 7th.
The abductees from that Shabbat do not differ from previous events only in their unusual number, but also in the mix: civilians and soldiers, children, women and the elderly. It is difficult to give signs of moral responsibility, but it seems that the majority of the public in Israel accepts the claim that a state's obligation towards citizens who have been kidnapped from their homes, due to a terrible omission, outweighs its obligation (although of course it does not cancel it) towards those wearing uniforms, at least in regards to prioritization in release.
A destroyed house in Kibbutz Bari. Perhaps it would have been better to acknowledge the loss, return the kidnapped - and only then act?/Uri Sela
Acknowledge the loss and start over
And what's more: even before examining the tactics Israel has chosen to deal with Hamas this time (is the release of about 110 hostages, 3 of them in military operations a relative success, as Netanyahu is wont to point out in every reference to the issue, or a resounding failure?), it seems that the disagreement is rising This time even in connection with the Israeli interest.
Is Mitut Hamas (everyone according to their own definition of this aerial concept) first - meaning that the abductees should be treated in advance as potential victims in order to achieve the goal, or is this the overarching goal of the State of Israel?
Of course, the disagreement on this also affects the conduct of the organization on the issue: the sales department, which sees before its eyes only the reward for the military achievement, pursues a line of profit that ignores the plight of the abductees (even if not offensively).
On the other hand, the human resources department of the organization points out that with all due respect to the reward of a military achievement, the organization will not survive the human cost: in the short term a dividend may be distributed, but in the long term the organization will not be able to recruit workers, since it abandoned the previous ones.
And there is also the finance department, where they rushed to declare that this is a lost debt, meaning that the organization known as "Israel" must admit the loss of October 7th, bow down, pay any price related to the release of terrorists from prison cells, if it is necessary to even retreat - to return "all for Everyone" - and prepare a business plan for a future military campaign aimed at getting rid of the enemy.
They point out, probably rightly, that the abductees are the strongest card up Hamas's sleeve and it does not make sense that they will be released only thanks to military pressure, at most we will have another round (which should not be underestimated of course) in which some of them will be returned, in exchange for a ceasefire, a temporary territorial concession and the release of terrorists.
Angry customers demand an urgent board meeting in order to oust the CEO. Demonstration in Jerusalem/Roni Knafo
A loss on all fronts
Needless to say, there is no right or wrong, as each department in the organization represents a different and important interest. So where is the problem? A bit like the fighting and the lack of ability to precisely define its goals ("the day after")
for
political reasons, the CEO is held captive by a board of directors that pulls him in opposite directions - and is unable to make a decision, define a goal (whatever it may be) and strive for it with all his might.
The fear - and growing day by day, that in the end the organization in front of us, which refuses to take the initiative, will be dragged into a reality that is not under its control, certainly not in its favor: the suffering of the captives will continue, a large part of them will pay with their lives, Israel will not achieve Mitut Hamas and will suffer from international ostracism (which has already begun) , in addition to an internal wound that will never heal and in the long run will lead to a devaluation of the commitment of Israeli citizens to their country.
This is perhaps the reason why a large part of the angry customers have already declared a buyer's revolt, a consumer protest that not only demands the promotion of a deal (although a large part of them understand that this does not depend exclusively on Israel), but also marks the CEO as someone who is unable to lead it - and therefore requires a vote of impeachment in the board of directors (elections - and their results, according to every survey).
What is going to shock them in the eyes of some of the public opinion? The fact that most of them demanded the exact same thing during the nine months leading up to October 7th. That is, according to their opponents, they marked the CEO as someone who should be removed even before the default. Even if this is the case, it does not mean that they are not right. In their
view, the start-up - the price of its establishment was paid by Yoni Netanyahu and expressed a bold and innovative approach to a complex problem, cannot be implemented by his brother (which implies that some of the achievements of the operation at Shifa Hospital may lead to a daring military release of at least some of the abductees).
Human life is not a resource, raw material or financial gain and Israel is of course not a commercial firm, but
day by day the feeling grows that through Conduct - not only in preparation for October 7, but also from then until now, will also be taught in business administration schools, under the heading: "What not to do".
More on the same topic:
abducted
Jibril deal
The Gilad Shalit deal
Ruler deal
Benjamin Netanyahu
Ron Arad