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Kremlin chief Putin
Photo: Alexey Druzhinin/ Sputnik/ AFP
When it comes to the conflict with Russia, advice from the Germans is not particularly popular at the moment.
The one-sided dependence on Russian gas, the embarrassing Kremlin propaganda of your former chancellor, the strange admiration for Putin in both left and right circles.
For years, the Germans, in their greed to use Russia as a cheap storehouse of raw materials, have generously overlooked the aggressive nature of Moscow's policies.
The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyj recently complained that from Berlin he had only ever heard “Economy, economy, economy”.
The criticism is justified.
Nevertheless, the Western debate on Russia could benefit from a little more economic calculation.
In the joy of the successful resistance of the Ukrainians, only the proposal that sounds the hardest seems to have a chance.
Recently there has been talk of regime change, of military intervention by NATO, of a total boycott of oil, gas and coal.
As if only a few West billions less had to arrive in Moscow and Russia's oppressed masses would coup Putin out of the Kremlin.
»A lot helps a lot« is not the correct maxim for sanctions
It would be nice, but unfortunately there is a reasonable probability that it won't happen that way.
In the past, even the harshest Western economic sanctions have rarely resulted in unwanted dictators being ousted from office.
Despite years of punitive actions, the Iranian mullahs have been able to stay in power just like North Korea's autocrat Kim Jong Un or the Cuban communists.
Regime change is therefore seen as a burnt demand in the US, and it is fitting that the strategists in the White House had to correct their own president when he brought up the R word again over the weekend.
The chances of success would also be low.
There is currently little sign of a popular uprising in Russia, nor of a palace revolt, which would also raise a number of questions: Could it be that a power struggle would rather strengthen Putin's position?
And who can guarantee that the next Kremlin ruler will not be even more unscrupulous than his predecessor?
In addition, the military situation in Ukraine is currently heading towards a stalemate.
Putin's plan to replace the Kiev government with a vassal regime dependent on Moscow after a brief blitzkrieg has failed.
And a long, material-rich war of attrition against a Western-backed Ukraine can hardly be won by a state like Russia, which has the combined economic strength of the Netherlands and Belgium.
Conversely, no matter how resolutely fighting Ukraine is, it will hardly succeed in ousting Moscow's military from its positions in the east of the country, where it is currently digging in.
In addition, the question must be allowed as to whether it would make sense to corner the despot in the Kremlin so far that he roams through his stockpile of weapons of mass destruction out of frustration and desperation.
In the end, the parties to the conflict will therefore have no choice but to strive for the negotiated solution that Zelenskyy is also increasingly talking about: on the territorial status of Crimea and Donbass and on a future security architecture for Ukraine that does not include NATO membership, but does include weapons aid and security guarantees of the USA.
It would not be a victory for Kyiv and not for Moscow.
And the West would only be left with the bitter realization that an aggressor who has nuclear weapons at his disposal cannot be dealt with with a quick surgical cut.
The threat posed by Putin is more like a war sore that needs to be isolated and reduced in size until it no longer poses a threat.
Containment was what it used to be called in earlier times.
The design of Western economic sanctions should also be based on this.
»A lot helps a lot« is not the right maxim.
The belief that a kind of economic decapitation strike against the Putin empire can be carried out without regard to one's own losses is misguided for many reasons.
Economically, Russia is a dwarf;
but it will always find a buyer for its huge treasure of raw materials in the world.
A tariff on Russian energy would be smarter than a total boycott
The right regime of sanctions against the Kremlin ruler must therefore be long-term.
It does maximum damage to Moscow while minimizing its own cost.
The question is not whether the sanctions will cost Russia money.
The question is whether the West can hold out.
Take gas, for example: anyone who completely foregoes procurement from Russia tomorrow exposes their domestic industry to an incalculable risk.
On the other hand, those who reduce their purchases from Gazprom and Co. to such an extent that they can soon cover their needs from many sources reverse the relationship of dependency.
He can dictate the conditions to the supplier.
The most intelligent proposal that economists currently have to offer when it comes to sanctions against Moscow is not a total boycott.
It's an import duty on Russian fuel shipments.
It would cut profits for Moscow's energy companies while bringing revenue to the West that could lighten the burden on its own citizens.
It is considered to be the logic of a shopkeeper's soul to keep an eye on the consequences for the economy when it comes to the economic penalties for the Kremlin ruler.
The opposite is the case.
The economy in Western Europe must be strong enough to be able to supply Ukraine with weapons, ammunition and materials for years to come.
It must ensure that the war refugees are cared for and at the same time ensure that the burden on the local population does not become too great.
This is not trivial.
Currently, those who are pushing for the toughest sanctions are often the same people who are calling for government compensation if the price of petrol increases by just a few cents.
Should Putin continue to govern, which unfortunately is to be expected, the Western sanctions will become a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations.
Putin will demand that they be rolled back, and the West, interested in an end to the war, will have to make at least some concessions.
In return, he should demand a price from the Kremlin -- and urge that part of Russia's export earnings go towards rebuilding Ukraine.
It would be a kind of Marshall Plan with the opposite sign, which of course presupposes that economic relations with Russia have not been completely severed by then.
"A complete end to trade with Russia," says Clemens Fuest, head of the Munich economic research institute Ifo, would be "geo-strategically unwise."
The Cold War began with a fragile peace under the threat of nuclear strikes.
It lasted for many years and was not ended by maximum economic sanctions.
But through patience - and the trust that a free social and economic order will ultimately prove to be superior.
