A lot of verbiage has been spilled in recent weeks around the "day after" in Gaza. When will we reach it, what will happen to it, who will rule the Gaza Strip on the day the land is quiet. Recall that the war has four stages: the first, the aerial pounding, continued for the first two weeks after Black Sabbath, and ended long ago; The second, the extensive ground campaign, is currently underway; The third, which is expected to begin sometime in January, will include the withdrawal of some of the forces into Israeli territory, redeployment along the border, and ground raids and targeted killings from the air as part of a long campaign at the end of which Hamas will be defeated. And the fourth - the day after.
The United States and the top echelons of the defense establishment demand to deal with the day after. The arguments are different: Americans want fruit for their investment in the war, or at least a carrot they can wave at voters at home and at those who rant outside. The defense establishment wants a target – someone to whom the stick can be handed over at the end of the race. They believe that whoever does not promote something he wants may discover another factor that will be much more problematic.
When Israel left Gaza, it simply abandoned it to the wind. Without going into the pros and cons of the disengagement, the way it was carried out was a failure. Instead of handing it over to the Palestinian Authority and thereby strengthening the (relatively) moderate forces in the Palestinian arena, Israel left a vacuum into which the strongest – Hamas – entered. Two years later, he completed the takeover of the Gaza Strip and threw Fatah off the rooftops.
IDF Spokesperson
That's what could happen now, too. If Israel crushes Hamas and does not act to present it with a governmental alternative, it may discover a bad factor in its place, or a cluster of bad elements (in the Somalia model) that will unite them only one thing: hatred of Israel. Such a situation could draw Israel even deeper in Gaza, and instead of moving it from the third stage to the fourth, return it from the third stage to the second, that is, to a full-scale war.
There were those who claimed this week that Israel would know what to do the day after, when it arrived. This is a ridiculous argument: There is no country in the world that does not plan strategically ahead, out of a desire to shape its own destiny. Correction, there is such a state: Israel. Under Netanyahu, she religiously refrains from looking beyond Popik. Everything unfolds from now to now, solving problem by problem, acting tactically instead of thinking strategically.
Example: For years, Israel has been claiming to the world that the Palestinians are the obstacle to solving the Palestinian problem. That there is no partner. That the Palestinians don't miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. This is the tactic that generations of Israeli diplomats have used vis-à-vis various governments around the world, with considerable success.
It was also true: the Palestinians really were not a partner. But now – for domestic political reasons – Netanyahu is announcing that he is not ready for Fatah Hastan to replace Hamastan in Gaza. What this means in the eyes of the world: Israel is the rejectionist, and it was the Palestinians who were right when they claimed that there was indeed no one to talk to.
Israel is not proactive. She's trailing. And when you're dragged, your influence is less. Instead of putting a plan on the table – any plan – in order to promote what is good for it, Israel only says what is not, and is sure that saying no is a strategy. That's exactly what's happening now with the day-after issue; Israel says no (to the continuation of Hamas rule), no (to the Palestinian Authority) and no (to prolonged Israeli rule in Gaza), but does not say what is.
Meanwhile, politics wins
In general, and assuming that Israel meets its goal and topples the Hamas regime and deprives it of a significant part of its military capabilities, there are five alternatives to future rule in Gaza. The first is a weakened Hamas regime. This is not on the agenda, and rightly so: a weakened regime will be followed by a strengthened regime, followed by a reign of terror, followed by the next war.
The second is the Palestinian Authority, not in its existing form, but in the so-called "New Authority," or RPA – Reformed Palestinian Authority. Its advantage lies in the fact that it already pays the salaries of officials, knows most of them – some of whom are professionals who worked under the Israeli military government – and is especially accepted around the world. She will be able to bring money and bring recognition. Its disadvantage: it may not be the same wolf, but it certainly has not conquered, and as long as it does not change its ways, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to forge a quiet future for it.
What is his favorite war name? Netanyahu, Photo: Oren Ben Hakon
The third is Israeli rule. This is a bad alternative in every respect: it will draw soldiers (and fatalities) into it, and it will draw budgets into it (to finance water, electricity, education, sewage, etc.). Nothing good will come from controlling 2.2 million hostile Palestinians, and Israel will receive a cold shoulder in the world that could reach the point of various sanctions.
The fourth is a multinational force. It is doubtful whether there are countries in the world that will agree to send their soldiers/policemen to Gaza in order to buffer the IDF from terrorism that will continue to operate there in the foreseeable future, and even if it does, the effectiveness of such a force will be negligible (according to UNIFIL in Lebanon). Worst of all, such a force would only hinder the IDF from operating freely in Gaza in the future.
The fifth is a mixed regime of officials and elements not affiliated with Hamas, who will administer Gaza civilianly with the support of key countries and with the assistance of international aid organizations. This is a perfect cacaponia that no one has an interest in establishing: the Western and Arab world will not put its head in the sick bed called Gaza without seeing it as a long-term solution that will allow, at some point, to transfer responsibility to someone.
In the transition from the third stage to the fourth, Israel must insist on some basic principles. The first and main of these is full freedom of security action, which will enable the IDF to enter any point in Gaza at any time. Hence the importance of shredding Hamas' military infrastructure now: the more they are damaged, the less the IDF will be challenged later on.
Subsequently, a full embargo on the entry of weapons into the Gaza Strip is required to ensure that it is fully demilitarized. To this end, cooperation with Egypt is required to prevent smuggling along the Philadelphi route. Israel also intends to establish a perimeter security zone west of the border fence to secure the communities from terrorist attacks. It is also likely that the area of Palestinian maritime activity will be reduced in the foreseeable future.
All of these must be coordinated by Israel with a number of countries and entities that have interests in Gaza (the United States, Europe, Egypt, Qatar, UN organizations) or that Israel has an interest in having there (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates). Rebuilding Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars that someone will have to invest, and that person will not give the money away for free: he will want to have a say in where his money is going.
As always, there are no good alternatives in this story, but it takes choosing an alternative, or designing one, to get there. Anyone who wants to see Saudi money instead of Qatari money needs to talk to the Saudis and hear what they have to say. And those who want to see Western involvement that will ensure stability must take their expectations into account. If Israel continues to say no, it is liable to remain with Gaza entirely its own – for its worst and for its worst.
All this is well known to Netanyahu. This was also told to him almost daily in the War Cabinet and by the heads of the defense establishment, by the Americans, and by every relevant foreign element that comes here. Unfortunately, domestic politics win. The man who gave Hamastan full immunity until October 7 looks at the base and insists on not making a decision.
Soldiers' voices from Jabaliya
Alongside the conduct of the war, intensive negotiations began on the future defense budget. It is clear that the budget that existed until now will no longer be relevant, and must be significantly increased regardless of the reimbursement of war costs, and also regardless of the special American aid that will be given to Israel after congressional approval.
The defense establishment wants to double the defense budget, meaning that its share will increase from 3.8 percent of the budget to 8-7 percent. This is a dramatic increase of tens of billions of shekels a year, which takes at least a few years, with the understanding that direct and indirect defense expenditures will increase dramatically: in inventories, reserves, infrastructure that needs to be rehabilitated or rebuilt, rehabilitation, and more. If it is also decided to increase the army's squadrons and ground combat forces, additional funding or a significant increase in American defense aid, currently estimated at $3.8 billion a year (or both), will be required.
Formal discussions on the issue will begin at the beginning of the year, together with the general budget discussions. The Finance Ministry is already talking about raising taxes in order to close the hole in the budget, but it will not be enough: coalition funds will again be on the agenda, even unnecessary government ministries, and the decision on what national priorities are.
Insists for some reason on wartime elections. Minister Moshe Arbel, Photo: Oren Ben Hakon
An up-to-date budget is just one task that the Defense Ministry and the IDF are now required to advance. There are several other urgent issues that need to be addressed. One issue is the matter of reserves. Hundreds of thousands of reservists were mobilized in Order 8 on 7 October. Some have been serving since then, and dozens of them have also fallen in battle (and hundreds have been wounded). They left jobs and families, and came to defend the homeland. Now the homeland owes them protection.
In recent weeks, I have accumulated many cases of reservists whose private business is in danger of collapse, but the state is not helping. Some were required to be released from reserve duty in order to save their livelihoods. In one case, he was a commander in a special unit fighting in Gaza. This is a particularly bizarre situation: with one hand the state recruits fighters, with the other it is forced to release them in order for them to survive economically.
At the same time, many requests came from women of reservists who had been fired, because they were required to devote more time to home and family. Those looking for work are asked if their husband is in reserve, that is, if there is anything that might interfere with their work. Here, too, the state takes the husband to war (and sometimes the wife), but does not protect the home front, which is forced to cope financially and emotionally under complex conditions of uncertainty.
This is an issue of supreme national importance, because without the support of the home front, the front will erode – certainly when it comes to a war that will last time. The state should honor those who contribute not only in words, but first of all in deeds. And it needs to do something else: punish those who harm reservists or their families. Let there be a price for those who fire or put on unpaid leave, and in general harm the national effort.
A second issue is the local elections, scheduled for 30 January. The finance minister raised a flag and argued that they should be rejected because many of the candidates are in the reserves, and they are not given equal rights to run. The interior minister refused to postpone again (the elections were originally scheduled for 31 October). It has been supported by more than a hundred sitting mayors, who in my opinion are incompetent to testify: the war serves their political campaign, allows them to use the means of the municipality to promote themselves, and generally gives less chance to those who run against them.
The finance and interior ministers are politicians, and it can be assumed that their considerations are also mixed with political interests. My question is different: not only is everyone given the right to be elected, but also the right to choose. In order for this to happen, the IDF must establish an election administration that will make sure to allow voting anywhere. Soldiers will stop fighting in Sejaiya or Khan Yunis (it's not clear how they even know who to vote for after months of separation from home), and we will all wait anxiously for the polling stations from Jabalia and Shati.
The chief of staff and defense minister should raise a flag and say it's an unnecessary headache. Yes, the IDF will know how to deal with it if necessary. No, it's not critical right now, and nothing will happen if the election is postponed to spring. By then, most of the evacuees will return home, and hopefully most of the soldiers will too. All the contenders will run, all the voters will vote, and the good guys will win.
And what happened before "Genesis"?
And there is another, seemingly esoteric issue - the choice of the official name for the war. In the first day, when everything was still confused, the name "Iron Swords" was established, which has been with us ever since. It's a name that has nothing in it: a not-so-great take-off on Defensive Shield. No one in public uses that name. Everyone just says "the war," and that's it.
There are those for whom branding is important. The issue is under discussion at the political-security leadership. As reported, there is a debate between three names: "The Genesis War," "The October 7 War," and "Simchat Torah War."
The prime minister prefers the "Genesis War." He has supporters of the idea (in English it sounds better: Genesis war). Netanyahu wants to show that from here everything starts anew. This is a problematic argument for several reasons: First, because in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and it is a bit strange to over-roll Him and create everything anew. Second, because the people of Israel have owned the Holy Land for thousands of years, and they have no need for a restart. And third, because a few things happened here before October 7, which obviously some prefer to skip straight to the next chapter.
The "October 7 War," in which many support the IDF, is also a problematic name, mainly because of its connotation of the name given by Egypt to the Yom Kippur War - "the October 6 War." Israel also never named a date as a name for the war, certainly not a Latin one. "Simchat Torah War" is a name that has an inherent contrast between joy and bereavement and destruction, and it also turns the Hebrew holiday calendar into a series of disasters.
We were left with the obvious name: "Gaza War". Just like the Sinai War (Operation Kadesh) or the Lebanon War (the first and second) - a war that will be named after the place where it takes place. It's a name that says it all without requiring accompanying explanations: in any case, when the dust settles, it's also the name that will be fixed in the public.
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