2019: Five Israelis were killed in the course of the war, but this is a significant decrease compared to 2018, in which 13 were killed. • Number of casualties does not indicate a continuing decline in terrorist organizations' motivation • Interpretation

• Photo: Oren Cohen

The year 2019, which will end in 12 days, has been more successful in terms of fighting terrorism than the year before. Although five Israelis were killed there, this is a significant decrease compared to 2018, when 13 were killed.

The number of casualties does not indicate a decrease in terrorist organizations' motivation to carry out attacks. The opposite is true: motivations are on the rise in almost all terrorist organizations operating in Judea and Samaria. What prevents them from actually becoming injured is the successful counterterrorism work led by the Shin Bet and the IDF.

The two episodes released yesterday are raising a screen above this trend. Apart from the title and the desire to carry out attacks, there is not much in common between them. One is about an effort to roll off terror attacks inside, and the other to an internal effort, which is conducted from the West Bank. The organizations themselves are also very different. One, Hamas, is a religious organization, and the other, the Popular Front, is a secular organization, a near-lasting remnant of the Marxist ideology of its founders.

The captured weapons // Photo: GSS communications

The Hamas affair is largely new. Since the Shalit deal, the organization maintains an active branch in Turkey, which deals with two main issues: attempts to roll out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria and fundraising. The British Telegraph paints a broad picture that, more than it teaches about Hamas, it teaches about Turkey. As part of its ideological identification with Hamas - its correspondence with the Muslim Brotherhood - and its desire to be involved in Gaza and Jerusalem.

This publication shows that Turkey is now denying its previously assumed obligations. The most notable of these is the deportation of Salah Aruri, who established the Hamas branch in Turkey after the Shalit deal. In 2015, he was deported under American pressure and moved to Qatar, and later to Lebanon. He now turns out to be back in Turkey, along with several other freedmen, and deals with terror.

In the past, Aruri has emerged as a fairly moderate operator of terrorist attacks. That is why most of the terrorist cells in the West Bank have also moved from Turkey to Gaza. And yet, his presence - as well as the fully visible activity of Hamas' military wing on Turkish soil - is defiant and has perpetual risk, certainly when added to the financial habit, led by Zahar Jabara, who is involved in tax evasion and money laundering in the amount of millions of dollars ( From Iran), whose ultimate goal is Hamas.

The second case has more local characteristics. It stems entirely from the territory itself, and by an organization deeply rooted in it. The activists of this organization carried out two shootings and amassed a great deal of armaments before they murdered the late Rina Schnav and were arrested. Some also went to prisons and administrative detention, and the ISA should look into how they slipped under the radar and managed (and hit) for a short period until they were arrested.

The detainees in the affair // Photo: GSS communications

A major explanation for this is the extreme compartmentalization and decentralization in which this organization operated. Thus, some of the activists were instructed in shooting when the guide is masked so that his identity is not revealed, and each cell acted separately from others, so that, if exposed, would not even destroy the entire infrastructure. The members of the organization also turned out to be tough investigators, but these are only extenuating circumstances: the Popular Front should always be under the headlamp.

It is likely that there will now be a decline in the activities of this organization, as happened to it in the past after waves of previous arrests of its activists. This will allow the GSS to focus on its main challenge - Hamas - that goes nowhere. Judging by the test of intent, strenuous intelligence work will be required (and, as usual, not too lucky), so that the trend in terrorism data will continue in 2020 as well.