The appointment of the Prosecutor's Office and the issue of Attorney General's position regarding Netanyahu's competence to form a government, while three indictments stand against him, represent a strong case for supporters of splitting the counsel's powers as general prosecutor and as representing the state in the High Court.

As one who signed the indictments against Netanyahu, schizophrenic ability on the part of the attorney general to represent the prime minister is required in response to the petition, as he is required to clarify whether the president may entrust Netanyahu with the job of assembling the government after the next election. Striving for a criminal case naturally dictates a valid tone on the part of the prosecution regarding the gravity of the offenses, while defending the state in the High Court draws in the direction of reducing the severity of the offenses. Splitting the counsel's counsel between the prosecution and the representation would have allowed the court to hear a clear and clear voice on the issue, Be biased from the counsel's position as a prosecutor general.

If the maneuverability between the two positions seems impossible on the issue of government assembly, the tension between the two adviser positions becomes even more difficult on the issue of appointing the State Attorney. In responding to a petition against Attorney General Ben Ari's appointment to the Prosecuting Attorney's Office, the Supreme Court ruled in an unprecedented step that her appointment is an extreme exception to the level of reasonableness. On the face of it, this assertion itself seems unreasonable: because the candidate herself is not an impeccable advocate, Previously promoted to the District Attorney's Office, other precedents are added to the issue of High Court intervention in appointments, which do not necessarily support the position of counsel. The vast majority of cases in which the High Court has so far interfered with allegations of applicants' uncleanliness or problematic statements.

The fact that the Minister "skipped" over the top leadership of the State Prosecutor's Office does not therefore indicate extreme unreasonableness per se. The minister may appoint a temporary state attorney who answers criticism of the prosecution's conduct to date. As part of the discussion, the argument emerged that it was a defiant appointment intended to help the Prime Minister's attack against the justice system. Possibly, but absurdly, the problematic conduct is that of the USSR, which behaves in a manner that may appear to be exploiting his position as state representative in the High Court to ensure that the interim state attorney is his preferred candidate.

In light of these precedents, the interim injunction issued by Justice Manny Mazuz in a petition against the temporary appointment of the State Attorney was surprising. Given a background, which may explain the execution of the order, is the fact that Mazuz himself served as attorney general, and as such he can identify with the current counsel's objection to coercing a temporary state attorney contrary to his opinion. This mood was also reflected in Mazuz's statement that "Minister of Justice for me is a distressing and disturbing situation." A Minister of Justice in contrast is a distressing situation for the Attorney General, but it is also a legitimate situation in a democratic country, where the Minister wants to promote a policy that is compatible with the critical approach to the Attorney General.

These examples sharpen the need to create an institutionalized buffer between the prosecutor general and the state's representation in the High Court. Indeed, proposals to segregate the counselor role often arise, and there is a logic that is intensifying in light of recent developments.

However, at this time, where any jurist who is critical of the legal system is at risk of being portrayed as a server by the prime minister, who is allegedly running against the system to promote his survival against the indictment, it would be appropriate to make the changes and consider the division of the court's functions. Only after the current storm has passed.

Prof. Moshe Cohen Elia, Constitutional Law Specialist, President of the Ramat Gan Academic Law and Business Center