The High Court yesterday discussed the legal questions arising from the coalition agreement, including the section on the Judiciary Committee, which has long been the subject of public discussion. Readers should change the nomination system from a committee of politicians, judges and representatives of the Bar, and adapt to many, for example, European constitutional courts - that political factors are dominant in selecting judges. this is necessary, it is argued, to strengthen public trust and diversify court arbitrator values. 

but methods of appointment of political and parliamentary judges unconstitutional in many European countries actually cause complex problems, as demonstrated A new study by Dr. Pablo Kstilo-aortiz University of Sheffield, published on "Georgetown Journal of International Affairs".

First, political actors use the political nature of constitutional judges' appointments to attack courts when they dislike their decisions, for example, by claims that the court is politically biased or ruled by political rivals. 

Second, contrary to the notion that political appointment strengthens public confidence in the judicial system, research shows that due to the political visibility and nature of constitutional courts, specifically in European countries with constitutional courts, citizens have a low perception of the legal system as a whole in judicial independence measures and legal fairness. This tendency is weakening as the country is older and more institutionalized. A court picture, made up of politically appointed judges and decisive on political issues at the request of politicians, conflicts with the notion of independent and political judgment that is crucial in litigation disputes. 

Finally, there is the danger of taking over courts by non-liberal actors. The executive branch, in various states, seeks to get rid of constitutional restrictions on its power and, for this purpose, seeks to "take over" the court, in part through the judicial appointment process. Non-liberal governments that control parliament or the nomination process appoint constitutional courts to constitutional judges who are perceived as "comfortable" or "loyal" to the regime. Then the court is unable or unwilling to object to the authoritarian tendencies of these regimes.

Therefore, the study argues, a trajectory must be recalculated. In order for constitutional courts to do their job better: protecting the constitution, fundamental rights and democracy, one must go towards the depoliticization of these institutions. Some European countries are already marching in this direction, which can contribute to strengthening professional legitimacy and the perception of neutrality of the courts. 

In the Israeli context, I would add that given the fact that the Supreme Court deals not only with constitutional petitions but, most often, in civil and criminal law disputes, the judicial professionalism is of paramount importance. The current method balances adequately between representation needs and professionalism. One change that is required, contrary to what is stipulated in the coalition agreement, is anchoring an opposition representative on the committee. Certainly those who call for court diversity and population reflection should be in favor of such anchoring. And just as the field of politicization is the desired direction in Europe, we too should not make the appointment of judges a mere political decision that will result in politicization and partisanism of the judiciary.

Yaniv Rosnai is Associate Professor at Harry Radziner School of Law, IDC Herzliya