For decades, every IDF command course has taught about the "strategic corporal."
A seemingly tactical and marginal local event, which drags the IDF and the State of Israel into a strategic tangle.
This is exactly what happened yesterday during a demonstration on the Gaza Strip border.
A pre-determined local event that was supposed to end without special interest, which got out of hand and entangled Israel in an unwanted clash, which seems to be culminating even before us.
The IDF was unable to provide plausible explanations yesterday for its conduct in the incident. Not to the question of why Hamas members were allowed to enter the perimeter - a buffer about 300 meters from the fence that should remain sterile - nor to questions about the snipers' location.
On the face of it, this seems to be a profound tactical failure, which ended in the fatal injury of the fighter Barel Hadaria-Shmueli, and could have ended in much worse consequences;
Had the terrorist chosen to roll a grenade into a slit, rather than fire a gun, the incident would have ended with three dead.
It is also not clear why the IDF did not use the many lessons it learned from past events on the fence. Hamas violent demonstrations are nothing new, and in 2018 the IDF paid expensive tuition until it developed methods to deal with them.
He then managed to do so at a bloody high price on the Palestinian side, but low on the Israeli side - one killed, despite the scale of the demonstrations and violence.
Now, the IDF is recording a heavy price already in the first significant demonstration it is facing at the moment. The IDF knew him and prepared for him - and it is not clear whether he stemmed from excessive self-confidence, complacency or an underestimation of the threat.
The IDF made it clear yesterday that it is investigating the incident thoroughly. Similar cases in the past have ended with decisive conclusions, including personalities. It is doubtful if this will happen now; With the approval given yesterday by the government to the scandalous "addition of the chief of staff" to the salaries of permanent servants).
The prime minister said at a cabinet meeting yesterday that "the IDF, the Southern Command and the Gaza Division are prepared and ready for any scenario," a somewhat problematic statement in light of the outcome of yesterday's events.
But the incident in Gaza is worrying not only because of its dire consequences, but mainly because of its consequences for the future.
Hamas has received a boost, and will probably continue its demonstrations in the hope of charging a price in the future as well.
It can be assumed that the IDF will make the necessary tactical adjustments and will probably show greater aggression in the use of force, which will inevitably lead to Palestinian casualties - a matter that will not pass without a response from the Palestinian side.
It is a familiar and pre-known ritual.
As mentioned, the parties were already there three years ago, and the violence ended then only after an agreement was reached to transfer a monthly payment ("money suitcases") from Qatar to Hamas.
It now appears that Hamas is unhappy with the new Qatari funding arrangement because it is leaving its people without salaries.
Israel will certainly not be able to restrain itself from continuing the violence and will be required to respond, which will inevitably put the parties back on a path of confrontation.
Only three months ago, at the end of "The Guardian of the Walls", the IDF top officials claimed that the operation would bring peace to the south for a long time. This is an important lesson in modesty (the operation was less heroic than the IDF tried to present it and its achievements), and also in looking to the future. Requires gentle driving and daily coping to keep from erupting again.