War in Europe and nuclear weapons, the threat of Putin 0:41
(CNN) --
Russia's troop buildup on its border with Ukraine has created a diplomatic standoff between Russia and the United States, the world's two largest nuclear powers.
For a better understanding of how we got to this point and what might come next, I spoke with Michael Kimmage, a professor at America's Catholic University.
He specializes in US-Russia relations and is a voice for engagement with Russia and a more nuanced view of the country.
News of the crisis between Ukraine and Russia: Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin will speak this Saturday
Our conversation, conducted via email and lightly edited, is below.
The difference between now and the Cold War
Let's start with a very general question. If the Cold War was about American capitalism against USSR communism, what is the confrontation between Russia and the West about today?
KIMMAGE
: It's less radical than the Cold War.
It is, in essence, a competition for influence in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Cold War, by contrast, was defined by the Iron Curtain.
The military situation was mostly resolved after 1949. This is why the ideological conflict (over capitalism and democracy) was so intense;
It was the real scene of the competition.
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Today there is no Iron Curtain in Europe.
There is no clear line dividing Russia from Europe, or Europe from Russia.
And in this ambiguous situation there is a great difference of vision or worldview.
The United States sees the individual states of Europe as fully sovereign and entitled to make their own decisions about security, trade, alliances, etc.
Russia sees itself as having a prime area of interest along its western border.
For reasons of security and prestige, Russia demands a combination of influence and respect in this area, and Russia is willing to use military force where it is frustrated in this privileged area.
Ukraine is smack dab in the middle of this contest, and since 2014 both Moscow and Washington have come to see Ukraine as a barometer of Europe's future.
Russia conducts military exercises and NATO reaffirms its commitment to allied countries 2:43
Is this the end of the West?
Much has been written about a possible erosion of the Western alliance. Germany wants to complete a gas pipeline from Russia. France seeks a more independent Europe. Is this the beginning of the end for the post-WWII NATO alliance?
KIMMAGE
: Not at all.
The alliance has always been a bit of a rebel.
For a time, France formally distanced itself from NATO, during the Cold War.
And in the early 1980s there were massive protests in Germany and elsewhere over the deployment of US missiles in Europe.
Both the Vietnam and Iraq wars caused major differences of opinion among the many member states of NATO.
So there is nothing new about the different agendas and approaches within NATO.
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Taking a step back, the NATO alliance has actually been quite unified since December 2021, when the current crisis accelerated.
It has done three things: provided a measure of military assistance to Ukraine through training and contributions of individual NATO states to Ukraine's military readiness;
stated in no uncertain terms that the war between Ukraine and Russia (now in its eighth year) does not directly affect NATO, as Ukraine is not a member of the alliance and therefore NATO itself will not fight in Ukraine;
and he took seriously the new set of concerns from Poland, Romania and the Baltic republic, some of which stem from the prospect of a broader war in Ukraine and others from the deployment of Russian troops and equipment in Belarus.
In addition, NATO has communicated to Russia that it will not make concessions.
It will not go back to where it was in 1997, as Vladimir Putin demanded of NATO.
It will not close the open-door policy on accession, and it will not rule out the possibility of accepting Ukraine into the alliance.
On the substantive issues, NATO has shown an impressive degree of unity in the last three months.
What should NATO look like in the future?
The United States and NATO countries have formally rejected Russia's demand that Ukraine be banned from NATO. Should NATO stay in the business of expanding into Eastern Europe?
KIMMAGE
: In my opinion, NATO should no longer be in the business of expanding into Eastern Europe.
This is already NATO's de facto policy towards Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, which are the three Eastern European countries that could possibly join NATO.
Moldova has a frozen conflict, and in Moldova there is a Russian military presence.
Belarus has been effectively annexed by Russia in recent months;
the Belarusian and Russian armies have been integrated for a long time.
There is no way that Belarus can enter NATO under these conditions.
And Ukraine includes Crimea and a segment of its territory in the east that is under Russian military occupation.
These are the practical difficulties with which NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe collides.
In another sense, the alliance already has 30 members.
It has a massive, irregular and unstable eastern border.
With each new addition comes new military commitments, and the alliance will face serious challenges in the future to defend the countries that are already members.
Setting limits can be painful.
It involves saying no to partners and friends.
It carries its own risks.
But it is time for NATO to limit itself, not for the sake of Russia, but for the sake of its own coherence and its own self-defense capabilities.
What is the NATO collective defense principle?
2:03
Why is this showdown over Ukraine different?
You wrote in The New Republic that Ukraine matters as a precedent and that Russia should not be allowed to invade or divide a European state. Why is the current situation different from when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 or parts of Georgia in 2008?
KIMMAGE
: This is a difficult question.
You could add the quasi-annexation of Belarus that Russia carried out last year.
That is also a problem.
I think the key point here is that both Georgia after 2008 and Ukraine after 2014 maintained their basic sovereignty, damaged as it was by Russia's annexation of territory.
And, of course, neither Georgia nor Ukraine are US or NATO allies, making military action only a remote political option, if at all.
There are two concerns in the future that can change the equation.
One is the cutting of salami by Russia.
How many borders can Moscow change before they simply start redrawing the map of Europe?
And that is certainly a concern about a broader war in Ukraine.
If unopposed, even the annexation of a small piece of territory in Ukraine would lead in a dangerous direction.
But the other concern is more dramatic: if Russia invades Ukraine with all the force it has mustered on Ukraine's border, it could well overthrow the government and/or carve up a substantial part of the country.
Instead of ending Ukrainian sovereignty, he would be abolishing Ukrainian sovereignty.
And a Europe in which borders and sovereignty are effectively poker chips on a big table, which a few players can rearrange at will, is the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s: an unstable playing field of great powers in the where no one is safe and where nothing is safe.
How has Putin changed?
Putin's approach to diplomacy, you have noticed, has changed in the last year. What's new and what caused the change?
KIMMAGE
: Putin's diplomatic style is again aggressive, again confrontational, and again hasty.
He is giving ultimatums, behaving rudely and acting like he needs to get answers right away, which is unusual for diplomacy in general and Russian diplomacy in particular.
I can only speculate on the reasons for this.
Part of it is frustration: Putin feels that since 1991 Russia has been lectured and dictated by the West, that NATO expansion has been a solitary act by Washington, which believes it has the power and the right to make decisions not not only in Western Europe (which would be fine), but also on the doorstep of Russia, in the Ukraine and elsewhere (which for Putin is not fine).
Putin harbors grievances and resentments towards the West and is using this crisis to express them.
It is partly self-confidence or arrogance: Putin has immense military power and has shown that he is willing to use it (in Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, etc.).
He believes, not without reason, that this degree of military power gives him influence.
And he also believes that there is a disparity between the influence he has (in Ukraine and elsewhere) and the degree of respect the West shows him.
Another aspect of your self-confidence is your relationship with China, which you did not have in 2014 and which may encourage you to think that you can withstand and overcome Western resistance or Western pressure.
He also judges his foray into Syria in 2015 a success and may think that in foreign policy he is making progress.
It is also in part a low regard for the West that drives his behaviour: he claims to believe that the West is in decline, that it is no longer what it used to be, that US foreign policy in particular is a history of overreach and failure (Iraq, Afghanistan , etc.), that the United States is internally divided and less committed to European security than it claims, and that Europe as such, be it the European Union or individual European states, is weak, lacks organized military power and it is deathly afraid of military conflict, so the threat of this conflict can win concessions for Russia.
More than his Western counterparts, Putin thinks the world has changed in the last 10 years, to the benefit of Russia and to the detriment of the West.
In a sense, the tables are turning.
The central themes of the meeting between Putin and Macron 1:06
Does Biden have enough clout?
President Joe Biden has promised that US troops will not get directly involved in a war between Russia and Ukraine. Does the United States have enough influence to keep Russia out of Ukraine?
KIMMAGE
: No. What would change the dynamic would be the provision of US air power and troops to Ukraine.
That could stop Putin.
The threat of economic sanctions is something that Putin must take very seriously, but he must have anticipated it before his military preparation.
And the diplomatic leverage that the US has, the leverage that could keep Russia out of Ukraine, means giving in to Russia, which is not at all what Biden wants to do or what Biden will do.
If Putin does not expand the war in Ukraine, it will be because he never intended to do so in the first place;
because he sees some cracks in the construction of the transatlantic relationship;
or because he can start to get concessions from the Ukrainian government.
With the exception of maintaining transatlantic unity, which the Joe Biden administration has shown it can do, the US is not the deciding factor here.
The deciding factor is the cost-benefit analysis that Putin will bring to his decision to invade or not to invade.
The ball is really in his court, at the moment.
Why should Americans care about this?
What would you tell Americans about why Russia and Ukraine are important to them?
KIMMAGE
: Ukraine and Russia, in the winter of 2022, are very important to Americans.
Neither country is a big economic factor for the United States.
That is not the source of its relevance.
Ukraine matters for what it is: a large country territorially with some 40 million citizens, and a country with which the United States, since 2014, has made many commitments.
Ukraine's success will be Europe's success.
And the evisceration of Ukraine, on the battlefield, would lead to a Europe defined more by war than peace.
Throughout the 20th century, the United States made many sacrifices in the name of peace in Europe.
Now that is something that hangs in the balance.
Russia matters for what it is: after the United States, the world's leading nuclear power;
an axis of international politics;
a country with the largest conventional army in Europe;
and a country with the power to inflict immense damage on the United States and its allies.
It is no longer the Cold War.
Not everything revolves around the relationship between Moscow and Washington.
But even so, this relationship is fundamental to what happens in Europe, what happens in Asia, what happens in the Middle East.
The United States must be aware of the challenges and threats posed by Putin's Russia, and at the same time, it is not an easy task, the United States must preserve the lines of communication with Russia, it must engage in careful diplomacy with Russia, it needs to find the way to deal with a country that because of its nuclear arsenal cannot be defeated and with a country whose population is not hostile to the United States.
Ukraine and Russia are two separate balls.
They are difficult to juggle at the same time, but the Biden administration must do it.
There is not a huge margin of error.
Possible effects on oil prices due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine 2:53
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