The fall of Pablo Casado in eight acts

An eight-day via crucis.

From Wednesday to Wednesday.

The fall of Pablo Casado as leader of the PP is a short novel, which takes place in a week from February 16 to 23, but no less dramatic for that.

The intensity of those days for the history of the main opposition party reveals that the young politician from Palencia was a leader sitting on a powder keg that involved current and past generations of the PP.

The fuse caught fire on a field irrigated with gasoline.

This was how, one by one, the eight days ended with Casado as president of the PP:

First chapter.

The spies come out of the dark.

Wednesday, February 16.

It is after nine o'clock at night when

and

publish two similar reports almost simultaneously: "Plumbers from Genoa contacted detectives to investigate Ayuso's brother."

For the president of the Community of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso, and her chief of staff, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, the information is not a surprise.

They have known her since last December, because one of the authors has already told Rodríguez.

Upon finding out, Ayuso's adviser had warned the journalist in a premonitory way:

—As you make this matter public, the PP explodes.

That night in which the alleged espionage emerges, the lights are on in Genoa, 13. An emergency meeting has been called to coordinate the response to the information.

The mayor of Madrid, José Luis Martínez-Almeida, goes to the headquarters, and meets there with Casado's circle of trust: his chief of staff, Diego Sanjuanbenito;

his press officer, María Pelayo;

the Deputy Secretary of Communication, Pablo Montesinos;

and the general secretary, Teodoro García Egea, together with his personal team.

The leader will be surrounded at decisive moments only by his

and by a group of journalists who are his closest advisers.

—You have to deny it with all forcefulness, it is resolved.

Second chapter.

The secret meeting of the nucleus.

Thursday, February 17.

Ayuso reacts to the alleged espionage by going on the attack, with a volcanic appearance at noon in which he accuses the management of trying to "destroy" her.

The general secretary, Teodoro García Egea, responds to the attack by announcing a file against him and accusing him of irregular practices.

It is already public: the PP has been opened in channel.

That afternoon, the management committee is secretly summoned to Genoa.

Casado reports that he has a dossier on Ayuso, with information that came to him anonymously about the president's brother's contracts with the Madrid Government, to which he gives full credibility.

—Ayuso cannot be president of the PP in Madrid because she is trying to hide behind that position to escape this corruption case, Casado and Teodoro say to the rest of the nucleus, who receives the information with astonishment.

After ten o'clock at night, Casado's press officer confirms to COPE that it will be the leader of the PP and not its

, as planned, who will attend an interview first thing in the morning.

There are doubts in the team, but it is decided that Casado should go, fearing that criticism will intensify, reproaching him for being hidden.

That interview would become his epitaph.

The president of the Xunta de Galicia, Alberto Núñez Feijóo (left), and the president of the Region of Murcia, Fernando López Miras, talk during the meeting of the barons with Casado at the Genoa headquarters, on February 23, 2022, In Madrid Spain).

Alberto Ortega / Europa PressAlberto Ortega (Europa Press)

Third chapter.

The enemies, face to face.

Friday, February 18.

Casado shoots Ayuso on the radio.

"The question is whether it is understandable that on April 1, when 700 people died in Spain, you can contract with your sister and receive €286,000 profit for selling masks," he launches.

The content of the interview is not prepared in detail, like many of Casado's interventions.

He likes to improvise, and that day, that definitive message is from his harvest.

After the interview, Cuca Gamarra and Javier Maroto send messages of support to Casado in the management chat.

The direct team of the leader does not realize that he has just set the party on fire.

But Casado soon receives dozens of calls asking him to fix things with Ayuso.

He also hears that a demonstration has been called in front of the headquarters on Sunday in favor of the Madrid leader.

So he secretly meets her in Genoa that afternoon.

The meeting lasts three hours.

The tension between the two is brutal.

Casado gives Ayuso a long account of everything that has happened and urges him to shelve it with a joint statement.

She is very angry.

She leaves there with the commitment to agree on a text, but she would never get to sign it.

That night, Casado's press officer exchanges the draft of the statement with Ayuso's press officer, in which the leader of the PP backs down and considers his explanations about the contract valid and the file against her concluded.

The problem for the agreement is the part of the text on espionage.

Two versions are written.

The first says:

"The president of the Community of Madrid has been able to confirm that the leadership of the PP has not ordered any investigation into the professional activities of her environment."

Ayuso's press officer replies that they reject her, because she cannot confirm such a thing.

The second version they refer you to is much milder:

"Pablo Casado has assured Isabel Díaz Ayuso that he has never ordered an investigation into the professional activities around her and that he will take legal action against anyone who claims otherwise."

Ayuso does not consider the text confirmed either.

At half past eleven at night, they agree to finish deciding the next day in the morning.

In parallel, the phones of the barons smoke.

Casado's time is running out.

Fourth chapter.

The unsuccessful capitulation.

Saturday, February 19.

Génova reveals to the journalists in the morning that Casado and Ayuso have seen each other the previous afternoon and reports that the file against her will be closed.

Andrea Levy, president of the Guarantees Committee, finds out through a teletype that the file has been closed, when it is up to her to close it.

García Egea does not agree with the capitulation;

the decision is up to the leader.

Puerta del Sol takes little time to issue the response to Casado's transfer: "The meeting was unsuccessful," they settle.

In parallel to the failed agreement between the two rivals, the operation to bring down Casado is already underway, spurred on by events.

Since Friday, most of the territorial leaders have been in contact.

Two have a leading role: Alberto Núñez Feijóo, president of Galicia, and Juan Manuel Moreno Bonilla, president of Andalusia.

Together they will take all the steps.

Some of the barons are already privately asking Casado to dismiss García Egea.

Everything rushes because the land is fertilized.

The year had begun for Casado on a tightrope, without him knowing it.

Around Christmas, when the first polls are published that warn of a drop in the PP's voting intentions, party heavyweights begin to talk about the possibility that Feijóo will take over before the general elections.

Those days, Ayuso sends the Galician baron the message that he will have his support if he wants to preside over the PP.

Fifth chapter.

Rajoy is aware.

Sunday, February 20.

The demonstration in front of the Genoa headquarters, with more than 4,000 fervent militant supporters of Ayuso, is the straw that breaks the camel's back.

The Casado circle believes that it can survive by defending that there are Vox infiltrators in the protest.

But the barons and especially his future successor, Feijóo, already believe that the leader has to go.

Feijóo then consults and speaks with former Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.

Feijóo locates Rajoy outside of Madrid, on a private trip.

He communicates his decision to her and does not ask her for support.

He does ask how he sees it.

Rajoy now thinks that “Feijóo is the best to assume that responsibility and the logical solution” to this situation, according to sources close to him.

The former president answers a good number of calls in those days from relevant members of the PP who express their "discomfort" about the party's situation.

He also makes calls to other leaders, some of whom later participate in the internal revolt.

He does not give instructions, but asks: "What are you going to do?"

PP sources point out that in the final phase of this operation the other former president, José María Aznar, has no role, although he feels "enormous disappointment" with what Casado has done with "his party" and with Ayuso.

Aznar had contacted Casado at the beginning of last summer to ask him to stop his confrontation with Ayuso.

The president of the Community of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso.

© Juan Barbosa JUAN BARBOSA

Sixth chapter.

The 'vase committee' rebels.

Monday, February 21.

At eleven o'clock in the morning, the members of the management committee arrive in Genoa, a body that for many of its members acted as a vase, without any decision-making capacity.

That day is the first that the committee paints something.

The meeting lasts eight hours and is very tense and definitive.

Former minister Elvira Rodríguez opens a gap questioning whether the contract with Ayuso's brother constitutes a crime.

She is followed by Ana Pastor, who demands to know if there has been espionage or not.

Belén Hoyo is the first to request the resignation of García Egea.

She says it in front of him, without hot cloths.

In the meeting, very harsh phrases are heard against the secretary general:

"Teo is the worst thing that's ever happened to you."

He has done you a lot of damage.

During the morning, Casado and García Egea resist as much as they can, but the leader begins to see that he has lost favor with his people.

Casado decrees a lunch break and goes up to his office.

At that time, the others organize themselves.

The decisive action is that of the three spokespersons of the Chambers: Cuca Gamarra, of Congress;

Javier Maroto, from the Senate;

and Dolors Montserrat, from the European Parliament.

The three realize that if Casado resigns, he is obliged to convene a National Board of Directors, because that body is the only one that can appoint his substitutes.

They make calls to verify that it is so and that the replacement for Casado is ready.

Back from recess, everything has already blown up.

—You won't even be able to go out on the street.

There is only one way out: that you convene the congress, say several.

His closest ones also see the end.

Until Pablo Montesinos:

—President, you know that I entered politics for you and I will support you until the end, but we are dead.

Casado gives in late in the afternoon and agrees to convene the National Board of Directors, which in turn will have to convene a congress.

García Egea has been calling deputies, senators and territorial leaders to the headquarters to press for their support.

The leader and the secretary general want to come forward and resist.

But that Monday, Feijóo and Ayuso talk and agree on Casado's departure.

It is the most relevant agreement to boost the Galician baron, who already has the support of Moreno Bonilla and the rest.

Casado's time has ended, although there are still two more days to shore up his departure.

Seventh chapter.

Garcia Egea leaves.

Tuesday, February 22.

The group of former friends of Casado who make up the dissidence in Parliament, all relegated by García Egea, gives another key thrust.

Guillermo Mariscal, Mario Garcés, Carlos Rojas and Pablo Hispán, and some others who used to meet at the El Luarqués restaurant, very close to Congress, call Casado in the morning and tell him that they are going to publish a statement signed by the majority of the leadership of the parliamentary group asking for the dismissal of García Egea and a congress.

That morning, in addition, all the territorial directorates of the party, in a cascade, join the request for an extraordinary congress.

The spokesmen of the three Chambers spread tweets pressing for the conclave.

In Genoa, the leader still allows himself to joke with his peers given the seriousness of the situation:

"I don't have a big back for so many knives."

Despite the intense pressure, Casado does not let García Egea fall until the end.

At noon, the general secretary has a conversation with the leader, in which he asks what he has planned to do.

Number

wants to continue fighting, but sees that Casado has thrown in the towel, so it is he who announces his departure.

"If we're not going to go ahead and the project is exhausted, I'll make a decision," he tells her.

García Egea leaves Genoa and announces that he has resigned that night on television.

Eighth chapter.

The night of the long knives.

Wednesday, February 23.

Casado has come to terms with his end, but he is obsessed with achieving a "dignified exit".

He needs to agree at the meeting with all the barons that is held that evening in Genoa that they let him hold out until the extraordinary congress in April and say goodbye there.

Many want him not to leave that night without resigning.

The president of Andalusia, Juan Manuel Moreno Bonilla, is key to being allowed.

In the end, they accept before the image of a leader who they see completely dejected.

At half past one in the morning, the PP released a statement in which Casado signed his surrender and promised not to appear at the next extraordinary congress in April.

His via crucis is over.

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