The agreement with Lebanon was not signed in a vacuum.
Two military systems are at the head of its signatories.
One: the Second Lebanon War.
The second: the current Russia-Ukraine war.
What do they have in common?
In both cases, the countries that initiated the campaign had an intelligence failure.
Not an intelligence failure like on Yom Kippur, about the adversary's intentions and capabilities, but what I will call "self-intelligence failure": a failure to read their military capabilities.
Olmert and Putin had a distorted self-concept, of a military power that was going to wear down an inferior military organization within days (in the first case) or weeks (in the second).
they were wrong.
In the end, both were disillusioned and played down their army image for years.
The IDF discovered inferiorities against Hezbollah, and the Russian army "eats dust" against the Ukrainians.
In both cases, it turned out that the huge funds that the armies "drank" went to the wrong places - probably for salaries, and not for equipment and training - while the readiness of the equipment is in a catastrophic state (military forces, remember?) and the ability of the generals to conduct a real war (ie, maneuver) is faltering.
It is hard to believe that the Israeli government of 2006 and that of Putin in 2022 would have embarked on the systems if they had known upfront the quality and capabilities of their armies.
During Netanyahu's time (which reached its peak during the Kochavi era, in which he chose to be the Chief of Staff), the IDF became such that there is nothing and a half between it and a maneuvering army.
Under Netanyahu's leadership, the IDF has become the last one capable of deterring - not to mention overwhelming - Hezbollah. All of the "Netanyahu operations" in Gaza have illustrated to Hamas and Hezbollah that he does not intend to move a single tank battalion across the border. "Netanyahu's clashes" were and will be aerial and artillery only, those that contain terror. Netanyahu's military legacy is that Hezbollah's leadership will continue to reside safely in the Da'aheh district in Beirut, and that of Hamas in the Gaza metro. Rocket showers aimed at empty spaces are mainly intended to shape the minds of the Israelis who gather under iron domes.
Now Netanyahu is lamenting a lousy agreement.
Let's take his criticism as an axiom for a moment, and move forward: let's assume that Lapid-Bennet-Ganz and their government were also happy to sign an agreement that would have produced a more "masculine" and just Israel - after all, they have no doubt that what Netanyahu sees, their voters also see.
What do they know that we don't?
Apparently, for the next round against Hezbollah - Israel is not prepared.
What Bennett-Lapid did not do in their short tenure, Netanyahu did 12 years before.
Here is an army that was simply deprived of the ability to overwhelm and deter Hamas-Hezbollah.
In order for Israel to come from a better position in future international agreements, it must be ensured that the public agenda does not deal only with the agreement itself, but with the current security behavior and its implications.
A country's ability to sign an agreement is derived from its position in the region, and this is derived from its ongoing behavior.
The gas agreement is a worrying reflection of our position in recent decades.
were we wrong
We will fix it!
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