Two years ago, a few minutes after missiles were fired at Jerusalem, the IDF returned a stunning blow in Gaza. This was in the days of Chief of Staff Kochavi. It is clear that the IDF was ready and immediately implemented a certain plan. The IDF usually succeeds more in the first strike, and when an exchange of blows begins, its conduct is subject to debate.
In the current round, the IDF does not seem prepared with a planned response to the events that will follow the death of hunger striker Khader Adnan. A terrorist on hunger strike did not die suddenly. Allowing his death is also a decision. It was possible to prepare for the scenario of his death with a measured, precise response that would hurt the other side more. The feeling is that the IDF's response in the current round was intended to check off several targets, while being careful, God forbid, not to accidentally kill anyone there.
On the political side, it is clear that Prime Minister Netanyahu is the dominant factor in the response we have seen. But it should be clarified: in the parietal triangle of the security hierarchy there is also the chief of staff and the defense minister. If Lt. Gen. Halevy and Galant had demanded a harsher and more painful response, and had a prepared and convincing operation, they could have imposed their will. So it's clear that this is the agreement of the top trio.
The political consideration prevails over the military
Netanyahu's conduct is clear – he wanted to demonstrate control over a security incident with the potential for deterioration. Is firing rockets following Adnan's death, which resulted in no casualties, worth two to four days of fighting for Israel? Apparently, there was an understanding in advance that the goal was to close the event. But there is also the political consideration. Netanyahu's constant fear is that a rolling operation could become complicated and prolonged, and that American intervention would eventually follow. American intervention entails political traps in the Palestinian arena, while a short round mediated by Egypt leaves international actors out of the game.
IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Photo: IDF Spokesperson
At its core, this is a cultural change that the IDF has been undergoing for 25 years. The IDF has not only disconnected from Gaza, but also from the military culture on which it was founded, according to which the IDF will be able to fulfill a mission to the fullest, while adhering to the goal, and reach a decisive decision – preferably quickly. The IDF is no longer there.
As was evident in Chief of Staff Halevy's vague letter to IDF soldiers and commanders, they will receive missions from him in accordance with "IDF values." Can the government today assign the army a simple task such as stopping the rocket fire from Gaza and destroying the launching capability of the terrorist organizations? It is highly doubtful whether, in light of the IDF's "values," the IDF is capable of acceding to the request of the political echelon.
Minister Galant, Photo: Coco
Thus, for many years, the political echelon has begun to adapt its demands to what the military leaders convey to it. The result - repeated rounds and reliance on the deterrent effect. Deterrence works, but in a limited way, and the residents of the western Negev always pay the price when in Gaza or Tehran someone decides that the Jews should be shot. There is a price for Israel's acceptance of this situation. This is a moral price, as well as a propaganda one: the world understands, because of Israel's acceptance, that the Arabs are merely exercising some natural right to kill Jews.
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