A quick summary of Operation Shield and Arrow raises three immediate conclusions: First, Islamic Jihad suffered another severe blow, with the assassination of its senior operatives and damage to its operational systems and weapons production infrastructure. Second, the organization has not succeeded in exacting a price from Israel, neither in the Gaza envelope nor by firing rockets in depth. Third, Hamas was left out of the round of fighting and effectively prevented its expansion, leaving Islamic Jihad to deal with the consequences of the conflagration it ignited, thereby enabling a relatively rapid closure of the fighting.
Attacking Islamic Jihad targets | IDF Spokesperson
This is the third time Israel has recorded such a tripartite achievement. The first was Operation Black Belt in November 2019, which began with the assassination of senior member Baha Abu al-Atta. The second was Operation Dawn in August 2022, in which Israel assassinated Tayseer al-Ja'bri and Khaled Mansur, Islamic Jihad commanders in the northern and southern Gaza Strip. And the third was this week, in an operation that began with the assassination of senior members of the organization, Khalil al-Bhatini, Jihad Anem and Tareq Izz al-Din. In all cases, the organization tried to take revenge on Israel and failed, and worse, from its point of view, did not succeed in harnessing Hamas or expanding the fighting to other areas.
Don't shy away from confrontation
This success raises some insights. First, that Israel should not rush to the conflict in Gaza, but it should also not shy away from it – certainly not when opposing a small and brazen organization like Islamic Jihad is opposed. The organization sought to connect Judea and Samaria with Gaza, so that every fatality in the West Bank would immediately be translated into revenge fire from Gaza, and Israel gave it a clear warning sign about the price it would pay if it did not stop.
Interceptions over Ashkelon, photo: AFP
Along the way, Israel exhausted the organization's target bank in terms of senior officials who could have been eliminated and other targets (from sites for the manufacture of weapons to launching pits), while ensuring precise hits to ensure that Hamas operatives or civilians were not killed (except in the opening blow), so as not to drag the largest organization in the Gaza Strip into fighting that could have escalated.
Key player
Second, that Israel is almost completely dependent on the Air Force, which has been in the headlines in recent months for completely different reasons. In the current combat format, which prioritizes avoiding ground operations (and certainly in warfare attacks), the Air Force is the only operator in the offense, and the main key player in defense (alongside physical defense of the fence and civilian discipline of the public). In the numbers of Operation Shield and Arrow, as of yesterday, it looks like this: almost 96% success rate in intercepting rockets fired from Gaza, and over 100 Islamic Jihad targets attacked with some 130 munitions of various types, with very high accuracy.
IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy and Defense Minister Yoav Galant, Photo: ISA Media
Prime Minister Netanyahu, Chief of Staff Halevi and Defense Minister Galant assessing the situation, Photo: Haim Tzach/GPO
Third, despite its belligerent statements, Hamas is not currently interested in a campaign, or to be more precise: it does not want Islamic Jihad to drag it into the campaign. Hamas will do so (if it does) for its own reasons, and at a time that suits it. By the way, this could happen in the coming days around Jerusalem Day, if the organization feels that it has managed to gather enough anger on the Palestinian street and in the Muslim world around the Temple Mount. If Israel knows how to neutralize this successfully, as it did last year, Hamas will prefer to keep the Gaza Strip calm, working and functioning, and itself in a state of force buildup rather than damage control.
Closer relations with Jordan
Fourth, that Egypt was and still is the main effective mediator vis-à-vis Gaza. The money entering the Gaza Strip is indeed mainly Qatari (Islamic Jihad is financed by Iran), but in times of crisis the dialogue is conducted through Cairo. Israel must maintain this axis – which is also in the interest of the Palestinians in general and the factions in Gaza in particular – and act in parallel with the strengthening of relations that have recently weakened with Jordan and the Gulf states, and of course with Washington, which is needed for rainy days when international legitimacy is required for extensive action in Gaza.
Israel needs to strengthen its relations with Jordan and the Gulf states. Jordan's King, Photo: AFP
Fifth, that nothing fundamental has changed this week. Anyone who brags about changing the equation on the Israeli side is invited to go back to the beginning: this is the third time in three and a half years that Israel has repeated the same exercise, meaning that deterrence against Islamic Jihad is short-lived and in need of constant reinforcement. In the absence of a horizon for a fundamental solution to the Gaza problem (and to the Palestinian cause in general), Israel will continue to wage a campaign against Gaza aimed at holding as short rounds of fighting as possible in order to achieve as long pauses between them as possible. The government is advised to explain this truth to the residents of the envelope, before waking up in a few weeks or days to the disturbing sound of the next red alert alert.
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