It is hard to be surprised that the arrest operation got into trouble this morning in northern Samaria. The only surprise, if there is one, could be that it just happened.
For the past year and a half, the security forces have been working against terrorism in this sector. It started in Jenin, spilled over to Nablus and recently to Tulkarm. These are areas where terrorist organizations traditionally have a prominent presence, mainly in the Jenin refugee camp and the Kasbah in Nablus, and to a lesser extent in other towns and villages as well.
The PA does not exist
Until two years ago, this activity was largely halted by the Palestinian security forces. The IDF acted only in exceptional cases, when it involved senior wanted persons or an immediate warning of an attack. A series of internal processes – from political power struggles to economic conflicts and clan battles – have caused the level of governance of the Palestinian Authority and its forces in northern Samaria to deteriorate steadily, until it became almost non-existent. The vacuum created has been occupied (or initiated) by terrorist organizations, headed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, alongside local networks such as the "Lion's Den" in Nablus, with activists often joining them with their weapons.
Clashes in Jenin, photo: Arab networks
The initial result was a sharp increase in the number of attacks and attempted attacks emanating from northern Samaria, including successful attacks. This required the IDF and the Shin Bet to significantly increase their proactive activity in this sector, with the level of risk rising accordingly. Every arrest operation has become a complex event that requires planning, sophistication and often takes place under fire and endangering lives, while IEDs are activated at the forces and heavy fire from a variety of weapons is fired at them. "These operations look like a scene from the movie 'Black Hawk Down' about the U.S. entanglement in Somalia," a senior General Staff officer recently described.
The terrain is more violent
These are promotions that take place almost nightly, and often during the day, in order to surprise the wanted. The forces operate in a variety of ways, often in a cumbersome manner, with the goal of arresting wanted persons (sometimes it ends in their death) and cutting off contact from the field as quickly as possible. The explanation for why most of these operations remain far from the news stems from the fact that they end peacefully; The forces take advantage of their intelligence and qualitative advantage, combined with the element of surprise, carry out the mission successfully - and return home.
A helicopter fires over Jenin, Photo: Arab Networks
This morning, the operation to arrest two terrorist operatives became complicated. The force was exposed, IEDs were activated at it, vehicles got stuck in the area, and in the exchange of fire that ensued in an effort to rescue them, seven fighters were wounded, five Palestinians were killed and dozens were wounded. The IDF was also forced to operate, for the first time since Operation Defensive Shield, combat helicopters for cover and rescue assistance. The fact that this happened also indicates the increasing level of violence on the ground, and the need to use heavier means to deal with it.
IDF forces operating in the Jenin refugee camp. Archive, photo: IDF Spokesperson
This incident is unusual, as noted, but it draws a series of lessons. The first, which is known, concerns the level of violence on the ground. The militants in northern Samaria have lost their fear, and they are challenging the IDF more than at any point in the past two decades. The second is that there is an unimaginable amount of weapons on the ground – including particularly lethal IEDs – whose risk is approaching an unreasonable level. And the third is that it is not always possible to end operations "on zero", and in the military profession there are and will be also brakes and encounters and mishaps.
There is no need to occupy Jenin
The issue of cargo is particularly troubling because of their potential damage. The IDF should consider adding protective plates to the vessels in order to ensure the safety of the forces, even at the cost of heavy and slowing down the vehicles themselves, and it is also desirable that special effort be invested in reaching the laboratories where the IEDs are manufactured in order to destroy them.
IED in Jenin, photo: AP
All this leads to the inevitable conclusion that the time has come for a broader operation in northern Samaria. There is no need to occupy the area or regain control of it, but it is necessary to concentrate large forces and exhaust intelligence and operational capability in order to reach the maximum number of wanted persons and weapons within a short and limited period of time. The option of such an operation has been on the table for more than a year, but it seems that now the time is ripe to carry it out.
Defense Minister Yoav Galant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy were former commanders of the Jenin Brigade. They know the area well, and know that this kettle – which has long since become a locomotive – should and should be silenced before it becomes a deadly train.
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