Three decades after the signing of the Oslo Declaration, the Israeli government may soon be required to make decisions that will determine the future of the Palestinian Authority, the fruit of that declaration.
Documentation: A dummy launcher aimed at northern Samaria | Arab networks
The (unsuccessful) launch of the two rockets from the Jenin area at the Gilboa communities may convince even those who doubted the necessity of a broad operation against the terrorist infrastructure in northern Samaria. Israel will not be able to allow a process similar to what took place in Gaza throughout Judea and Samaria.
The main dilemma facing Israel's political leadership on the question of the nature of the campaign against terrorism in the West Bank is how to relate to the Palestinian Authority: whether to see it as part of the problem or as a component of the solution or "both" – in the spirit of the policy, unofficial, in practice. The decision on this question is essential in order to define the purpose of the efforts and to draw the boundaries of the sector for the activities of the IDF and the Shin Bet.
IDF forces in Jenin. Each entry into the area is weighed a hundred times, Photo: AFP
Maintain the Abraham Accords
As for the defense establishment, the main challenge it will face is to implement the "maxi-mini" formula in its actions: to achieve maximum damage to terrorist infrastructure, with minimal risk to our forces and without introducing additional arenas and "actors" into the campaign. In addition to the arrests of operatives and collaborators, the targets for its activity include the seizure of weapons, the destruction of "laboratories" for the manufacture of weapons, and damage to the supporting envelope of terrorist elements – the organizational and civilian infrastructure.
If Israel chooses to act in this way, it will have to take into account the difficulty of confining the activity to one sector, the possibility of revenge attacks from various arenas as it operates, and the possibility that terrorist elements from Gaza will not put their hands on the plate, as will elements among Israel's Arab citizens.
A helicopter fires over Jenin, photo: Arab networks
In addition, it can be assumed that Israel will be required to wage a campaign in the political arena and invest inputs vis-à-vis the Arab states and the Abraham Accords countries.
The many achievements of the defense establishment in dealing with the prolonged wave of terrorism are impressive and worthy of praise. Nevertheless, they have not yet brought about the desired strategic impact: the motivation for attacks is not waning, the number of attacks and attempted attacks is not small, and neither are the prices they exact. Against this background, there are growing voices who believe that the method of focused activity has exhausted itself. This claim was reinforced yesterday, in the form of rocket fire from the Jenin sector.
A dangerous adventure in Judea and Samaria
The development of rocket weapons in Gaza is etched in the memory of the heads of Israel's defense establishment and political leadership. The development attempts, which initially drew reactions of ridicule and contempt, quickly improved and enabled terrorist elements in Gaza to threaten large areas of Israel with these weapons. The Palestinian Authority's contribution to this reality, through its omissions and actions, is undeniable, and this too must be remembered as a lesson for the future.
IDF forces operating in the Jenin refugee camp. Archive, photo: IDF Spokesperson
Still, Israel cannot afford to embark on a dangerous adventure in the West Bank until it defines the political purpose for its action and not only its security objectives.
The political echelon will have to ask whether preserving the PA is in Israel's interest and whether it constitutes a "glass ceiling" for the activity of our forces. The answer to this, it can be assumed, will not make it easier for the military echelon in its work. The current government does not want to see the preservation of the PA as a national interest, but since this is an existing fact and in light of the possible costs, it will probably not act to dismantle it. The political echelon will be instructed not to see the existence of the PA as a barrier to carrying out actions necessary for security, but the military echelon will find it difficult to ignore the hovering shadow of the PA and its mechanisms.
Armed Palestinians in Jenin, photo: AFP
Another issue that is supposed to influence Israel's course of action concerns the "day after" the operation. The demilitarization of the territory of weapons and weapons in order to later hand it over to the Palestinian Authority apparatuses is a recipe for introducing the rotation system, familiar to us from Gaza, into Judea and Samaria as well. After all, it cannot be assumed that the Palestinian Authority in the 2022-2023 edition, on the eve of the succession battles for Mahmoud Abbas' throne, will be more effective against terrorist elements and local militias than it has been before. If this is indeed the purpose (purification and transfer to the PA), then it does not justify the risks involved in extensive action. In such a case, it may be preferable to continue the targeted raids, combined with targeted counterterrorism operations from the air.
To exact a price from Gaza and its headquarters abroad
In addition to the activity in Judea and Samaria, it can be assumed that the process of building the rocket capability in Jenin was carried out, at least with the assistance of Hamas elements from the Gaza Strip or abroad. If it turns out that Hamas exploited the freedom of movement that Israel allowed Palestinian workers from Gaza for this purpose, then it would be right to stop this dangerous experiment altogether.
The writer is the head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem, served as head of the National Security Council between 2021-2017 and is a senior member of the Israel Security Agency.
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