When he launched the war on Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin thought the Russian people would be able to distinguish "real patriots from scum and traitors." He said this at an event in Moscow's Luzhniki stadium a month later, where he also saidthat the Russian fifth column was made up of those who had left the country or refused to serve in the army. He was wrong: the first major blow was not dealt by any democratic dissident, but by the same mercenaries whom a month ago he congratulated for the conquest of the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut. The Wagner group's rebellion last weekend has shown cracks in loyalty to the Russian president and exposed weaknesses in his control of the regime. To the consequences of the failed military coup attempt in the middle of the war against Ukraine are added other open fronts to which Putin is exposed, from social detachment from his figure to economic deterioration, through growing international isolation.
The silence of many figures close to the Kremlin during the advance of the mercenaries towards Moscow has been more thunderous than the diatribes against the leadership of the army and the Ministry of Defense of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner's boss. Striking has also been the reaction of the Russian people themselves, who supposedly supported the leader without fissures: no demonstration was formed in support of Putin, while the rebel troops were entertained by groups of citizens in their advance towards the Russian capital.
The indifference of the population to the coup has set off alarms in the Kremlin after 23 years in which Putin seemed essential. The president is now trying to regain contact with citizens, from whom he distanced himself with the pandemic.
Putin has also shown signs of trusting his advisers less and less. After allowing Wagner's boss to leave for Belarus, one of the most popular generals, Sergei Surovikin, has been questioned about his close relationship with Prigozhin. The internal division of the army has become even more palpable after the mutiny and there is another great one singled out: the Minister of Defense, General Sergei Shoigu, who many remember is from the president's inner circle, but not a career soldier.
Putin's plans have revealed fissures this past week. The military industry is working at full capacity and the missiles to attack Ukraine have not been exhausted, but the insurrection of Prigozhin, with whom many soldiers sympathize for having dared to criticize the high command, has shown the disenchantment of part of the Russians. In addition, the sharp devaluation of the ruble and the new extraordinary taxes reveal that the economic situation is not as buoyant as the Kremlin presumes. International sanctions also take their toll.
The clock is ticking and on the horizon are the presidential elections of March 2024. The margin for error is narrowing amid the indifference of citizens after 16 months of war.
Yevgeny Prigozhin, June 24 in Rostov-on-Don.AP
Russian society, between indifference and fear
At the end of Moscow's Novi Arbat Avenue, a monument recalls that "three defenders of democracy" were killed there when they demonstrated along with thousands of others in front of the coup plotters who sought to evict Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. They died at the hands of the battalion led by a then unknown Sergei Surovikin, until a week ago one of the most acclaimed generals of the Russian Armed Forces and comrade of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Unlike three decades ago and despite the request to narrow ranks around the president, citizens did not take to the streets to show their support for the government after the failed rebellion against the high command and against the Kremlin on June 23 and 24. Fear, indifference and weariness were the feelings aroused by the military and political confrontation in ordinary Russians.
"In 1991 we were clear that there was a good side and a bad side. Now there is no choice: bad or bad," says a Muscovite who had started university when the coup of the communist leadership against Gorbachev took place. He was not afraid to show his face publicly. Today, like many others, he prefers to speak from anonymity. "The best thing for us will be the least bad option," he adds.
Another woman, Asia, believes that the political situation is not in her hands. "I understood that the situation was serious [when Wagner's coup attempt occurred], but I could not influence it. I was afraid, I planned what to do if something really serious had happened," she says over the phone. His alternative was to go to Kazan, about 800 kilometers east of Moscow. Many Russians went to their dachas, the country houses on the outskirts, until everything calmed down.
Denis was in Kazan — not his real name, as he wants to preserve anonymity — that weekend. "I watched the situation from a distance and felt somewhat safer. I couldn't help but a mix of emotions ranging from fear and euphoria to panic and a strong sense of curiosity about the end result," says the thirty-year-old. "I don't align myself with either side, I just hope that any change will happen progressively and not through a revolution. The last thing I want to see is another senseless war," he adds.
"Everything has happened" and "it has been a circus" are two of the phrases most repeated by the Russians, despite the fact that a column with thousands of rebels advanced eight days ago towards the capital shooting down helicopter gunships and taking military installations. For many, it has been an anecdote and practically stopped talking about it a few days later.
"On Sunday, no one remembered," says Anna. A native of Voronezh, the second region through which Wagner passed while threatening to enter the capital, he tells by telephone how his family and friends lived through those events. "My parents wanted to go to the country house on the weekend, but [the authorities] declared the anti-terrorist operation and all exits from the city were cut off; In the end they stayed at a friend's house." "They didn't understand my panic," she adds.
Russians could see, even through official channels, that an armed mutiny was unfolding in their country. "The panic is incomprehensible," a friend of hers wrote to Anna, "the news speaks of a burning depot and that the police and the National Guard have reinforced the city, but while driving to work I saw nothing. Everything is fine overall." That fuel tank had been bombed by Russian forces to hinder the advance of the rebels, as well as a bridge between two nearby villages. "They told me that the son of an acquaintance could not go home," says Anna.
Russian state media experienced the crisis "not with fear, but with adrenaline." "I didn't understand anything," says a TV station worker who wants to remain anonymous. "During Friday night I thought everything had been manufactured, I didn't believe anything. On Saturday I had the feeling that something was happening, but that it would end well. And they fixed it!" he writes via mobile. And he emphasizes: "I would say it was thanks to President [Putin] and [Aleksandr] Lukashenko," the president of Belarus, who mediated the confrontation. Prigozhin finally stopped the advance towards the capital and withdrew his mercenaries from the occupied facilities in Rostov-on-Don to then go into exile in the neighboring country.
"This indifference of Russians to what might happen to the government is an indication that they do not support it [Putin] and that it can be very easy to change one for the other," said Oleg Lukin, a Russian researcher at the World Order analysis website. "This event reinforces the idea that Russia is a kidnapped country. In this case by a criminal organization that wanted to overthrow another," he says.
Hours after Wagner's rebels retreated to the cheers of the residents of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh, Muscovites were back to normal life. But Putin showed signs of changing pace. After being cut off from the world by the pandemic since 2020, he plunged into a crowd Wednesday on an express visit to Derbent, capital of the republic of Dagestan. Hugs, screams, selfies. A gesture aimed at showing that he still enjoys the support of the average Russian.
Although several political voices called for unity around the president as soon as the mercenary rebellion began, the State Duma did not meet until Tuesday to address this crisis and call for unanimous support for Putin. "The lesson we learned on June 24 is very simple: we are more united," said Leonid Slutski, leader of Russia's populist Liberal Democratic Party.
The rebellion coincided with a survey conducted at the time by the independent Levada sociological think tank. The poll showed that the crisis has sunk the public image of both the mutineer and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Prigozhin's approval sank from 58 percent on the eve of his uprising to 34 percent earlier this week, while support for Shoigu fell from 60 percent to 51 percent. In addition, it is striking that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov (71%) is better valued. The leader of the Caucasian republic took more than half a day to pronounce himself in favor of Putin.
Putin's approval has remained stable at around 82% of Russians, although another poll conducted by Levada from June 22 to 28 shows that the percentage of the population that considers the country "going in the right direction" fell from 67% to 61% – the figure reached 53% on the Saturday of the riot.
A terrace of a restaurant in Moscow, on June 25. Alexander Zemlianichenko (AP)
The elite have taken note of the success of a critic Prigozhin and Kadyrov against a Kremlin and a Ministry of Defense that do not admit mistakes. Before the mutiny, 19% of those surveyed by Levada were willing to support the owner of Wagner if he ran for president in 2024, although this figure fell to 10% after rebelling against the government.
Despite the failed military coup attempt, the mercenaries' products have not been banned, but have become a bestseller in Russia. Ozon and Wildberries, the main Russian online trading platforms, offered this Saturday 12,228 and 16,278 items under the label "Wagner": flags, patches, key chains, mugs, t-shirts ... with the skull of the rebels and even images of Prigozhin himself.
While online sales have skyrocketed, military and souvenir shops are much harder to find their products, at least in the capital. "No, we have nothing," a saleswoman replied this week with obvious nervousness when asked if she offered anything from Wagner. The mutiny was still fresh and he had not yet assimilated that the group is actually still legal thanks to Putin's guarantee of its security: mercenaries will be able to join the army, go to Belarus or lay down their arms.
The electoral horizon
War is about to enter the election campaign in Russia. There are nine months left for the presidential elections in March 2024 and Vladimir Putin has not yet announced whether he will be a candidate again, although at the political level he keeps the situation under control for the moment: the democratic opposition is in prison or in exile, and the parties that are part of Parliament have reiterated their loyalty to the president after the Wagner riot.
But the most important elections for the Kremlin will not be the Russian ones, but the American ones in November. Putin's great hope is the return of Donald Trump, who insisted this week in an interview with Reuters that Ukraine must be forced to make concessions to Russia.
The Kremlin's satellite parties have urged unity around Putin, but it has been striking that they took their time to openly side with the president. The leader of the ruling opposition, Communist Party of Russia Chairman Gennady Zyuganov, waited for Putin to address the nation to denounce the military mutiny more than 12 hours after it began. And the speaker of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, one of the first to criticize the rebellion, waited until eleven o'clock in the morning of Saturday 24, with the column of mercenaries on the way to Moscow.
The general feeling is that Putin has closed the Wagner conspiracy only temporarily with his pardon of the mercenaries. "Some actors may have the impression that playing with power and even an open rebellion with victims will not have consequences that are dangerous for them personally: they will win (take power) or they will not lose (they will be pardoned and exonerated from responsibility)," says Mikhail Karyagin, an expert at the Center for Political Conjuncture.
"How is the political system going to stabilize like this?" asks Kariaguin, recalling that the Russian authorities criticize, on the one hand, an international order with unwritten rules, while pointing out that the law does not apply to certain people in the country.
Dissident Alexei Navalny announced at one of the hearings of a new trial he faces that his team will contact Russians who support the war to try to convince them of its failure. According to the opponent, 20% of the population has lost an acquaintance in combat compared to 5.6% at the beginning of the mobilization last year.
Barely a tenth of Russians support Navalny's actions, according to a poll by the Levada institute. However, the political threat may arise in the most unexpected place. In the last national elections, the legislative elections of 2021, it was the head of the Communist Party in Moscow, Valeri Rashkin, who led the demonstrations for an alleged massive electoral fraud through electronic voting. Only his arrest weeks later quelled the protests.
Those elections took place in a more or less stable scenario. The 2024 presidential election, if Putin's plans do not change, will take place on the second anniversary of a war that has already cost more lives than those in Chechnya and Afghanistan.
The battle in Ukraine
The Russian president is today little more or less than the devil in Ukraine, where they perceive with some relief the storm of instability that clouds the high spheres of power of the Kremlin, now that Kiev has launched the expected counteroffensive to recover the occupied territory in the south and in the east. "I better not tell you what I think of him," Anastasia, a 22-year-old woman, replies at street level in the Ukrainian capital. After his attempts to subjugate Kiev's levers of power failed in the last two decades, Putin launched in 2014 the illegal annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, in the east, and finally, the great invasion of February 2022. It did so driven by an imperialism with the aroma of the Soviet Union and supported by its particular distortion of history, which considers the neighboring country, independent in 1991, an artificial entity. His obsession with Ukraine – its "denazification", he insists – and his determination to subdue it by arms have not only left Putin almost isolated from the rest of the planet, but have multiplied the food, economic and energy crises.
No one feels, in any case, that Putin's designs will evaporate after the notorious conflict with Wagner's boss. "It is not true that Putin is forced to backtrack on his plans for Ukraine. It hasn't done it for 16 months and I don't think it will do so in the future," said Yevhen Mahda, director of the Institute of World Policy in Kiev. "Putin believes that Ukraine is an artificially created territory, he believes that the United States is at war with Russia in Ukraine ... And that country is occupying what he calls 'historical Russian lands,'" explains this political analyst. In that sense, it has systematically tried to subdue the neighbor. "In February 2022, they hoped to capture Kiev in three days, force Ukraine to change the government, and then they hoped to use Ukrainian potential to move deeper into Europe," Mahda said. Now, the Russian leader faces the counteroffensive that Kiev has initiated.
Wagner's Mercenaries, on June 24 in Rostov-on-Don. STRINGER (REUTERS)
"Putin is more threatened than me," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky concluded Friday during a meeting with Spanish media. "Only Russia wants to kill me and Putin everyone wants to kill me."
A bleak economic outlook
The Russian economy is reeling. Its financial system withstood international punishment in 2022 better than expected, but the effect of Western sanctions, the drastic reduction in public revenues derived from the sale of energy and the increase in military spending have caused the budget deficit projected for the entire fiscal year to be exceeded between January and April. by accumulating a hole of 3.4 trillion rubles (41,000 million euros). The Kremlin's need to further increase investment in its military to try to reverse the dynamics on the battlefield clashes with the intention of mitigating as much as possible the impact of the war on Russian society to prevent outbreaks of discontent from arising.
The unprecedented battery of sanctions that the EU, the United States and other allies approved at the beginning of the invasion caused the ruble to plummet to record lows and the Moscow Stock Exchange suspended its activity for a month. Various analysts projected a contraction of more than 15% of Russian GDP in 2022; US President Joe Biden said it would be reduced "by half in a few years". After the first impact, the Central Bank doubled interest rates and injected liquidity into banks while hydrocarbon exports soared with sales to China and India. The trade surplus grew by 70% last year, exceeding 300,000 million euros, and GDP only decreased by 2.1%, less than at the beginning of the pandemic.
The effects of sanctions on Russian crude have been delayed until 2023. Since December, the EU, the G-7 and Australia imposed a total veto on imports and a cap of 60 dollars on the price of barrels of crude oil from the Eurasian giant and transported by Western shipping companies to any destination. In the first five months of 2023, revenues from oil and gas sales plunged 52% from the same period a year earlier and the ruble marked its lowest level against the dollar since the early stages of the war.
Faced with the bleak economic outlook, and with the troops deployed in Ukraine increasingly exhausted and with fewer resources, the Kremlin is looking for formulas to multiply military spending without having a profound impact on the quality of life of Russian society, already depleted by inflation. It is not known how much Russia invests in paying for the war. Since the spring of 2022, the public budget has become less and less transparent and the government finances the war effort through indirect means.
Even so, the increase in Russian military spending has been less than expected given the symptoms of weakness exhibited by its army in Ukraine. The Economist estimates that Moscow devotes no more than 3% of GDP to war money, while the USSR invested more than 60% in some stages of World War II. The German Council on International Relations (DGAP) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimate that Russia has raised total defense spending to about 5% of GDP, up from 3.6% in 2021.
"Unlike Ukraine, which activated a war economy, Russia tries to avoid public spending cuts," says Guntram Wolff, director of the DGAP. "The option of mobilizing all the resources of the country to finance the war, Soviet-style, would be tremendously damaging in economic terms and extremely dangerous for Putin," adds the German economist. Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, a researcher at SIPRI, believes that the Kremlin "still has enough room for maneuver" to increase military spending without adopting drastic measures for the population. Both Wolff and Béraud-Sudreau stress that the Russian National Investment Fund has assets worth more than 150,000 million euros.
Several factors further blacken the economic outlook. On the one hand, the West keeps frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank worth around 300,000 million euros. On the other hand, Moscow is investing huge amounts in rebuilding the Ukrainian city of Mariupol – its biggest conquest in 16 months – and in the social benefits of the inhabitants living in the occupied areas of the Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, illegally annexed in the autumn.
The demographic drain and the flight of companies and human capital exacerbate the serious economic situation. More than a million Russians have gone into exile since February 2022. And 300,000 men were forcibly mobilized to the front. The unemployment rate is at an all-time low of 3.2 percent, but various sectors, such as the arms industry, have been severely affected by a shortage of skilled labor and the inability to import Western technology. Moscow has forced regional governments to assume part of the war spending, such as uniforms and military equipment – very precarious, generally – of young people recruited on its territory.
The union of adversaries on the international stage
The future of Putin's regime depends to a large extent on the evolution of the international context. The development of the war in Ukraine or the vicissitudes of the Russian economy are linked to the decisions taken by the West, China and other major players on the global chessboard.
From the outset, the Western core that has imposed sanctions on the Russian economy (about 40 countries) or that supports Ukraine with weapons (about 30) plays a fundamental role. Supplies are an essential key to the balance of forces in the war, and sanctions, while not bringing the Russian economy to its knees, have hurt it.
On this front, the outlook for the Kremlin is not good, as there is a strong determination of the adversaries to remain united and insist on that line. Since the beginning of the invasion, NATO has expanded, the EU has responded with unity and has overcome dependence on Russian energy, while relations between Atlantic and peaceful democracies are strengthened.
Secondly, China's action is of enormous importance. Beijing has been exhibiting its determination to strengthen a strategic relationship with Russia, with which it shares the suspicion of the pre-eminence of the Western world. Trade between the two countries between January and May this year was 40% higher than the previous year. China has bought more Russian energy and increased exports to a Russia under sanctions.
However, the relationship between Beijing and Moscow has clear limits. China has not provided, to be known, military support, and is also avoiding exports of advanced and sensitive products, because it fears secondary sanctions by the United States, a vastly more important trading partner for it. In any case, this development of Sino-Russian relations is, de facto, a path that leads to a Russia in a position of strong inferiority and dependence on China.
Chinese and Russian Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on March 20 in Moscow.Sergei Karpukhin (AP)
Thirdly, the relationship with a wide sector of countries that some define as the global south or that can be considered non-aligned is relevant. While there were 141 countries that condemned the invasion of Ukraine in the UN General Assembly, a hundred of them – plus another fifty who abstained or did not participate in the vote – do not want to impose sanctions or cut ties with Russia. India, in particular, is throwing a lifeline with large oil purchases; Brazil is waging a diplomatic offensive that the Kremlin appreciates by demanding that Moscow's reasons and the alleged provocations of the West and Kiev be considered; the re-election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey was also good news for Russia.
Here too, however, there are difficulties for the Kremlin. India does not intend to cut ties, but moves away from its dependence on Russian arms sales and moves closer to Washington; Brazil's influence is very low; the crisis with Wagner complicates the projection of influence in African countries where the mercenary group was the longa manus of Moscow. In addition, the relationship with Riyadh within OPEC+, good in recent years, has shown signs of deterioration and divergences in recent weeks.
Finally, Moscow is also questioned the projection of its influence in what it considers its backyard. The countries of Central Asia are looking ever more intensely towards Beijing – with Kazakhstan particularly oriented towards a position of independence; in the Caucasus, Turkish-backed Azerbaijan wins over Russia-backed Armenia. And in Europe, Moldova is stepping on the accelerator to join the EU.
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