By the end of 2022, the political map of Latin America was tinged with left-wing or center-left governments. In October of that year, Lula had just been elected for the third time as president of Brazil and with it was completed what was called the second Latin American pink wave of the XXI Century. The first wave, remember, had occurred at the beginning of the century with the rise to power of characters such as Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, Pepe Mujica, Néstor Kirchner, Ricardo Lagos and Lula himself.
With the departure of Jair Bolsonaro from the presidency of Brazil, the largest countries in the region were again headed by governments identified with the left: Alberto Fernández in Argentina, Luis Arce in Bolivia, Lula in Brazil, Gabriel Boric in Chile, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, López Obrador in Mexico and Pedro Castillo in Peru. In addition to them, the regimes of three other countries in the region tend to identify with the left (Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela), although in these cases with questions for their lack of respect for democratic principles.
Overall, the rise of the two pink waves in Latin America has occurred as part of the pendulum political movements in the region. The growing social demands, unsatisfied by the neoliberal governments that prevailed in the region, are still in force. Widespread poverty and enormous inequality remain hallmarks of the region. Progressive Latin American governments have tried to address these issues in different ways and with different strategies. Some have resorted to traditional populist policies, which are often unaccountable and ignore macroeconomic balances. Not surprisingly, these cases have ended up leading their countries into recurring episodes of inflation, devaluation and crisis. That was the case of Chávez-Maduro's Venezuela, but also of Cristina Fernández's Argentina. Others began their efforts with profound social reforms and claims of race and class. Some even wanted to carry out economic and political reforms of greater depth and scope, which ended in unsuccessful semi-authoritarian attempts at political perpetuation. In other cases, such as Uruguay and Chile, progressive democratic governments opted for moderate policies that led to some improvements but that, given the traditional erosion in the exercise of power, ended up being insufficient to address social demands and had to give way to political alternation.
The question now is how successful this new Latin American pink wave will be. Will it manage to transcend more than the first wave? Will it be enough for the region's economies to solve their most pressing social problems? Can he get the region's economies to make an economic leap and get out of the middle-income trap they seem to be in?
The reality is that the scenario does not look easy. Not only is the economic environment now more complicated than it was at the turn of the century, when a commodity boom facilitated the growth of South American economies. Now, after the pandemic and the inflationary process that followed, governments in the region face greater budgetary constraints. In addition, several governments won with limited margins, which has resulted in more fragile political balances and with some obstacles to pass laws more in line with their campaign promises. Such is the case of the Boric government in Chile, which faced a double major rejection, first of its proposal for a new Constitution in September of last year and then of its proposal for tax reform in March of this year.
Other progressive governments face problems of a different nature. In the case of Argentina, the Government faces a delicate economic situation, which has worsened in recent years and in which annual inflation is already above 100%. Colombia's Petro government is also struggling to advance its reform agenda. After having managed to pass an important tax reform at the beginning of his administration, President Petro became radicalized and broke with some moderate sectors that had accompanied him at the beginning of his Government. Not surprisingly, his political, labor and health reforms have faced rejection in Congress or not even been debated.
Petro's popularity, as in the case of Boric in Chile, is in tatters. Even Lula has already begun to suffer political attrition in his third presidential term and his approval rating has already begun to decline. To all the above we should add the defenestration of President Castillo in Peru that occurred at the end of 2022, which, as a whole, paints a picture not rosy (paradoxically) for the leftist regimes of the region. So far, the only progressive government that maintains its popularity and its prospects for continuity is that of López Obrador in Mexico, where there will be presidential elections next year.
In short, the reality is that Latin American leftist governments face a delicate balance between respect for democratic principles and values, being able to respond to growing social demands (which implies a determined fight against poverty and inequality) and maintaining macroeconomic stability. So far, very few governments have been able to solve this riddle.
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