Jubilee to the jarring alarm - and Israel is still mired in a debate over the Yom Kippur War. The dispute is being conducted as if it were a contemporary national decision. Since October 1973, the country has experienced two wars in Lebanon and two key withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula and Gush Katif. The argument over them left scars, but it is nothing like the wounds of Yom Kippur.
The main explanation is "The Rahav," as Prof. Yoav Gelber's book is called, the one that has spread in the six years since the glorious victory in the Six Days. The arrogance, complacency and contempt for the enemy caused Israel to close its eyes from seeing the warning signs of the War of Attrition. The joke at the time was that 300 Egyptian soldiers surrendered because three IDF soldiers surrounded them.
An innovative simulator seeks to teach the younger generation about the Yom Kippur War
At the outset of wars, many nations found themselves at a disadvantage that stemmed from the mistake of the political-military leadership. Chamberlain misled England with the "peace for a generation" he brought from the surrender treaty in Munich, and remained a minister in Churchill's government. In the Soviet Union, Stalin remained an omnipotent ruler, even though he missed the warning that Germany was about to attack his country. Franklin D. Roosevelt was also surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. None of these failures continued to occupy the affected nations for half a century, except academia.
The insights and the outrage
Something about the compulsive nature of engaging in war is indicative of some self-pitying victimizing tendency in Jewish DNA. 2,693 deaths are terrible pain (the number rose after the ceasefire), but not on the scale of panic that continues to preoccupy Israel.
Still, I, too, read eagerly about that war. The congestion of publications as a growing fountain. A spectacular mapping signed by IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy has just been published; biography by Yael Yanai about the exemplary pilot Avi Lanir, "A Short Life Story"; And an amazing book by Jackie Hugi, "Two Diaries, 1973", based on fascinating things written during the war by an Egyptian soldier who was killed and a living Israeli fighter, to which I dedicated a post on Facebook. After reading their books and memoirs and other research, I came to the conclusion that the outrage is understandable, but the preoccupation with the 50-year-old event is exaggerated. However, the following insights can be enumerated:
- Golda Meir occupies first place on the bench of the defendants in the trial of history. It pretended to be willing to discuss a proposal for an interim agreement based on withdrawal to the Mitla and Gidi crossings in exchange for opening the Suez Canal and a non-belligerent arrangement. Its refusal is at the core of the fracture. The attempt to whiten its black stain in cinema and the Bible will not succeed.
- Military Intelligence chief Eli Zeira lied to the government that he had employed "special measures" to obtain early warning of war. There is no atonement for such a lie.
- The Mossad failed, but less so than Military Intelligence. Zamir also did not warn that the war was at the gate until close to its outbreak.
- The essence of the spy - the Egyptian "angel" Ashraf Marwan - is still the subject of investigation, even though the Mossad claims that everything went well.
- Golda Meir had no option for a preemptive strike. It pledged to the United States that as long as the IDF was not withdrawn from the lines of the Six-Day War, Israel would be able to suffer a surprising first blow from the Arab armies. A preemptive strike would have deprived Israel of the airlift from America.
When the fighting ended, Brigade Commander Natan Nir sent me to Fayed Airport. I met Ariel Sharon, who was the hero of the fighting in the south despite the attempts to discredit him now. He told me that the IDF was prepared for the possibility that he would be surprised, as indeed happened, and that he had an appropriate defensive plan called "pigeon striker." However, his successor in command, Shmuel Gorodish, did not take care to implement it. Therefore, stopping the Egyptians was more difficult than planned.
Mr. Li said that the IDF was prepared for the possibility that he would be surprised, as indeed happened, and had an appropriate defensive plan called "pigeon striker." Sharon, Photo: Getty
In his album, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy notes that the spirit won the war. This is true, but the unpopular truth must be told: since the third day of the fighting, the political and military leadership has acted appropriately, in a spirit consistent with the heroism of the fighters.
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