1.
Five weeks after the outbreak of the Simchat Torah War, there is no Western pressure on Israel to stop it. And as far as we are concerned, the West that counts. In fact, the opposite is true. The United States, Britain, and even the European Union justify Israel's goal of erasing Hamas rule from Gaza. "The Hamas terror organization, or any other terrorist organization, cannot control Gaza," said none other than Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Union, an entity not exactly known for backing Israeli wars.
There are indeed certain gaps in the question of when and under what circumstances it is appropriate to embark on a "humanitarian pause" in order to bring the release of the prisoners closer. There is an American expectation to bring in much more water, food, and medicine, which Hamas has got its hands on, than we would if it were only in our hands. The Americans are also talking to us about bringing fuel into the Gaza Strip.
In the heart of the residential neighborhood of Sheikh Radwan: missiles are manufactured in one room and children sleep in the other | IDF Spokesperson
But pressure to stop the action, there is none. The pressure exists only in television studios, which are breaking records of demoralization and sowing division among the people in wartime.
Western countries have a variety of reasons and interests to back the cause of the Israeli war. Moral identification, fear of similar outbursts, responsibility towards their abducted citizens, and the fantasy that at the end of the day a Palestinian state will be established. The last clause is not going to happen, and the days will come when we will argue about it with those who now support us. But at the moment, whatever the reasoning, unlike all the rounds we have known and all the wars we have known, the relevant international players do not want us to stop, but to continue.
This approach gives Israel long-term political oxygen and allows the IDF to advance slowly, cautiously and aggressively inside Gaza. There are other reasons to hurry up, chief among them the economic costs and breathing time of the home front. But as far as the political-security aspect is concerned, it will not be the six days, nor the six weeks, but perhaps the six months.
2.
While the people of Israel are focused on the war and understand that politics will wait, an extremist, small and screaming group does not stop shouting "Bibi, Bibi." Two focal points for her. One, opposite the houses in Caesarea and Jerusalem, and the other in Studios 12 and 13. The war effort is in full swing. About 1,400 people were killed. 200,<> were evacuated. Dozens of settlements were abandoned or burned. The education system works at half strength. The economy is rattling, and they are like, "Bibi, Bibi, take responsibility, take responsibility." Like if he said the magic words, someone would come back to life. It's as if there's one leader in Israel who can say, "On my watch, this wouldn't have happened."
My personal opinion was and still is that Netanyahu should say "the responsibility is on me." It would contribute to unity among the people and take the issue off the agenda. But he, for his own reasons, chose not to say the explicit words. Right. We can move forward.
Moreover, everyone who listened to him, in the open statements and closed briefings, understood that he understood that the responsibility was on him. When presented with what he had said about Ehud Olmert on the issue of responsibility, his answer was, "Nothing has changed." In other words, it is clear to Netanyahu that the responsibility is on him. For some reason, he doesn't want to say it, and the more calls there are, the more you can understand why. He knows the obsession won't let up.
And so, much of the news broadcast and his press briefing this week was devoted to snooping on responsibility. This was the context in which Netanyahu said what he said about the need for the future, "to examine the connection between Sinwar's motivation and refusal."
I was there in the room. Netanyahu did not raise the issue on his own initiative. Journalists pressed and clicked. So he answered. After all, if he doesn't answer, they claim that he "doesn't answer questions." And when he replies, he is attacked for the answers.
Despite the flood of questions, Netanyahu did not say that the refusal lured Hamas to attack – which may well have happened. It is quite clear, by the way, that "brothers in arms" were quick to attack Netanyahu for what he did not say, because their consciences rebuke them for what they did and for the fact that their behavior may have provoked the enemy.
In any case, among the other things said at the briefing, it is already possible to outline what Netanyahu's defense lines will be the day after. First, he is expected to claim that none of the various cabinet members over the years supported a ground operation in Gaza. In Netanyahu's version, neither does Lieberman. During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, he presented the cabinet with the possibility of a full ground occupation. No one wanted him.
In the absence of occupation, the alternative was crushing from the air. This is the main tool Israel has used to curb terrorism from Gaza in the 18 years since the disengagement. "We thought crushing was enough. It turned out not," Netanyahu will say. And by "we thought," he means all the statesmen, and ministers, chiefs of staff, and generals who have ever participated in decision-making since Hamas took control of Gaza.
In addition, Netanyahu will recall that a few days before the war, he checked with the military leaders about what was happening with Hamas, as required by his job. He, as is known, was again answered that the organization was deterred.
In other words, Netanyahu will not remove responsibility from himself, but will only say that everyone is responsible, and that although the blunder happened to him, the concept that Hamas would not attack was shared by all decision makers, without exception. If this alibi satisfies the public, we will see after the war. Now is not the time to discuss this.
Netanyahu himself says that as long as the guns thunder and the soldiers fight, he refrains from dealing with questions of conscience and emotion. He sleeps a few hours a night – fatigue was certainly evident for the first two weeks – and concentrates solely on the success of the campaign. Everything else, including the "warranty", will be discussed the day after. If the reservists can hold back until then, so can the commentators.
3.
As our forces fight the enemy inside Gaza, another struggle is heating up in the Kirya, between two groups of influence that can be called "old" and "new." What is the struggle about? On the right approach to the Palestinian issue.
Among the "old" group is Defense Minister Yoav Galant, who made INSS Institute head Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Heiman his close adviser. Another appointment is that of Brigadier General (res.) Udi Dekel, to the position of advisor to the IDF on the question of the day after. Dekel advocates the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. I want to say, the army is still running in the minds of the "old ones".
Meir Ben Shabbat, Photo: Oren Ben Hakon
However, against it, especially against the background of the IDF's conceptual, intelligence and operational collapse in Simchat Torah, the influence of the "newcomers" is intensifying. At the beginning of the war, there was disagreement over whether its goal should only be a higher-level defeat by Hamas, or the eradication of the organization.
Some of the old ones advocated option A, the new ones favored option B. Their position was accepted.
The question now on the agenda is how to deal with the threats from Judea and Samaria. Captive to the 30-year-old Oslo concept, the IDF still projects its trust in the Palestinian Authority. In other words, no one is naïve to think that Abu Mazen's police are in love with us, but only that for their own reasons they are doing part of the work of eradicating terrorism.
But as such, the olds say, Israel must guard the Palestinian Authority from all guards. It should also turn a blind eye to its hostile activity against us, the salaries of terrorism and incitement, even though they are the ones that fuel terrorism in the long term. This is the way to achieve the best security outcome, the IDF thinks.
As our forces fight the enemy inside Gaza, another struggle is heating up in the Kirya, between two groups of influence that can be called "old" and "new." What is the struggle about? On the Right Approach to the Palestinian Issue
Fifteen years of Netanyahu's rule did not bring about a change in the concept. On the contrary, even a minute before the war, Netanyahu's cabinet implemented exactly the same method, including a very refined treatment of terror nests in Judea and Samaria, "in order to strengthen the Palestinian Authority." This was the permanent recommendation of the defense establishment, and Netanyahu used to rely on these recommendations.
The terrible cost in blood of the war opened his eyes too. Perhaps it is not worthwhile to adopt as gullible what the "experts" say. Perhaps it's time to listen to the "newcomers," who present a different, much more realistic approach. Who is included in the new group?
For example, the "securityists," headed by Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, who met with Netanyahu two weeks ago and advised him not to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. Another body that offers an up-to-date and sober approach is the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, headed by former National Security Council head Meir Ben-Shabbat.
In a short period of time, Ben-Shabbat gathered a group of talented researchers who challenge existing paradigms and present a firm and honest approach. For example, in a document submitted by the Institute to the Cabinet, the recommendation is to achieve an "expanded purpose" from the war in Gaza. In other words, not only to remove Hamas' threat, but to achieve deterrence vis-à-vis the entire "axis of resistance." And the Palestinian Authority, Misgav explains, is part of this axis.
"Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah do not accept the legitimacy of a Jewish state in the region, on any border, and are still committed to the ultimate goal of wiping Israel off the map and replacing it with Palestine, even if this goal is not achievable in the near term. The most central Palestinian ethos is reflected in every aspect of public and private life: from the Palestinian education system, which raises generations of children on the "lost paradise" stolen from them by the Zionists in 1948, to the curricula, which glorify and glorify terrorists; From the culture of 'preserving the keys to the houses' from which Palestinians were allegedly expelled in 1948, to the total adherence to the myth of the 'right of return'; From the names of the streets and squares, which glorify murderers of Jews in the past and present, to the children's camps, with the names of the former Arab neighborhoods in Haifa, Ramle and Lod; From ceremonies, plays and the media, united in their anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish messages, to Abbas's constant insistence on continuing to pay salaries to terrorists held in Israel."
Against this background, Misgav concludes that "Abbas's opposition to terrorism is not principled, but tactical. He sees terrorism as one of the legitimate forms of the struggle against Israel, but believes that certain forms of terrorism are less beneficial at certain times. In his view, there are times when more can be achieved through other forms of struggle."
In other words, the new say to the old, enough pretending, enough ignoring reality, enough being captive to false perceptions. We paid a heavy enough price for them.
In practice, the institute writes, "transferring the Gaza Strip to the control of the Palestinian Authority after the war will not prevent the regrowth of terrorist infrastructure, which in turn will eventually lead to further rounds of fighting. Therefore, it is forbidden to transfer power to the PA as long as it has not undergone a fundamental change."
Misgav's papers, as well as those of others in the new group, received a much more attentive ear in the political echelon following the war. For this reason, and perhaps also because it is clear to them that the cheese is moving, the old group organizes attacks on Misgav and other members of the new group.
But the bitter reality cannot be rolled back. The time has passed for the generals who have run our lives in recent decades, and who are now looking at us from our screens. They brought us no less shock than the politicians, and the public will speak freely about this the day after the war.
Wrong? We'll fix it! If you find a mistake in the article, please share with us