At 2:30 A.M. on the night between Tuesday and Wednesday, after many hours of discussions with the entire top echelon of the security establishment, Bezalel Smotrich motioned to his two party ministers, Orit Struk and Ofir Sofer, to leave the cabinet meeting room. This was after the prime minister and defense minister concentrated enormous efforts to get the ministers of Religious Zionism to support the approval of the abductee deal, answered every question at length and answered any concerns or doubts they had about the nature and feasibility of the deal.
Only a few hours earlier, Smotrich's office had issued a statement vehemently rejecting a deal with Hamas, making it unequivocally clear that party ministers would oppose it in a government vote. For ten minutes, the three of them – Smotrich, Sofer and Struck – stood in the corridor outside the Kirya conference room, deciding to unanimously support.
Further efforts made by Netanyahu that night to persuade Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to do the same were unsuccessful. The prime minister sent Gal Hirsch to speak about the heart of the minister of national security and dissuade him from opposing the deal that was being formulated, partly because of the need to convey unity vis-à-vis the enemy. In the end, Ben-Gvir and Otzma Yehudit ministers voted against it.
GPO
At the time of the vote itself, very few people remained in the room. Most ministers had exhausted the debate hours earlier, left a note with how they voted in the hands of the Cabinet Secretary and left. The atmosphere among those who remained until the end, including three Likud ministers – Ofir Akunis, Yoav Kisch and Miki Zohar, members of the small cabinet – and Attorney General Gali Bahar-Miara, was very serious. Feeling of historic seating. As they dispersed, they approached each other and shook hands. Baharav Miara also approached Netanyahu and shook his hand. Such a substantive and exhaustive meeting has not been seen in the current government since its establishment, and it was clear that Netanyahu, Galant, Gantz, Eisenkot, the chief of staff and the head of the Shin Bet had done everything possible to make it so.
Smotrich's matriculation exam
The political implications of the latest move are evident even before the deal is implemented. Among the leaders of the war, the most militant and determined figure is that of Defense Minister Yoav Galant. Prime Minister Netanyahu, after creaking at first, has been adopting Galant's offensive line, supported by the chief of staff, in recent weeks, and approving any plan the two bring to his doorstep. This is in stark contrast to the beginning of the war, when Netanyahu blocked a significant move related to the northern arena.
Gantz and Eisenkot lead a more moderate and slightly weaker line. Last week, members of the War Cabinet were presented with an outline for a hostage deal brought from Qatar by Mossad chief Dadi Barnea. When Gallant heard the terms, he rejected him outright. Gantz and Eisenkot pressed for approval. Netanyahu adopted Galant's approach, and Israel rejected the offer. A week later, Hamas improved the conditions and put the current proposal on the Qatari table, the one that was finally approved.
The separate vote of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir led to a reassessment of the balance of power within the coalition. Ben-Gvir remains the troublemaker, the extremist. With Smotrich you can work. When the government returns to its original form, with only right-wing parties, this fact will be taken into account. Unlike at the beginning of the war, when there was no substitute for any party in the original coalition, now the warming up between Gideon Sa'ar and Netanyahu may lead to a new hope remaining in the government, even after Gantz and Eisenkot resigned with Blue and White members. For the first time, Ben-Gvir will have a replacement.
Throughout the discussion of the deal, Smotrich sought a crack in the government and military determination to finish the work in Gaza, topple the Hamas regime and complete the full occupation of the Gaza Strip. He didn't find one
Throughout the discussion, Smotrich sought a crack in the governmental and military determination to finish the work in Gaza, topple the Hamas regime and complete the full occupation of the Gaza Strip. He didn't find one. On the contrary, the conclusion he reached was that there was no chance in the world that the IDF would not continue the fighting after the pause. He reached this conclusion even after investigating and demanding what would happen in a situation of violation of the agreement, of an attempt to text him, of deception on the part of the terrorist organization, of international pressure that might arise. The decisiveness and hermeticism of the answers he received caused him to change his mind and vote in favor.
For Ben-Gvir, the story is different. He objected not only to the nature of the deal, but to its very existence. First, because it discriminates between families and families and between abductees and abductees. She saves some, but abandons others.
Second, a prisoner deal is part of the concept that was supposed to collapse, in his opinion, on Simchat Torah last. Nazis don't talk, Nazis kill. The warrior spirit is strong and determined. The spirit of the people was also like this, and so was the leadership. The feeling from the first moment was that the story this time was different. No more rounds, silence will be answered quietly. To deal Gaza a fatal blow, a painful blow, a decisive blow. This time - finish it. Tear it to pieces. No mercy, no hesitation.
Just don't go back to the rounds
But then something began to crack. It started with bringing in water and trucks, continued with fuel, and now with a hostage deal, which includes a lull in attacks, and even a shameful agreement to ground aircraft for intelligence purposes. It is true that the IDF is in Gaza, and that the goals of the war are still the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the collapse of Hamas, but the road there is beginning to take the form of the old and familiar rounds of fighting. Another small international pressure – and we will withdraw from this goal as well. It shouldn't work that way in a leadership whose people's spirit is so strong and solid. The leadership of such a people cannot stutter, make deals with Satan, stop the fire.
For the first time since the beginning of the war, Ben-Gvir is beginning to talk about achieving the goals of the war as a political necessity of the current coalition. He does not give an ultimatum or threaten directly, but the message he conveyed to Netanyahu's people on Tuesday was clear: After the truce, the war continues to achieve its declared goals. And the whole existence of the government depends on it.
Not just Ben-Gvir. Religious Zionism, and even some Likud ministers, spoke this language this week. That the government has no right to exist without achieving the main goal of toppling Hamas. If they carry out the threat, Gantz and Eisenkot will not be able to help Netanyahu either.
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