Responsibility. The first to claim responsibility for the failure on October 7 was IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi. He was followed by Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva and Southern Command commander Yaron Finkelman. The head of the Military Intelligence Research Division, Brig. Gen. Amit Sa'ar, also clarified that he had failed to provide a focused warning that would have prevented the attack, as did the commander of the Gaza Division, Brig. Gen. Avi Rosenfeld, who admitted that he had failed to defend the communities.
The sharp-eyed will immediately notice that on this list of those voluntarily responsible by the relevant security agencies there is one senior absentee: the 8200 commander. It turns out that Israel's most central and dominant collection body, the flagship responsible for about 80 percent of the intelligence accumulated and produced for all Israeli intelligence services, does not believe that it bears any responsibility for what happened here on Black Saturday.
On the contrary, in internal conversations, the commander of 8200, Brigadier General Y., says that the unit provided all the necessary intelligence. That everything was on the table. Those responsible, in his opinion, are the Research Department and its head, who did not know what to do with the material they received.
Sa'ar, as mentioned, had already claimed responsibility, but the claim itself required an examination, which yielded the following astonishing finding: 8200 had everything in hand – it simply did nothing about it, nor did it pass it on. All the relevant commanders in the unit fell asleep on guard duty, headed by Brigadier General Y'. He was busy promoting the periphery (an important matter in itself), projects dealing with climate problems (ditto) and a variety of social and other issues, until he forgot to deal with the basic - intelligence. Read material from the people in the field, form teams, investigate, question and make difficulties, and turn over every stone to be sure that his unit is not wrong and misleading, even though there were those who cried out in Scripture that catastrophe was at the gate.
Weapons in children's rooms and under beds: documentation from the activities of the Shaked Battalion | IDF Spokesperson
When the commission of inquiry is established after the war, its hair will be nailed from the details of what was, and the disregard for what was, the lack of professionalism, the mishandling of the material. It will also learn about the unsuitable people appointed to the most sensitive positions of commanders of centers and theaters, some of whom did not even answer the phone to join a consultation that took place in the hours leading up to the attack, against the background of disturbing intelligence accumulated.
The 8200 warranty doesn't end here. In the months preceding the attack, real-time listening to tactical communications was halted. This is the basic communication between Hamas members – a kind of walkie-talkie – listening to which would have made it possible at least to advance forces and reduce damage. The cessation of real-time listening was carried out with the approval of all echelons; It was professionally motivated, but at its core was arrogance: the idea that we will know everything, always, in every arena and against any enemy.
Organizational-collegial. The chief of staff instructed immediately after the attack to refrain from internal wars and mutual blame until after the war. Later, he also agreed with the head of the Shin Bet to avoid inter-organizational battles in order to focus on the campaign itself.
The second reason is professional. 8200, as mentioned, is the flagship of Israeli intelligence. After the war, many questions will be asked about cyber addiction and the need to return to basics, especially in the field of human intelligence (HUMINT). But even before that, you have to make sure that the body that failed—and that can't look in the mirror and admit that it failed—doesn't fail again.
Brigadier General Y. is indeed an avid optimist who, since October 7, has been opening his every document with the title "Looking Forward," but when the possibility of expanding the campaign to additional and no less dangerous fronts is on the agenda, it is necessary to make sure that 8200 is on the right track. It is no longer a matter of ego, but of national security, in its deepest sense.
And two more comments on responsibility: The failure of intelligence does not remove an ounce of severity from the collapse of the physical defense systems, which turned out to be irrelevant in the face of the Hamas attack that was carried out. Nor does he remove an ounce of responsibility from the shoulders of the political echelon (especially the prime minister), who have been warned several times over the past year that the internal crisis is translating for Israel's enemies into weakness that could lead to catastrophe.
To a large extent, this is a tragedy of intelligence, which knew how to provide precise strategic warning and knew how to provide tactical intelligence of impressive quality to the forces on the ground, but completely failed to provide operative warning that could have thwarted or reduced the Hamas attack. The commission of inquiry will be required to deal with all these floors after the war, and it will find that all of them functioned far below what was expected of them, and in less euphemistic words, failed in their duties.
Pause. Those who attended the cabinet meeting on Tuesday night, at which the outline for the release of the hostages was approved, said that the chief of staff gave it the appearance of his life. He was focused, matter-of-fact, calmly answered every question, and even succeeded in persuading the ministers of Religious Zionism to reverse their early decision to oppose the outline – and support it.
The only ones who were not convinced by the chief of staff's remarks were Otzma Yehudit ministers. It is astonishing that those who support the release of murderer Amiram Ben Uliel opposed the release of abducted Israeli children. It is even more astonishing that two of the ministers (Amichai Eliyahu and Yitzhak Wasserlauf) did not even bother to stay until the end of the discussion. They deposited their vote, and went home. It was yet another display of irresponsibility on the part of an irresponsible group, which this time also turned out to be unscrupulous and insensitive: while the families of the abductees have not slept since October 7 (and who knows what the abductees themselves are going through), the ministers preferred to retire to sleep.
Intelligence to the forces on the ground is passing, the failure was to provide warning before the massacre. Exposure of a tunnel at Shifa Hospital, photo: Reuters
Let's get back to the discussion. The ministers wanted to know how the forces would defend themselves during the lull from fighting. In the background, it will be recalled, is the ceasefire in Operation Protective Edge, and the attack in which Hamas killed Hadar Goldin (and two of his comrades) and kidnapped his body. The IDF has made it clear that the truce does not require stagnation – it obliges him not to fight. The forces will be able to change locations in their areas of stay, as well as freshen up – an important matter as many of the fighters have been in Gaza continuously since the ground operation began, and some have not seen a home since Black Saturday.
The concern in the IDF is actually about incidents stemming from a lack of understanding. Fighters who recognize someone coming out of a tunnel shaft or from a house, convince themselves that it is a threat, and open fire. Such a local mistake could collapse the entire ceasefire.
Another question concerns the possibility that Hamas will take advantage of the truce to improve its positions. The threat is clear: tunnels will be rehabilitated and used, weapons depots and food and fuel stockpiles will be filled, forces will be transferred between sectors and abductees may be smuggled into new hiding places. These are tactical problems that the IDF is supposed to overcome from the moment it resumes fighting. The ceasefire will also allow the Israeli side to better organize for the next chapter in the war.
There were also quite a few questions about possible manipulations Hamas would carry out in the process of releasing the hostages. It can delay and hum the resumption of fighting for days or even weeks, while playing with live and dead hostages and the nerves of us all. Israel will need all determination in the face of expected pressure from the United States and Qatar to stop the war for humanitarian reasons, so that it can at least severely damage Hamas' infrastructure in the southern Gaza Strip.
Beyond the detailed answers given, the naked truth emerged: The State of Israel and the IDF failed to provide protection on Black Sabbath. They abandoned the kibbutz residents and those partying to their fate. This has created a debt that is many times greater than previous cases of kidnapping, certainly when such a number of civilians are at stake, including many children, women and adults. In the absence of an operational way to release them, Israel had to find another solution.
The obvious question is what would have happened if Israel had refused this outline and continued to press to push Hamas further into a corner, as some politicians and commentators have suggested. The fair answer is that no one has a clue. Hamas might have been even more flexible, but it is quite possible that it would have hardened its positions, and perhaps even begun executing hostages in order to push Israel into a corner.
The bad news is that Israel has made a deal with Satan. And Sinwar is a particularly bad devil, who is well acquainted with Israeli society and its weaknesses, and does not blink when he is required to sacrifice his people or ours. The good news is that we are not completely in his hands. On the issue of abductees, yes, but in the Great War, Israel can go all the way if it only implements its declarations.
And after all this it is necessary to clarify: the main thing is still before us. There will be tough, bloody, painful, nerve-wracking days and weeks here. Especially in the context of the abductees, but not only in it. There are risks in remission, but there are also opportunities. After the tough streak of recent weeks, the State of Israel needs some breathing air and some good news. The release of the hostages and the respite next to it should give her some of them.
Lies. Israel is focused on the war in Gaza and keeps a worried eye on the north and beyond, but the arena that particularly worries the security leadership is Judea and Samaria. The reasons are clear: the enormous effort Hamas is investing in unresting on the ground, the fatalities and destruction in Gaza, the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, the thousands of detainees and hundreds killed in the West Bank since the war began, the growing economic hardship as a result of the fact that 150,<> Palestinians do not go to work in Israel, and the fear of an increase in extreme right-wing violence.
The IDF attached security to Central Command General Yehuda Fuchs, as part of increasing security around the General Staff's generals in wartime. Right-wing activists also demonstrated near his home, as part of a well-known attempt to create deterrence against him. Fox is not the first general to be threatened or harassed, but it seems that now the records of audacity have been broken - in times of war, when the entire State of Israel is busy in Gaza and turning worlds upside down in an attempt to avoid opening more fronts.
Against this backdrop, here's an outrageous story that happened this week: A foreign media team from an influential country came to Israel to cover the war. On Monday of this week, he asked to do an article about the implications of the campaign for Palestinians who do not work in Israel, and went to the Hebron sector. When he arrived at one of the villages, he got into a confrontation between Palestinians and a reserve force. The reservists confiscated the crew's camera and cell phones and ordered them to leave.
The stunned staff rushed to leave frightened. In the meantime, another force arrived and took the camera from those who confiscated it and mistakenly handed it over to the Palestinians. Realizing his mistake, he took the camera from the Palestinians and returned it to the crew broken. At the same time, he tried to locate the phones. The reservists who were in the original incident claimed that they took only one phone and returned it. It was a lie: they took five phones, and didn't return them.
Only after the matter was raised to the highest echelons – and with a commander on the scene raising his head – was one phone found, and searches conducted into the night found three more phones lying on the side of the road. The fifth phone was not located, although the IDF sent many soldiers to search the area. They did so instead of carrying out routine security missions.
The day before yesterday, the brigade's commander, Col. Yishai Rosilio, summoned the foreign team to his office and apologized to him for the incident. He told the team members that the force in question belonged to the regional defense department, which had been recruited to reinforce the activity against the background of the war in the Gaza Strip. These are reservists who live in one of the communities in the area, and during their investigation they refused to turn in the soldier who detained the crew and confiscated the equipment. Rosiglio decided to immediately suspend them from activity until they provide the full details (recall that there is a suspicion that the fifth phone was stolen in the background).
This story is important for four reasons: First, because soldiers have no authority to confiscate equipment from civilians. They can call the police to take care of the matter, if there is an issue, and in this case there was no interest. This is even more true when it comes to journalists, who enjoy extensive protections, especially when it comes to information about equipment such as phones.
The second reason is war. The State of Israel (including the IDF) is investing tremendous effort in convincing world public opinion, as part of the effort to gain legitimacy for the continuation of the campaign. Such an incident is targeted damage, which does the exact opposite – it presents a different and ugly face from the one Israel seeks to show the world.
The third reason is the situation in Judea and Samaria. Most of the Jewish public is law-abiding, but there are elements in it that are convinced that they are the law. This case is a classic example of such confusion. A backlog of several such incidents – and some cases escalate into severe violence and damage to property – can trigger an unnecessary and dangerous conflagration.
The fourth reason is the lie and the crowding of lines in an attempt to advocate for it. Had it not been for a foreign team and a case that caused resonance, the issue might have been swept aside. The fact that he was personally examined by the brigade commander revealed disturbing findings. It would be a mistake to ignore them on the grounds that this is an isolated incident or a weed. The IDF must ensure that this is not a culture, otherwise the consequences could be severe.
The IDF Spokesperson's response: "An initial investigation indicates that the force exceeded its authority by confiscating equipment for foreign letters. At the same time, it emerged that the commander of the force acted appropriately when he acted to resolve the issue and return the equipment quickly. The incident is still being investigated, and the brigade commander has instructed that the service of the combatants involved be suspended until the investigation and disciplinary treatment of those responsible for the act is completed."
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