1.
It was not with a light heart that the War Cabinet made the decision on "the outline of a truce and the release of terrorists in exchange for some of the abductees." The deliberations of his friends, which incidentally ended on November 14, a week before the public was exposed to the details of the deal, can be divided into two parts: the period of truce itself and the route back to war.
The second dilemma, if the agreement goes into effect, will probably be more difficult. The Israeli side said in advance that the truce could last more than five days, and even expressed hope that this would happen, assuming that another group of abductees would be released every day. The most optimistic scenario was ten days of ceasefire, at the end of which 100 hostages would be returned against 300 terrorists. However, as early as Wednesday morning, Hamas expressed hope that the temporary would become permanent, meaning that the fighting would not resume at all, just as many in Israel fear. And of course, the murderers in Gaza have leverage that could push Israel into a corner, and that is the continued trickle of abductees.
In the mediation talks, Sinwar's people claimed that because of the destruction of the Gaza Strip, they knew of the location of only 50 to 80 abductees. In Israel, they tended to believe them. According to intelligence assessments, some of the abductees are being held by private individuals in Gaza and terrorists from other organizations. But even if this is true, Sinwar may be able to get in touch with at least some of the other abductees during the lull, meaning he will be able to release more.
What will we do if, at the end of the tenth day, Hamas announces that a group of abductees will also be released the next day? Will we renew the fire when the family members of the person slated for release beg on television not to do so? In this cynical and cruel way, Hamas can drag the ceasefire days and weeks ahead.
Netanyahu, Galant, Gantz, Eisenkot, Dermer, Deri and all the other partners in the decision were well aware of the prisoner's dilemma they might face at the end of the term. In order to tie themselves by force to the second round of fighting, the leaders promised themselves, the cabinet, the government, President Biden, and the people of Israel that the war would be renewed – whatever happened.
Netanyahu, in order to allay his own fears, but also that of the right-wing base that was outraged by the deal, told the government in the first sentence that the claim that "after the pause to return our abductees we will stop the war" was "nonsense."
Like him, Benny Gantz declared countless times: "Even if there is a lull to return our kidnappers, we will return and strike the enemy with all our might." Defense Minister Galant persuaded some of the undecided ministers when he said in the discussion that in the future "negotiations with Hamas will only be under fire." In other words, we will not drag the ceasefire beyond ten days, but will renew the fighting and enter into chapter two of mediation talks.
The government also added two "belts" to its decision, intended to ensure the resumption of fighting in any case. Galant's initiative stated: "The government of Israel, the IDF and the security forces will continue the war in order to return all the abductees, complete the elimination of Hamas and ensure that no threat to the State of Israel will renew from Gaza."
In addition, according to the proposal of Finance Minister Smotrich – who during the meeting switched from opposing the deal to supporting it – it was determined that the extension of the ceasefire would only be approved by the plenum of the entire government, and not only by the War Cabinet.
Egoz Unit Activity in the Gaza Strip | IDF Spokesperson
Still, both he and the others know that renewing the fire can be difficult. For at the core of the matter the question is on what course the war is heading. When Sinwar ordered Nukhba forces to kidnap Jews in the early morning hours of October 7, his psychopathic mind had a clear war plan. He believed that we would get down on our knees, hold the fire and beg our people. After all, in those first days of the war, his spokesmen still talked about releasing all the terrorists in exchange for all the hostages.
This plan did not go well for him. Israel embarked on a different course – a war of annihilation. She did not fall for his psychological terror, and did not agree to moderate the military action for the abductees.
That was the case until the government approved the deal. Once most ministers voted in favor, we were effectively on the chorales Sinwar wanted. Whether we will return to orbit No. 1 the day after the truce, assuming it takes effect, is still pending. This is dilemma number 2 that still lies before us.
2.
And there were many stomach flutters the day before. Is this really the maximum that can be extracted from Hamas at this time? Will Sinwar keep his promises? Is he even capable of delivering the goods? Isn't it foolish to supply the Gaza Strip with fuel that, at least in part, will fuel Hamas? Will the ceasefire be maintained? Is it right to give up six hours a day of drone and balloon surveillance of Gaza? Won't they be used to prepare a surprise counterattack? What will we do if the number of those released is smaller than promised, if a soldier is hit by gunfire, if "lightning" launches rockets at the center or mortar shells at the envelope?
And what about the damage caused by releasing terrorists? After all, the Simchat Torah offensive was born entirely as a result of the Shalit deal. Won't 300 underage terrorists ever be great?
"All security agencies fully support the decision; They made it clear in their full professional appreciation that the security of our forces would be ensured during the lull, and that the intelligence effort would be maintained during these days. They made it clear that the war effort would not only not be harmed, but on the contrary – it would allow the IDF to prepare for the continuation of the fighting," Defense Minister Galant used the IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad to validate his position.
A small problem lurks behind this argument. "All the security forces" are also those who fell asleep on guard duty that Shabbat, who did not understand Hamas for years, who claimed that it was deterred, who thought we had won Operation Protective Edge, and who recommended, well, the Shalit deal. That is, not exactly tall trees to hang onto.
With or without recommendations, after feeling that they had improved positions throughout the complicated negotiations, the decision of the small cabinet was in favor. Benny Gantz, chairman of the state camp, quoted sages and summarized the reason he decided to take the risks: "'There is no doubt that brings out the certain.' The supplier can be a lot of things that we might be able to get to later, and it's definitely here and now – and we have to bring it home."
In other words, bringing the women and children seemed within reach, which might not be acceptable later. On the other hand, all other problems, chief among them the military risks involved in the deal, are doubts that can be dealt with later. How?
Every day there will be a reassessment by the defense establishment and the War Cabinet of the status of the deal. Netanyahu and Co. will examine the extent to which it is maintained or violated, and whether the ceasefire should be continued or restrained. There is nothing to envy the decision makers. Along with the happiness that probably awaits some of the families and the entire nation, there will also be heartbreaking moments. Our enemy is bitter and cruel.
3.
When Joe Biden and Antony Blinken attended Cabinet meetings at the beginning of the war, there was concern in Israel that the Americans were waging the war. It was a false fear. Ankle Joe came to press the humanitarian issue, which is still very important to him, but mainly to back up Israel's war goals of destroying Hamas and returning prisoners. He left the conduct of the war to the Israelis. But what Biden himself and his people did manage were the negotiations for the hostage deal. According to a report in the online magazine The Hill, two phone conversations Biden had with the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, twice pulled the stalled conversations out of the mud.
In addition to the president, a secret and limited team was established in the White House to mediate between the sides. And there were a lot of them. Hamas spoke with Egypt. Egypt with Qatar. Qatar with the Americans and the Americans with us. It is true that in the middle there were trips by Mossad chief Dadi Barnea to Doha, and also that the Americans spoke directly with the Egyptians at one point. But the important phones, partly broken, traveled along the Gaza-Cairo-Doha-Washington-Jerusalem route and back.
Effective talks about the deal took place for almost a month. On October 23, with the release of two American citizens, Yehudit and Natalie Raanan, both Israel and the United States got the impression that there was someone to talk to on the other side. From that date, talks and transatlantic flights began, including by CIA Director Bill Burns.
Biden is required to exert personal pressure on the Emir of Qatar, as well as on its prime minister. One of the conversations with the Emir took place when he was in San Francisco, not Washington. In the end, on November 14, Netanyahu gave "general agreement" to the deal. It takes another week for a final OK from the murderers and for the approval of the entire government.
This record is important because it reflects how effective the pressure the United States is exerting on Qatar is already effective. The latter approached Washington in the first days of the war with an offer to try to secure the release of the hostages. It did take some time, but every time Biden demanded that they improve results, and they in turn pressured Hamas, they came.
Why? Because the war puts Doha in a very shameful situation. Just as the Saudis were caught naked on September 11, when it emerged that their citizens had flown the planes into the World Trade Center, so the Qataris are now being exposed as having provided the money and sponsorship to the terrorist organization that committed one of the most horrific crimes the world has seen.
The Qataris have been promoting radical Islam and incitement against Israel for years. Al Jazeera is just one of the tools they employ. Until the war, they compensated for the tango with the radical elements by hosting American bases in the Arabian Gulf, money for American institutes and universities, and, of course, supplying gas and oil to the West.
But Hamas's terrible war against Israel could put an end to the masquerade. That's the Qatari concern, at least.
Preoccupied with the horrors of war, Israel, for its part, was not available at the outset to exact the price from Qatar. Now that things have somehow gotten on track, you can hand her the bill, or at least the beginning. Qatar owes a national debt to the Jewish people, and it should repay it, and quickly.
4.
Only one Israeli official warned the public on Wednesday evening: "This is a complex process that I emphasize – it is not yet closed, and can take time." It was the IDF Spokesperson, Brigadier General Daniel Hagari, who suggested caution in light of the agreement in question with Hamas.
One can understand why Netanyahu and Galant need bombastic statements. They have a need to compensate for failure. But victory is achieved through deeds, not words. And it has already been said, "Do not praise a belt as a key." If they need help in this matter, they should contact the report
Defense Minister Yoav Galant, on the other hand, spoke that evening about the excitement gripping him at the return of some of the abductees. Galant, like Netanyahu, also stepped on an open shoe mine laid before them, when the question arose at the press conference whether Khaled Mashaal and Ismail Haniyeh were mortal. Gallant, when asked to answer, replied with the boast of a kindergarten child: "They live on borrowed time." Netanyahu, who was not asked about the issue, jumped in with a statement that no other Israeli prime minister has ever uttered, saying: "I gave the Mossad an order to eliminate the entire Hamas leadership."
One can understand why the two need bombastic statements. They have a psychological need, conscious or unconscious, to compensate the public for the terrible failure of Simchat Torah. Well, victory is achieved through deeds, not words. And it has already been said, "Do not praise a belt as a key." If they need help in this matter, they should contact the report.
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