The 50th day of the war was a distillation of what we have been going through since October 7: the rage, the pain, the frustration, the helplessness and the hope. The rage over what happened to us and what is happening to us. The pain for those who have paid and are paying the highest price of all. The frustration and helplessness that we are not in complete control of our destiny, but that someone else is playing with us diabolically. And the hope that it will still be good: that the abductees will return home, that the IDF will win and Hamas will be defeated, and that maybe something better will emerge from all this evil at some point.
Whoever thought Hamas would play by the rules didn't live here. Hamas will maneuver as much as it can to achieve its main goal: extending the truce, hoping to stop the war – and on the way to make Israeli society even more miserable. It requires iron nerves from all of us, knowing that what happened yesterday was just one turn among who-knows-how Yahya Sinwar will try to do on us.
Israel had three ways of dealing with the (expected) situation that was created. One is to blow everything up and return in the morning to a full-scale campaign throughout the Gaza Strip. The advantage: Hamas will again be pushed into a corner. The downside: There is no telling if and when a deal will be reached again that will bring abductees home.
Waiting for abductees, photo: None
The second way was to blow up the deal without immediately returning to the fighting. To inform the mediators that the agreements are void at this moment, and that Hamas has a specified time to release the abductees according to the lists set, otherwise the fighting will resume immediately. The advantage: pressure on Hamas, with a clear ultimatum. The downside: Red lines are something that the Israeli government does not tend to meet, especially when abductees are at hand.
The third way was to swallow the saliva and look for a specific solution to the crisis that would get the deal back on track. The advantage: This increases the chances that the abductees will return home, even if it is late. The downside: Hamas will understand that it can play with us, and will raise new arguments every day that will postpone the implementation of the agreements.
In order for Israel to rise from the blow, it must not only defeat Hamas, but also transcend the miserable politics that run it, and grow out of it something more worthy that will provide solutions and hope
Israel chose the third option. It operated from the head rather than the stomach, and prioritized the return of the abductees over honor. With all the justified anger and the knowledge that Sinwar is once again hanging over us, the main task at the moment is to return as many abductees as possible to Israel – if possible then all of them, even if it takes weeks – and then make time to renew the campaign against Hamas, until it is defeated.
Israel should think like a superpower. Set a goal for itself, and strive for it while moving every mine in its path. There are quite a few such mines, such as the humanitarian issue, which Israel must deal with in such a way as to enable it to move forward. Here, too, the stomach says not to give them food, water and fuel – but the head says yes, because otherwise the world will stop Israel and not let it win.
Another example is the volatility in the northern arena, which ostensibly requires greater aggression on Israel's part. But once it was decided that the main campaign was in Gaza, everything had to be done so as not to start a war on another front. This is also true for Judea and Samaria and even for the decision not to respond directly against the Houthis in Yemen.
The abductees are transferred from Hamas to the Red Cross
This war is already the longest in the history of the state since the War of Independence. It began with the worst blow Israel has ever suffered (and more from a small terrorist organization with limited capabilities), based on a resounding intelligence failure, a failure of all defense systems, a fixation on consciousness and thought, and a resounding leadership failure that was intensified by the madness of the past year, in which Israel was significantly weakened.
The price that Israel paid in the opening blow – the dead, the abductees, the evacuees, the enormous damage – is a burn for generations, whose depth and effects we have not even begun to internalize in every sphere: security and political, economic and social, and of course psychological. In order for Israel to rise from it, it must not only defeat Hamas, but also transcend the miserable politics that run it and its fundamentally rotten public service, and grow out of it something more worthy that will provide solutions and hope.
Must win
To do so, it must win in Gaza. It will take time, but this victory must be clear and clear, and one that will create change that will be felt on both sides of the border between Gaza and Israel, and in the entire region. In the meantime, the IDF has proven that it is capable of operating in Gaza with great success; He still has a long way to go both in Gaza City (mainly in Jabaliya, Sejaiya and Tufah) and south of it (in Khan Yunis and Rafah, and in the refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip) – but those who claimed Hamas was an impenetrable target have lost their minds in recent weeks. This lesson seems to resonate outside Gaza – in Lebanon, in the West Bank and among Israeli Arabs – and Israel must lean on it to move on: to turn worlds upside down in order to bring back the hostages, and to return to fighting, and to do both with strength.
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