Status: 25.11.2023, 20:58 PM
By: Foreign Policy
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Moscow's decade as an arbiter in the Middle East is coming to an end. Russia has hardly any influence on the Israeli war.
- Ten years ago, Russia gained influence as a diplomat in the Middle East in the Syrian conflict
- The Ukraine war weakened Russia's power in the Middle East
- Russia with Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin is hardly influential in resolving the Israel war
- This article is available in German for the first time – it was first published by Foreign Policy magazine on November 21, 2023.
In the fall of 2012, I took part in an open discussion about Russia's role in the Middle East at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. In her lecture, an experienced American diplomat emphasized that Russia is a spent power that will never be able to regain the importance of the Soviet Union in the region. The discussion, in which there were few dissenting voices, was remarkable because it was completely wrong: it was precisely at this moment that Moscow began to re-emerge as a major player in Syria and in the region as a whole.
Today, Russia's influence in the Middle East is at another turning point. In the wake of the disastrous invasion of Ukraine, Russia's declining importance in the region has been further highlighted by Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7. While Moscow played a central role in diplomacy around Syria's civil war 10 years ago, Russia's push for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip has received little support in the UN Security Council. The contrast is indicative of the end of Moscow's decades-long comeback in the region.
Even before Vladimir Putin regained the Russian presidency in May 2012, he was determined to help Russia regain the prominent role in the Middle East, which he believes it needs to become a great power. When he criticized then-President Dmitry Medvedev's decision to abstain from voting on the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya, he seemed to want to prevent the West from ever having a free hand again. And when the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 and intensified in 2012, the Kremlin strictly rejected any action by the United Nations, fearing a repetition of the events in Libya.
Russia has been living with diplomatic compromise in the Middle East for ten years
Russian President Vladimir Putin at a Security Council meeting in Moscow on October 30 (archive photo). © IMAGO/Gavriil Grigorov/Kremlin Pool/Zuma Wire
In the midst of the Syrian war, Moscow set course for a new meaning in the Middle East. In September 2013, Putin took his first major step there. While the United States was preparing for armed intervention after the Syrian regime crossed the "red line" publicly proclaimed by then-President Barack Obama and used chemical weapons against its own people, Putin drafted a diplomatic compromise in which Russia promised to help eliminate Syria's chemical weapons arsenal.
Two years later, Russia once again cemented its position in the region by intervening militarily in Syria. In less than a year, Moscow's forces turned the tide and secured the rule of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad – a success that would help Putin gain influence throughout the region. With its firm grip on Syria, Russia has become the central player in regional diplomacy from Ankara to Riyadh to Cairo. By cooperating with Iran and Hezbollah on the battlefield in Syria, Moscow's relations with Tehran began to improve. Forced to take into account the Russian forces in its neighborhood – especially the Russian air defense units that could potentially keep the Israeli Air Force on the ground – Israel became increasingly involved with Moscow. Iraq and Egypt sought cooperation with Russian intelligence and counterterrorism. Soon, Russian-backed troops arrived in Libya to intervene in the civil war there as well.
Moscow used its new involvement in the region to position itself as an alternative to the United States, exploiting discontent with Washington to strengthen its influence. In Turkey, Moscow took advantage of the perception of Western support for the failed coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2016, as well as the ongoing disputes over U.S. cooperation with Kurdish forces in Syria, which Ankara considers terrorist groups. In Egypt, Putin used the Obama administration's concerns after the Egyptian military overthrew the democratically elected, Muslim Brotherhood-led government in 2013 to build cordial relations with Egypt's new president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
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In Israel, Putin used the icy relationship between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to further strengthen ties with Israel. In Saudi Arabia, Putin backed ambitious Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman early on and demonstratively shook his hand at the 20 G-2018 summit, just a month after journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi government officials.
Russia dependent on Turkey for trade route: No more diplomacy since Ukraine war
Moscow's interest-based approach and skillful diplomacy have helped successfully overcome regional divisions. Russian policy has been pragmatic and even cynical, and not tied to any ideology or values such as democracy. Russia was able to improve relations with Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia at the same time. He managed to get involved with the Turkish government and Kurdish groups in Syria, deftly dodging Ankara's criticism of Washington.
However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ushered in a gradual waning of the Kremlin's influence in the Middle East. First, Russia's unprovoked attack has damaged its international reputation, making it a less attractive alternative to play off against Washington. Cairo, for example, under pressure from Washington, agreed to stop planned arms deliveries to Russia that would have supported its war in Ukraine. Ankara has reportedly refrained from buying another supply of Russia's S-400 air defense system, probably because it has concluded that playing the Russia card to Washington is now less credible and effective.
Moscow's influence in its relations with key states in the region has also reversed. While Russia was able to impose painful sanctions on Turkey in response to the downing of a Russian fighter jet in 2015 and eventually force Erdogan to apologize, Russia now relies on Turkey as a transshipment point for goods to circumvent Western sanctions. Russian planes are now being diverted via Istanbul and Dubai to circumvent the restrictions of European airspace. Moscow buys Iranian-made armed drones and is even building a factory for the production of drones with an Iranian license in Russia.
Since the Israel War: Russia Loses Influence in the Middle East Despite Hamas Visits
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Finally, Moscow has weakened its military and security presence in the Middle East. While Russia still maintains a major naval and air base in Syria, it has moved some of its forces and equipment there to support military operations in Ukraine. To supply its ailing war machine, Russia has even recruited Syrian fighters. Although Russia has a presence in Libya through the paramilitary group Wagner, it has also reportedly dedicated forces from this group to fight in Ukraine. Russia's ability to demonstrate its power in the region is also hampered by the fact that, given its commitments in Ukraine, Moscow would hardly be able to increase its presence in a crisis or challenge its forces there.
Hamas' vicious attack on Israeli civilians and Israel's sharp response are likely to mark a point of no return for Russia's waning influence in the Middle East. Relations between Russia and Israel were already strained by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but Putin's response to the crisis in the Gaza Strip has likely made things worse. Moscow blamed U.S. policy and refrained from explicitly condemning Hamas' attack. Moscow's reluctance to side with Israel has not gone unnoticed: a politician from Netanyahu's party appeared on Russian state television to criticize Russia's response. While Putin has likely damaged his personal ties with Netanyahu, bilateral relations would likely deteriorate even further if Netanyahu were to leave office due to the crisis in the Gaza Strip.
Moscow's role in the past as a mediator between Palestinian groups is also likely to wane. Russia has refrained from recognizing Hamas as a terrorist group and is seeking to facilitate reconciliation between the Palestinian groups as an important step on the road to peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Hamas figures have visited Moscow several times over the past decade, including last month. But even if Hamas manages to survive Israel's ongoing ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, internal Palestinian reconciliation is unlikely to be a priority for the Middle East peace process in the foreseeable future.
Russia's Military Not Influential as Iran Gets Involved in Israel's War
The war between Israel and Hamas is also likely to make it more difficult for Russia to navigate regional rivalries, especially given its increasingly close ties with Tehran. While Moscow would probably prefer not to choose a side between Israel and Iran, trying to maintain neutrality amid the escalating conflict would likely only lead to friction with both sides. If Moscow were forced to choose sides, it would likely be guided by the impact on the war in Ukraine – the framework through which Putin is currently looking at all international challenges. The Kremlin would have to decide whether Iranian weapons are more important to Russia – or whether maintaining influence over Israel is a priority to prevent it from supplying weapons to Ukraine.
An escalation of the crisis into a broader regional struggle in which Iran is directly involved – which seems unlikely at the moment but remains possible – would make Russia's impotence obvious to all. Despite its bases in Syria, Russia's military presence is not sufficient to influence events. When challenged in the past, Russia has chosen to back down, as it did in 2018 when the United States launched punitive air strikes against Syrian targets. Russia simply does not have the influence to forge a compromise or conduct negotiations. Even with states with which Moscow has good relations - Iran and Saudi Arabia - it was Beijing that mediated the normalization of relations between the two countries.
Russia probably not involved in the solution of the Israeli war due to low influence
Certainly, the war between Israel and Hamas is a welcome development for Moscow, as it diverts international attention from Russia's own war in Ukraine and potentially forces the United States to make decisions about prioritizing security assistance to Israel or Ukraine. Washington's unconditional support for Israeli military operations has also provoked some uncomfortable comparisons with Russia's own attacks in Ukraine. But Washington's own goals with the Arab world or the global South more broadly are not necessarily Moscow's.
Ultimately, the crisis triggered by Hamas' large-scale attack on Israel could help determine the future of the Middle East. However, Moscow is unlikely to play a major role in this - if it plays one at all. There will probably not be another Madrid conference. While Russia played a central role in discussions about the Syrian civil war a decade ago, the future development of the Middle East is likely to emerge from the Gaza crisis without any significant contribution from Moscow.
About the author
Peter Schroeder is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Center for a New American Security's Transatlantic Security Program, a former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, and a former member of the CIA's Senior Analytic Service. Twitter (X): @schroeder_prs
We are currently testing machine translations. This article has been automatically translated from English into German.
This article was first published in English in the magazine "ForeignPolicy.com" on November 21, 2023 - as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to the readers of IPPEN. MEDIA portals.