During Operation Kadesh, which took place 67 years ago between October 29 and November 5, 1956, David Ben-Gurion fell ill. As prime minister and defense minister, he waged the war from his home in Tel Aviv, and one day there was real concern that the Egyptians might bomb the city.
50 years since Ben-Gurion's death, what was the "old man's" position on Gaza and what would he say today? Uri Ramati from Ben-Gurion House in Tel Aviv hosts Dan Margalit
The commander of the air force at the time, Maj. Gen. Dan Tolkovsky, called Ben-Gurion's home urgently, and the phone was answered by personal secretary Yitzhak Navon, who later became Israel's fifth president and minister of education and culture.
"I want to strike a preemptive strike and bomb Cairo," Tolkovsky described the conversation on the program "Such a Life" that became Navon years later. "That's why you have to ask the 'old man,'" Navon replied.
The "old man," who was lying in his daughter Renana's bed with a temperature of 40.1 degrees, as documented by his wife Paula, and Navon testifies that he also copied into his diary, replied in the negative. "We will not bomb first," he replied, "we will respond only if they bomb our population centers."
Tolkovsky heard the answer and responded: "Then let him go down to the shelter." Navon forwarded the request, but it too was denied. "If Paula wants, she can go down to the shelter," he added.
"He's a stubborn Jew," Paula says to Navon and her husband. "That's right, and I'm sleeping here," Ben-Gurion concludes the argument.
"Much more dangerous"
The shelter in question still stands today in the backyard of Ben-Gurion's house in Tel Aviv, but it was closed for decades until it was recently opened, for pragmatic reasons, like the legendary leader who lived in the house and today, December 1, marks the anniversary of his death.
"We opened the shelter about a month ago, at the beginning of the second week of the war, simply because we don't have a safe space and we really want to restart the house. I'm pragmatic, like the man who used to live here, and I need shelter," explains Nelly Markman, CEO of Ben-Gurion House for the past four years, just before we descend the rickety stairs to get our first glimpse of the place that was supposed to protect the lives of the first prime minister, his family and the neighboring Cohen family.
The receiver itself is not yet in usable condition. It's a room and a half that needs cleaning and tidying, but in the corner we suddenly discover a folding chair, simple and modest, and we can't resist opening it, taking pictures and imagining who sat on it and when.
"It has treasures." The shelter at Ben-Gurion House in Tel Aviv, photo: Efrat Eshel
"I think we haven't seen the whole shelter yet," Markman says. "In my opinion, if we go down there seriously once, we will discover more openings and all kinds of burrows. At the moment the shelter is not usable, but it is definitely in our plans.
"The shelter has intrigued me all these years, because this whole house is packed with treasures that have not yet been revealed. There were a lot of closed rooms here, and as far as I'm concerned, it's clear that I'll find something in the shelter as well."
Ben-Gurion was in the shelter sometimes?
"Yes. The shelter itself was built in 1942, like many shelters in Israel. During World War II, the British built shelters in places they considered strategic, and even made more far-reaching plans, such as on the Carmel – the so-called Masada on the Carmel.
Stayed there during the War of Independence. Ben-Gurion at the entrance to the shelter in his yard, photo: Ben-Gurion Archive
"Ben-Gurion House was already a strategic place for the Zionist movement in the early 40s, and it had to be defended against the 'axis of evil' of that time – Germany, Italy and Japan – which has now become Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. The Italians did bomb Tel Aviv during World War II and the Egyptians during the War of Independence, and on both occasions Ben-Gurion went down to the bomb shelter.
"By the way, the bombs back then are not like today's precision bombs. The house is also relatively close to the strategic target, which is the port, so everything was really much more dangerous."
So why didn't he agree to go down to the shelter during Operation Kadesh? And how did we protect him?
"First of all, he was sick. By the way, he was always sick when he was stressed. It was already a working assumption of the country's top brass that he would be ill. He himself writes in his diary, 'An act of Satan, I fell ill.'
"Apparently, it was pneumonia, in those days a serious disease that was in danger of death, partly because of the few antibiotics that existed in the country, so he had to stay lying in bed.
"He won't go down." The report in Davar from the days of Operation Kadesh, photo: from the Davar newspaper
"It so happened that Ben-Gurion actually ran Operation Kadesh from his daughter Renana's bedroom, where they specially built a brick wall, which turned the room into a safe room for the Ben-Gurion family.
Nelly Markman: "When he refused to go down to the shelter, Ben-Gurion said to Paula, 'Get down if you want.' He understood that the decision was a public decision and knew that it could lower public morale if the prime minister and defense minister went down to the shelter."
"What's interesting is that even though Ben-Gurion won't go down to the shelter, he tells Paula, 'Get down if you want.' In other words, beyond his physical illness, he understood that the decision whether he himself would be in the shelter was a public decision. Ben-Gurion knows that this could lower public morale if the prime minister and defense minister go down to the shelter.
"He was a man who lived by seeing history as it was happening, and understood that if he went down to the shelter it meant that the residents of Tel Aviv had to go down to the shelter. He had a great understanding of public consciousness, of how everything was perceived."
"We haven't seen the whole shelter yet." Nelly Markman, Photo: Efrat Eshel
In the years that followed, for example during the Six-Day Wars or Yom Kippur, when he was already a civilian, did he stay in a bomb shelter?
"In 1967, Ben-Gurion was still an active politician and even stood on the threshold between being prime minister or defense minister and being a civilian. In the end, he remained a civilian, but during the war he even came to the house every day to update him on developments and check the shelter.
"In 1973, the same story happened – a third arrives and checks the shelter, but Ben-Gurion is already very ill. On 16 October, in the middle of the war, his birthday is celebrated here, in retrospect his last birthday, and Shimon Peres arrives. Ben-Gurion is sick, but perfectly lucid and even expresses ambivalence about the IDF's ability to win. On December 1, a month and a little after the end of the war, he died."
Markman: "I think we haven't seen the whole shelter yet. In my opinion, if we go down there seriously once, we will discover more openings and all kinds of burrows. At the moment the shelter is not usable, but it is definitely in our plans."
"We have the responsibility for their safety"
Ben-Gurion's refusal to go down to the bomb shelter during Operation Kadesh, a refusal that incidentally was documented in real time in the Davar newspaper, raises another question, more relevant than ever, regarding his attitude toward the Gaza Strip, whose occupation during that operation was somewhat swallowed up by the jaws of history, which remembers mainly the battle at Mitla and the conquest of Sinai.
Like all Israeli leaders, Ben-Gurion is often asked about the question of Gaza and the terror emanating from it. His special reference to the subject can be found in his remarks at the political committee of the 18nd Congress in Basel, held on December 1946, 11, two months after the operation to establish the 5 points in the Negev, when 6 new settlements, including Kibbutzim Be'eri, Nirim, Urim and Mishmar Hanegev went to the ground on the night of October 1946-11, <>.
"There is political value to the fact that 11 Jewish points were established in this area," Ben-Gurion told those present at the committee. "There is also settlement value to the fact that in this desert, which has been desolate for 1,600 years, we have proven that flourishing settlements can be established. However, together with the Zionist pleasure bequeathed to us by these communities, our hearts were filled with deep anxiety. Because we became responsible for the lives of the boys and girls who settled in this desert, far from the Jewish community and the centers of Jewish power in the country.
"To this desert we sent hundreds of positions of our dearest men and women – and we effectively abandoned their lives. If disaster strikes, God forbid, it will be harder than anywhere else in the country to help them. Those who have gone to the Negev know the danger and are not afraid. But we must be afraid. We must not remain silent, and we are responsible for their safety."
"To this desert we sent our dearest men and women." Ben-Gurion planting a tree in Nahal Oz, photo: from "In the Camp"
These things took on greater significance in the mid-50s, when the terror emanating from Gaza, under the auspices of the Egyptians who controlled the Strip, greatly increased. One of the most prominent terrorist incidents of this period was the murder of Varda Friedman from Kfar Vitkin on March 24, 1955. Friedman traveled to a wedding ceremony in a hammer seat, which unfortunately was attacked by terrorists from Gaza.
"The ceremony took place at the end of the village, by the light of the Lux Menorah," the website describes in her memory. "In the middle of a stormy 'Ruyna' dance, infiltrators (fedayeen) from Egypt infiltrated and threw grenades, at close range, at the dancing and celebrating. Nineteen people were injured, and only Varda fell wallowing in her blood from bullets in her leg. They got closer and shot her in the heart. Varda was critically wounded and died of her wounds."
Another incident, which even led to an Israeli response, took place a little earlier, on February 23, 1955, right in the center of the country. An Egyptian squad infiltrated a government facility near Rishon LeZion and stole classified documents. On their way back, they encountered a cyclist near Rehovot and killed him.
In response to that incident, the IDF launched a retaliatory operation called "Black Arrow," named after the beautiful monument on the Gaza border, which unfortunately also served as a gathering point for Hamas terrorists on Black Saturday.
The operation, during which Ben-Gurion was defense minister in Moshe Sharett's government, began on 28 February and lasted until 1 March 1955. Its objectives, set by Ben-Gurion and IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, were to infiltrate a military camp near Gaza and blow it up together with the water institute and the train station next to it.
Dayan's "Sinai Systems Diary", with a personal dedication to Ben-Gurion, photo: Efrat Eshel
Paratroopers under the command of Ariel Sharon and Aharon Davidi, later Chief Infantry and Paratroopers Officer, participated in the operation, who won the Medal of Oz together with Uzi Eilam and Saadia Elkayam for his part in the operation.
The operation was carried out according to the order, but in practice it expanded much more. Egypt had 37 fatalities and 31 injuries, while the IDF had 8 killed and 13 wounded. This was the first major reprisal, and one of the first explicitly directed against soldiers.
Perhaps the most well-known terrorist incident at that time was the murder of Roi Rothberg, a 21-year-old member of Kibbutz Nahal Oz, who was murdered on 29 April 1956 by Palestinian infiltrators from the Gaza Strip. They dragged him across the border and even abused his body. Chief of Staff Dayan carried on his grave one of the strongest and most significant eulogies in the history of the State of Israel.
"Didn't want Gaza"
About six months after Rothberg's assassination, Israel launched Operation Kadesh in order to conquer Sinai and the Gaza Strip and put an end to the terrorism emanating from it.
"On the eve of the operation, Ben-Gurion convened the government and said: 'There are many things you don't know, don't need to know, and I won't tell you,'" says author and historian Michael Bar-Zohar, 84, who wrote Ben-Gurion's biography, was one of the founders of Rafi and even served as a member of the Labor Party in the 80s.
"He was referring, for example, to agreements with the British and French before the operation," Bar-Zohar continues, "but, and this is his exact quote: 'Gaza is an embarrassing ambersing target. We must take it. If I believed in miracles, I would want you to be swallowed up in the sea.'
"זה מה שהוא אמר כבר אז, כך שהוא לא רצה לכבוש את עזה וידע שהיא מסוכנת, קן צרעות, אבל לא היתה לו ברירה. הוא גם אמר לי זאת יותר מפעם אחת. הוא רצה את סיני, את המיצרים, את שארם א־שייח', לא את עזה.
בן־גוריון בכנסת: "ואשר לרצועת עזה, הועמדנו בפני הברירה: קליטת מאות אלפים עולים, או קבלת העול של 300 אלף תושבי הרצועה, ש־200 אלף מהם פליטים, בניגוד לרצונם של 300 אלף הערבים ובניגוד לרצון העולם המזרחי והמערבי"
"אחר כך היה לו גם מפח נפש עם זה, כי כאשר הוא החליט לסגת מסיני אחרי המבצע, התנאי של ישראל - ובזה עזרו שר החוץ הצרפתי פינו וגולדה שהיתה באו"ם - היה שהממשל המצרי לא יחזור לעזה, שכוח האו"ם יישאר שם. באותו זמן הממשל המצרי הוא זה שדחף וארגן את פעילות הטרור שיצאה מעזה. כך הוסכם, גם עם האמריקנים, אבל מייד לאחר מכן המצרים חזרו לעזה".
שיקולים נוספים לנסיגה מסיני ומעזה במארס 1957, אחרי מבצע קדש ובהמשך להחלטת האו"ם בנושא, שגררה ביקורת רבה על הממשלה בתוך ישראל, אפשר למצוא במסמך נדיר שנמצא בארכיון למורשת בן־גוריון בשדה בוקר.
המסמך הוא נאום שנשא בן־גוריון בפני תושבי הנגב המערבי ב־7 במארס 1957, אולם נדמה כאילו היה יכול להתקיים גם היום: "ידעתי שאני חייב לבוא אליכם ולהסביר לכם במיוחד למה יעצתי לממשלה למסור עכשיו את רצועת עזה לכוח או"ם, כי לא נעלמו ממני החששות, ואולי גם החרדות, שדבר זה יעורר בליבכם בלי סיבה מספקת".
"המטוסים, שאלת קיום". נאום בן־גוריון לתושבי הנגב המערבי, צילום: הארכיון למורשת בן-גוריון בשדה בוקר
השיקול הראשון שאותו מעמיד בן־גוריון בפני התושבים הוא חופש השיט במיצרים, גם ישראלי וגם בינלאומי - "סידור", כך בן־גוריון, "שנעשה על ידנו עם כמה מדינות ימיות: ארצות הברית, קנדה, צרפת, אנגליה ועוד, שלא באמצעות האו"ם אלא באמצעות הכרזות פומביות של הממשלות הנ"ל במועצת האו"ם".
לדברי בן־גוריון, "שיט ישראלי ובינלאומי לאילת ומאילת לים סוף ולאוקיינוס ההודי הוא אחת מהמשימות הגדולות ביותר של מדינתנו.
"אם סיכוי זה יתאמת", הוא ממשיך, "ישתנה מעמדה הבינלאומי של ישראל, יפותח הנגב, תגבר עצמאותנו הכלכלית, וקו אילת־חיפה יהווה אלטרנטיבה בינלאומית לתעלת סואץ".
השיקול השני, והמעניין יותר, שמונה בן־גוריון הוא שיקול עוצמתה הצבאית של ישראל, עוצמה התלויה במעצמות, ובמיוחד בצרפת. "כשנכנסנו לבירורים בשני השבועות האחרונים", אמר בן־גוריון, "שתי המדינות היחידות שהציעו לנו מטוסי סילון חדשים, צרפת וקנדה - ומטוסים מסוג זה הם שאלת קיום עבורנו - ראיתי שאסור לנו להגיע למצב שבו נהיה מנודים על ידי האו"ם, באשר ייתכן כי המקור היחיד לקבלת נשק לצה"ל יסתתם.
"אני מכיר בערכו וביכולתו של האדם הלוחם שלנו. אני יודע שהגורם הראשי הוא האיכות האנושית של הלוחמים, אולם בלי כלים מעולים, ובייחוד באוויר, גם החיילים המצוינים ביותר יהיו חסרי מגן וישע".
בהמשך לנאום הזה בן־גוריון נדרש מעל בימת הכנסת גם לשאלת תושבי עזה, ואמר: "ואשר לרצועת עזה, הועמדנו בפני הברירה: קליטת מאות אלפים עולים, או קבלת העול של 300 אלף תושבי הרצועה, ש־200 אלף מהם הם פליטים, בניגוד לרצונם של 300 אלף הערבים ובניגוד לרצונו של כל העולם, המזרחי והמערבי, העוין והידידותי".
בן־גוריון לתושבי הנגב המערבי אחרי הנסיגה מעזה ב־1957: "אני יודע שהגורם הראשי הוא האיכות האנושית של הלוחמים, אולם בלי כלים מעולים, ובייחוד באוויר, גם החיילים המצוינים ביותר יהיו חסרי מגן וישע"
לדברי רמון זיו־אב, מנהל מרכז המבקרים של הארכיון למורשת בן־גוריון, "בן־גוריון מסביר בדבריו את המצב כמו שהוא. כנראה ש'בתנאי מעבדה' לא היה בוחר באפשרות שישראל תיסוג מרצועת עזה.
"בשנים שקדמו למבצע קדש, בן־גוריון עמד בצד האקטיביסטי בשאלת רצועת עזה - הוא חשב שכדי להשיב את הביטחון לתושבי הנגב המערבי, ישראל צריכה לשלוט ברצועה וידע שמצרים מעורבת במידה מסוימת בפעולות הפדאיון. הוא כמובן יזם פעולות התקפיות ברצועה כאשר שב לתפקיד שר הביטחון בתחילת 1955.
"Another position was expressed by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who believed that the solution must be political and that the price we will pay for annexing the Gaza Strip, its residents and refugees, will be high for Israeli society."
So Ben-Gurion changed his mind 180 degrees?
"When the international conditions were ripe for the occupation of the Gaza Strip as part of Operation Kadesh, Ben-Gurion was already in a different position. He was prime minister and defense minister, and Sharett left his post and was replaced by Golda Meir. However, after the war and the occupation of the Gaza Strip, Ben-Gurion discovered that in reality it would be very difficult for Israel to hold it, even without Sharett's opposition.
"The Soviets expressed a firm position and threatened Israel with a demand that it withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Sinai, and the Americans also opposed Israel's stay there. These were the 'sticks', but there were also 'carrots'. The withdrawal included a significant security deal, which was reflected in Ben-Gurion's remarks.
"The French Mirage planes that were discussed could not protect the residents of the Negev from infiltrators, but they were a strategic security asset. In addition, the danger that hovered over Israel, had it continued to hold on to the Gaza Strip and Sinai, was that of an international boycott that would have hampered the state's efforts in those years to absorb hundreds of thousands of immigrants who arrived from all corners of the world.
"Realistic politician". Ramon Ziv-Av, Photo: Esther Suissa
"Ben-Gurion was at his peak a very realistic politician. He knew reality well and knew that we were walking a tightrope between interests and ideology and the desire to be part of the world and our dependence on world powers.
"His position before Operation Kadesh was that it would be better for Israel to control the Gaza Strip, but the geopolitical situation after the operation forced him to withdraw from the idea and from the Gaza Strip, and as a good statesman he understood the advantages inherent in the current situation and used it to fortify Israel's position in the Middle East."
How do you think he would have acted in the face of the situation today, after the events of October 7?
"I think it's actually important to address a different question: Why do we even care what Ben-Gurion thought, said or did almost 70 years ago? There are, of course, many possible answers to this, but for our purposes, to a large extent, the tension between our situation in the international arena and our immediate needs and interests exists today as it did in the past.
"All those who are currently waging the campaign are operating within a certain geopolitical reality and not under laboratory conditions. Therefore, the discourse on the past allows us to have a discussion that is very difficult to discuss in today's context, because we are all in a 'position'. The discussion of the withdrawal in 1957 could be cleaner, colder, and serve as a laboratory of thought experiments for us."
Ramon Ziv-Av: "All those currently waging the campaign operate within a certain geopolitical reality and not under laboratory conditions. Therefore, the discourse on the past allows us to have a discussion that is very difficult to discuss in today's context, because we are all in a 'position.'"
"Was under tremendous pressure"
Bar-Zohar, from his close acquaintance with Ben-Gurion, sheds further light on the tense period following Operation Kadesh.
"There was public criticism of the 'surrender' to the UN and the withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza after Kadesh," he explains, "but the criticism came mainly from the right, and Ben-Gurion, as we know, did not exactly refer to Begin or take his opinion into account, although Begin spoke with admiration about Operation Kadesh and even said in the Knesset, 'Good luck.'
"But Begin didn't understand the limitations of power that Ben-Gurion already knew. On November 7, 1956, Ben-Gurion sent his famous letter to the 9th Brigade, in which he wrote that the Third Kingdom of Israel had been established, but later he told me that he regretted those words. "I was triumphantly drunk," he said.
"After all, already that night the ultimatums of the Russians and the Americans came, and there was tremendous anxiety. The Russians threatened Israel's very existence as a state, and Ben-Gurion was afraid of them and preferred to surrender to the Americans.
"Ben-Gurion thought we needed the support of a foreign power." Michael Bar-Zohar, Photo: Arik Sultan
"By the way, the Russians carried out an amazing deception operation. There were reports at the time that the Russian Air Force was in Syria and that they had shot down a British plane, that the Soviet navy with nuclear weapons had passed through the Dardanelles en route to the Middle East, that Russian paratroopers seemed intent on reaching Egypt, that Russian flotillas had reached Alexandria. All this, from beginning to end, was a complete lie. Fake news. And everything was published and provoked immense fear.
Nikita Khrushchev later boasted in his memories of how they managed to deceive the whole West. The CIA informed us that the Russians intended to destroy the State of Israel within 72 hours with a massive bombardment. By the way, the CIA was wrong as always, but that's a story in itself. In any case, Ben-Gurion was under tremendous pressure, his government did in his pants.
Michael Bar-Zohar: "Ben-Gurion believed, quite naively, that peace could be made with the Arabs quite easily. He said, 'If I sit with Nasser,' who was then the symbol of the enemies, 'within two hours we will solve the problems and there will be peace.'"
"At the same time, there was the great alliance with France, which Ben-Gurion did not want to harm. Before the Six-Day War, I sat with him a lot, and he kept saying that we must, if we want to go to war, win the support of a foreign power – France or the United States."
Did he oppose going to the Six-Day War?
"Absolutely. He told me, and not just me, that we had to dig in, wait. "This is not the time, there will be 5,000 dead," he said. He also saw that France was disavowing us, after all, de Gaulle had abandoned us.
"On May 27, 1967, Begin arrived at Ben-Gurion's house, in a very noble step, because Ben-Gurion had made a mockery of him all these years. Hurt him, insult him, 'the man who sits next to MK Badr,' 'the martyr from freedom,' and all those nicknames.
"Begin nevertheless came, through the mediation of Shimon Peres and secretly, to propose to Ben-Gurion to return as prime minister before the Six Day War. Begin saw that Eshkol was not suitable to be prime minister. He suggested that Eshkol bring Ben-Gurion back and that the two of them go together, but Eshkol refused and told him, 'These two horses can no longer pull the same wagon.'
"At the meeting itself, when I was at home, Ben-Gurion started lecturing Begin about the forbidden to go to war now, and so on. Gradually, I would say that Begin turned pale and in the end did not even mention the matter of the prime ministership, but went to Peres and told him, 'We are withdrawing our support from Mr. Ben-Gurion as prime minister and transferring it to Mr. Dayan as defense minister,' and so it was.
"The truth? Begin was right. Ben-Gurion was wrong here all along the line. Before the Six Days, he was no longer the great Ben-Gurion."
Bar-Zohar: "Ben-Gurion did not know the Arabs and did not understand the Arab mentality. As my friend Avigdor Kahalani told me about the situation today, but the same is true of Ben-Gurion: 'It's time we started talking to the Arabs in Arabic, not Yiddish.'"
Over the years, did he have a pragmatic solution for Gaza?
"No, and that's why after the six days he said to return all the territories except Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. He didn't want Gaza.
"Ben-Gurion believed, quite naively, that peace could be made with the Arabs even quite easily. He said, 'If I sit with Nasser,' who was then the great enemy, the symbol of the enemies, 'within two hours we will solve the problems and there will be peace.'
"He really wanted to meet with Nasser, and every time a guest came from abroad and told him I was in Cairo and I met with Nasser and he said he wanted peace, Ben-Gurion immediately told him: Go back and arrange a meeting with him, I'm willing to come to Cairo to meet him. This happened on at least three occasions, and in all three of them the messengers returned with their tails between their legs. Nasser did not want to meet.
"Ben-Gurion had a naïve attitude on this issue. He didn't understand the Arabs and didn't know them. In all the years of his rule, it seems to me that he met only once or twice with Arab dignitaries, and I mean the Arab peoples around us, the Palestinians and the Arabs of the country. He didn't understand the Arab mentality. As my friend Avigdor Kahalani told me about the situation today, but the same is true of Ben-Gurion: 'It's time we started talking to the Arabs in Arabic, not Yiddish.'"
shishabat@israelhayom.co.il
Wrong? We'll fix it! If you find a mistake in the article, please share with us