Exactly two months into the war, the political echelon was required to do what it evaded: define for the IDF what the desired achievement is in the south and north, and what will happen beyond it.
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On the face of it, things are clear. The ministers' statements stated that Israel would destroy the Hamas regime and its capabilities, and distance Hezbollah from the northern border. However, the official definitions of the war's goals are less definitive. They talk about denying Hamas governmental and operational capabilities, and they do not set clear goals for the campaign in the north (in fact, they are talking about preventing the launch of a parallel campaign in order to focus an operational effort in Gaza).
The IDF needs clear definitions in order to act. When the OC Southern Command is told to destroy a Hamas battalion in Sejaiya, he knows how to do it. The same goes for the north: tell the OC Northern Command to move divisions and make sure that the Radwan force is not south of the Litani River, and he will do it at time constants and at prices that can be estimated. None of these appear in the official objectives of the war, either in the south or in the north. Moreover, contrary to public statements that the war has no time limit, internal discussions speak in different terms. The understanding is that for a variety of reasons – international pressure, a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the economic situation in Israel – Israel has something like two or three weeks to complete the current, intensive process in Gaza, until it will have to switch to a different modus operandi.
The IDF needs clear definitions in order to act. Members of the Radwan Force in the Syrian town of Saraqib, Photo: None
It is also possible to draw what this pattern of action will look like. After the IDF completes its massive attack on Hamas' main force in the northern and southern Gaza Strip, it will redeploy west of the border fence in a kind of security perimeter, and from there it will launch raids and carry out targeted attacks and killings. Those who say that the war will continue for many more months mean this, not a continuous stay in Palestinian territory. In order for this to be possible and effective, an answer must also be given to the question of what will happen in Gaza the day after.
The prime minister has so far refrained from dealing with this, mainly for political reasons, but he will not be able to avoid it forever. Netanyahu says no to Hamas, not to the Palestinian Authority and not to permanent Israeli control of Gaza. And what is? There is currently talk of management by an international team funded by Arabs, but in order for this to happen, a complex international process with uncertain prospects is required, which has not yet been initiated.
The same is true in the north, where the solution for the evacuees seems even more distant than in Gaza. There are three ways to keep Hezbollah away from the fence: in a broad or limited war, in a diplomatic move, or in a combination of both. The Americans are running between Jerusalem and Beirut in order to advance a diplomatic move, but even if such an agreement is reached, who guarantees that Hezbollah will not violate it, just as it did with Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War?
Netanyahu has so far refrained from dealing with this, mainly for political reasons. Halevi and Netanyahu, Photo: Haim Tzach, GPO
The answer is clear, and therefore assessments in Israel are growing that a certain military move will be required in the north as well. However, in order to enable such a move after the massive crushing of Gaza, international legitimacy is required, which Israel currently lacks. The Israeli government is not really working to promote it, nor is it telling the IDF (or the residents) what the outlook is for the near and distant future.
The conclusion is clear, and the IDF leadership is also trying to shout it out in every discussion, so far with limited success. The political echelon must define goals, act in the international arena in order to create conditions for them, and coordinate expectations with the public. Not to be a cheerleader band - to lead.
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