War is a complex human phenomenon. With all the effort to manage it systematically and planned, it is subject to chaotic developments. This is how we should look at the difficult war against Hamas in Gaza.
Compared to the Yom Kippur War, this war is much more complex. The IDF's achievements on the battlefield towards the end of October 1973 led three weeks after the outbreak of fighting to a comprehensive agreement to a ceasefire. In the war these days, even after more than two months, despite the IDF's significant achievement in attacking the core of the Gaza Strip, the road to ending it and shaping the desired strategic order in its wake is still long. The end of the war in the north, and the return of residents to communities along the conflict line, are also subject to strategic uncertainty at this stage.
In this respect, the essential difference between December 1973 and December 2023 stems from the profound change in Hezbollah and Hamas' perception of war. The logic that led them to plan the war is based on a new logic, based on the idea that they can emerge victorious from the war even if they lose most of the battles against the IDF. This logic was inspired by the wars of the past decades in Afghanistan, Iraq and even the Vietnam War.
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These wars show how much the test of winning a war is not similar to the test of winning a football match. The outcome in football is final, it does not depend on trends that develop after the game. New Age Wars, led by Hamas and Hezbollah under Iranian guidance, are aimed from the outset at denying the militarily strong side's ability to control the trends it desires the day after the war. The outcome always depends on tangible physical victory, such as conquering territory and destroying the enemy's military force, but in new wars the totality of achievements in battles does not necessarily lead to victory in the war.
In the Vietnam War, for example, the U.S. Army won most battles, but did not emerge victorious at the end of the war. Although the U.S. Army lost about 50,40 men, while the Vietcong lost about a million and a half men, by the end of the war North Vietnam had occupied South Vietnam, which seemed to be a clear victory. Yet after more than <> years, culturally, politically, and economically, Vietnam has undergone a comprehensive transformation in full integration into American globalization. Thus, the question of victory in the war arises anew, in the test of the trends it generates.
The idea of "resistance"
This is a central question in the war against jihadist organizations led by the logic of muqwama ("resistance"). Over the past 40 years, this religious-cultural idea has been formulated by radical Islamic organizations, and includes much more than just resistance, since it is a different cultural perspective on the phenomenon of war.
In the West, war is perceived as a deviation from the stable order, and is therefore waged in striving to restore order of peace and stability. On the other hand, within the framework of the muqwama, the fighting is aimed at maintaining and maintaining a constant momentum of friction and struggle. With limited power, but purpose, to promote a religious vision of world Islamic domination. In the context of the struggle against Israel, the vision is focused on eliminating the presence of Jewish sovereignty and "liberating" Jerusalem. With the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Nasrallah established the Shebaa Farms as a new ground for fighting, declaring that fighting at the Shebaa Farms was a war for the gates of Jerusalem. He thus marked a connecting line between limited and constant fighting in the Shebaa area (the Har Dov area) and the vision of Jerusalem, which one day according to his belief will be realized.
The concept of muqwama expresses two dimensions of faith. First, it is the duty of the believer to act actively. Just like the Jewish Kabbalah doctrine that emphasizes man's obligation to awaken from below in this world in order to bring about God's awakening from above. It is about man's duty to make practical efforts. For example, when a person is faced with a tsunami wave, even though he clearly has no chance of acting and is equipped only with a bucket, he must do everything, expecting and believing that something of his action will come into salvation.
This was also the mindset of Egyptian President Sadat in his decision to go to war in October 1973. With the ultimate goal of the war, he sought to regain the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. On the other hand, he realized that he could not achieve this goal in combat. Out of this awareness, he created an idea of war based on the expectation that through his efforts to desecrate the upheaval of war, something great would later emerge beyond his control, and that would lead him to his goal.
Hamas's logic
From this developed the logic by which Yahya Sinwar acted in his decision to go to war. As far as he is concerned, after Hamas has fulfilled its duty to initiate and act, it expects trends to develop in the future under God's guidance. If Israel is forced to accede to US demands for the establishment of a Palestinian state and withdrawal from the West Bank, victory will be credited to it despite the devastation in Gaza. He will gain the historic status of Saladin.
The second dimension in muqwame signals to the believer the obligation to recognize the limitations of reality, since victory is not quick and assured. The believer must act patiently ("saber" in Arabic), and bear the price of losing without giving up an eternal dream. Iran's Supreme Leader Khomeini explained in his 1988 "poisoned chalice" speech that he accepted the dictate of reality for accepting the terms of the armistice at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. According to him, even what appears to be a defeat must be accepted as God's will. In doing so, he succeeded, on the one hand, in accepting the conditions of reality as a believer, but on the other hand not to give up striving to realize the religious vision of the revolution he led.
The path to victory depends on understanding these two dimensions. It depends not only on the magnitude of the achievement on the battlefield, but on post-war trends. The Hamas vision will probably continue to exist, but we can bring the jihadists to recognize their weakness, with the chance of a temporary cessation of their struggle.
This insight must be integrated into the foundations of the security concept; it requires an Israeli existence in a constant consciousness of struggle. In its overall existential content, it goes far beyond the concept of deterrence, which has repeatedly proved unfounded.
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