The November mobilization, which was completed in recent days, was particularly challenging because it was carried out under conditions of war, but it also had good news: a sharp jump in motivation for service in general – and for combat service in particular.
Many recruits who came to the military command center asked for "combat" - and were answered that all quotas were full. This is a constant situation when it comes to most infantry brigades, but it is a happy surprise when it comes to armor or artillery. Several dozen young men refused to accept the answer and decided instead to postpone their service until the next recruitment cycle, in March 2024, promising that they would then be assigned to combat units.
These figures are not surprising: wars always boost motivation. This happened in the distant past, and also after the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge. The feeling that home is in danger, and the desire not only to pass the time but to do meaningful service, make more people want to enlist and join combat units – notwithstanding, and perhaps because of, the danger involved in serving in them.
The IDF's challenge is to maintain this motivation over time. Past experience shows that when security tensions calm down, motivation calms accordingly. The current wave makes it possible not only to fill quotas in all units and systems, and even to preserve some surpluses, but also to plan or examine the possibility of opening new units.
Want to fight, photo: Ziv Koren
This was on the agenda before the war and it will be on the agenda after it, in light of the new security reality that is expected to accompany us in the foreseeable future: a war that will last for many months in Gaza, an unresolved campaign on the northern border, and an understanding that Black Sabbath and the war that began after it changed something fundamental in Israel's security concept, in the perception of its enemies, and in the deterrence it conveys to them.
There is no decision without the ground army
Examination of needs is required in all systems. The ground army is proving in the current war that without it there is no victory and that Israel must not shy away from ground campaigns again, because it will end up paying a much heavier price. The IDF will examine the scope of the regular army, but also the length of service: the trend of shortening service has halted, and it may actually be necessary to extend it, or extend it to certain units, while providing appropriate compensation. The same is true in the reserve army: in the coming years, the reservists will serve many more days, which will require compensation as well as excess investment in training and means.
Cobra helicopter, photo: Dudu Greenspan
The Air Force is also more relevant than ever. On Black Saturday, only a pair of helicopters were on standby. In order to have more, you have to buy helicopters and train pilots. The expansion of the campaign and the need to maintain alert for the possibility of an attack in Iran (or Yemen) requires an examination of the number of fighter jets and support systems – refueling, electronic warfare, communications and unmanned aerial vehicles, and of course air defense systems.
Investment required in Modiin
An excess investment will also be required in intelligence, which has become (with a great deal of justice) the national punching bag because it did not warn of a Hamas attack. This should teach us that it is actually necessary to invest more in it, in all systems: from cyber and contractual to human agents and POW interrogators. Modi'in will also have a challenge in attracting good minds to it, because in an era when the "we" has replaced the "I," many will now prefer to go to a combat track.
All these will also require a dramatic change in the defense budget. Intensive discussions are already taking place behind the scenes on the subject, ahead of the formal discussions that will begin at the beginning of the year. It is clear that the budget that existed until now will no longer be relevant, and must be significantly increased regardless of the reimbursement of the costs of the war and also regardless of the special American aid promised to Israel (and will be given after congressional approval).
The defense establishment wants to double the defense budget, meaning that its share will increase from 3.8 percent of the budget to 7-8 percent. This is a dramatic increase of tens of billions of shekels a year, which takes at least a few years, with the understanding that direct and indirect defense expenditures will increase dramatically: in inventories, reserves, infrastructure that needs to be rehabilitated or rebuilt, rehabilitation, and more.
The establishment of new units means additional budgets in shekels or dollars, which are also estimated at billions of shekels a year, which will require a thorough examination of the state budget and a clear decision on national priorities.
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