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On the operational debriefing: Mofaz is a bad choice | Israel Hayom

2024-01-06T21:14:55.228Z

Highlights: On the operational debriefing: Mofaz is a bad choice | Israel Hayom. The separation between the investigation of the circumstances of the omission and its roots is a mistake. Entrusting the investigation to those who made a mistake is outrageous. Cabinet ministers who criticized the chief of staff may need to undergo a crash course in manners and manners. Such a team is not expected to investigate the connection between October 7 and Oslo and the disengagement. And even if he investigates, there is a grave concern that he will behave like a cat guarding the cream.


The separation between the investigation of the circumstances of the omission and its roots is a mistake • Entrusting the investigation to those who made a mistake is outrageous • Cabinet ministers who criticized the chief of staff may need to undergo a crash course in manners and manners, but matter-of-factly, they are absolutely right • Such a team is not expected to investigate the connection between October 7 and Oslo and the disengagement. And even if he investigates, there is a grave concern that he will behave like a cat guarding the cream


The distinction made by IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy between an "internal professional investigation" and an examination of the failures of October 7, and an examination of the failure at the political and strategic levels, is an artificial distinction.

Meeting of the Political-Security Cabinet at the Kirya (Archive) // Omer Meron, GPO

The cabinet ministers who criticized the chief of staff may need to take a crash course in etiquette, but matter-of-factly, they are absolutely right: the investigation must ascertain not only the immediate circumstances of the colossal failure, but also the soil of his growth; the seeds and infrastructure that allowed it to grow; The clear causal connection between it and three core events: Oslo, the disengagement and the Shalit deal (and that's before we even talked about the policy of containing Hamas).

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy with OC Southern Command, photo: IDF Spokesperson

A team headed by former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, who carried out the disengagement, supported it, supports it even today, and denies in advance any connection between it and what happened on Simchat Torah. A team that includes more members of the concept that brought us this far is not worthy of investigating what happened, for several reasons.

First, such a team is not expected to investigate the connection between October 7 and Oslo and the disengagement. Secondly, even if he investigates, and should investigate, there is a grave concern that he will behave like a cat guarding the cream. Mofaz's position on the matter has already been determined and publicly expressed.

Third, the team does not represent professional military officials who were not part of the Oslo and Disengagement concept, which almost predetermines the results of the investigation. Such a team should have included reserve generals such as Uzi Dayan, Gershon Hacohen, Yitzhak Brik or Yaakov Amidror, but they – and their professional outlook – were excluded from the examination in advance.

Explore, but otherwise

The trauma of October 7 is not just an internal IDF issue. We have all experienced and are still experiencing what happened, which is not divorced from Oslo, the disengagement, the Shalit deal, which turned into a bloody deal, and the policy of containing Hamas. All this led us to 7 October, and the investigation must not skip over the connection between the omission and these significant background factors. It is also unlikely that those conducting the investigation will be people who rule out any such contact in advance – perhaps because they were part of it.

It is not appropriate to investigate what happened. Former IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, photo: None

Oslo created Hamastan in Gaza. The disengagement and the Shalit deal created the conditions for Gaza's ammunition and tunneling to monstrous proportions. The construction of Hamas' significant military force and the smuggling industry and missile production began only after Oslo and intensified after the disengagement. Thus, for example, before Oslo, there was no rocket fire from Gaza at Israel. After Oslo, it focused mainly on Gush Katif, and after the disengagement, it expanded and intensified to large areas of the country.

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Source: israelhayom

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