Alongside reports about the start of Security Cabinet discussions on the issue the day after the war, expectations should be calibrated: there are no good options in Gaza. If there were, they would have already been implemented, on one of the many occasions throughout the years of conflict.
IDF Spokesperson presents: This is how the IDF completed the dismantling of Hamas' military framework in the northern Gaza Strip \\ IDF Spokesperson
In its attitudes toward the day after, the political echelon will have to adopt a realistic approach, stick to the hard facts and data about the monstrous entity next to us, which has held on deeply to all systems of life and strata of the population, and assume that it is impossible to bring about a profound cultural change – at least in this generation.
With Hamas' high rates of support, as long as a strong, organized and armed core of the terrorist organization remains in Gaza, it will be the main force in the Gaza Strip, regardless of the identity and definition of the entity officially entrusted with managing its civilian affairs. Therefore, the war must be ended with a clear victory and under conditions that will prevent the renewed growth of the terrorist organization.
Pro-Hamas demonstrators in Jenin after al-Arouri's assassination, photo: AFP
In any case, Israel's security demilitarization and freedom of action within the Gaza Strip must be a basic condition for any reality that takes shape in Gaza. It is right to have reservations about any initiative or move that would jeopardize this, to beware of a puppet government that will be a pawn in the hands of Hamas (the Hezbollah model in Lebanon) and not to trust foreign monitoring mechanisms.
From Israel's perspective, the "day after" question in Gaza is secondary to the more important goal of the war: rebuilding Israeli deterrence that crashed on 7 October. The final picture of the war must first be formulated according to this criterion.
IDF activity in the Gaza Strip, photo: IDF Spokesperson
The collapse of the de-facto Hamas administration, the dismantling of its military frameworks, the destruction of its production infrastructure and military capabilities, the killing or neutralization of most of its commanders and military order, the design of a broad security perimeter along the entire border, and the existence of effective security control in the area between Gaza and Egypt – all these are pieces of the puzzle of Israel's desired final picture. When Hamas feels that the sword is approaching the necks of its leaders and that Israel is determined to eliminate its presence in Gaza, it will be forced to give up on the issue of the abductees as well.
Israeli Interests
Without delving into this, it can generally be said that in the new reality that will take shape in Gaza, Israel will have to ensure the following interests:
1. Security of the surrounding communities.
2. Preventing terrorist attacks and military attacks.
3. Maintaining security demilitarization: preventing military buildup, smuggling or production of weapons.
4. Preventing the existence of military frameworks, training and other activities for military force buildup.
5. Preventing Hamas from returning to power and weakening its influence in and out of the Gaza Strip.
6. Preventing negative effects on Judea and Samaria.
7. Reduction to removal of liability in the civil spheres.
IDF attack in the Gaza Strip, photo: AFP
In its public positions on the "day after," the political echelon defined in a negative way what will not happen in the Gaza Strip: the de-facto Hamas administration, an Israeli administration, the Palestinian Authority, military capabilities that threaten Israel, and limitations on its freedom of security action.
These definitions leave room for a limited number of alternatives: one, the establishment of a central government based on local elements that are not affiliated with Hamas and do not represent the PA. Muhammad Dahlan's name has already been thrown into the air in connection with this, creating expectations whose basis is far from solid.
The second is the establishment of regional governments appointed from among the local clans to manage civil affairs in their areas of residence. The role of central government can be filled by a "board of directors" composed of representatives of countries that will contribute to this. Such international involvement would also serve the need for funding sources.
The third is centralized external management of Gaza affairs by an international committee through international mechanisms and institutions operated by local bodies.
Gaza refugee camp, photo: AP
Let's face it, the chances of success of administrations of these models, in the difficult opening conditions of the Gaza Strip, are slim.
Hamas's strength in the Gaza public, the depth of its penetration into the systems of life, its organizational ability and its military power will not allow anyone to bypass it. An entity that does not cooperate with Hamas will be illegitimate on the part of a large public. At best, he will lose power, and at worst, he will lose his life with him.
The danger that lurks before us is that in the absence of an alternative, Israel will be forced to choose a solution that will be defined as the "lesser evil," one that is currently unrelated to Hamas. Before long, this solution will become a proxy for Hamas, either openly or through discreet contacts. Then we will find ourselves dealing in the Gaza Strip with a puppet government controlled by Hamas and acting according to its will, and when we are prevented from harming it, lest we be accused of destroying the new hope. It is better for Israel to leave Gaza as an area without a solution than as an area with a bad solution.
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