The transition from the second to third phase of the fighting in Gaza, announced yesterday by the defense minister and the IDF Spokesperson, as well as the US president, presents Israel with quite a few unresolved dilemmas on the way to achieving the war's goals.
These announcements, which were given in interviews with the American media (the defense minister to The Wall Street Journal and the IDF spokesman to the New York Times), offer a rare glimpse into how things are going behind the scenes. They also indicate Israel's strategic distress in light of growing pressure from Washington to reduce the intensity of the campaign in order to make things easier for the residents of the Gaza Strip.
Soldiers maneuvering inside Gaza, photo: IDF Spokesperson
American ear statements
This past week the Americans demanded that Israel officially announce the end of the intensive part of the Gaza campaign and the transition to a new phase focusing on raids and targeted attacks carried out from Israeli territory. The Americans also claimed that such an announcement would reduce pressure in the north and help reach an agreement with Hezbollah. Israel refused the American demand, claiming that such an announcement would strengthen Hamas, which would understand that it had to barricade itself for a short time until the military pressure on it diminished. All this, without reaching a solution to the issue of the abductees and without the organization's leadership being harmed.
In order to prevent the increase in pressure during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit, the defense minister and the IDF Spokesperson were dispatched to the American media and announced the change in the nature of the fighting. They did so in English, to American ears, and not in Hebrew to the Israeli public.
Secretary of State Blinken, photo: Reuters
There is reason for a flaw in this: those who bleed in this war are first and foremost the Israeli public, which is entitled to clear answers from its political-security leadership about the goals and achievements of the war. This leadership also refrains from interviews with the Israeli media, making do with partial answers at press conferences and closed briefings. In so doing, it spares itself from answering a series of questions that will confront it with commitments made to the Israeli public since the October 7 attacks.
The objectives were not achieved
By going to war, the Israeli government set itself two goals: toppling the Hamas regime and negating its military capabilities (along with avoiding starting a war in the north and creating conditions for the return of the hostages). The situation, as of yesterday, is far from achieving these goals. In the northern Gaza Strip, the activity in its current format has been effectively completed, and the IDF has significantly diluted its forces there. According to IDF reports, 8,000 Hamas operatives out of 14,6 were eliminated in this area, meaning that 000,<> Hamas operatives are still operating there, and as far as is known, abductees are also being held there.
In the central Gaza Strip, the IDF operates in some of the refugee camps, and it seems that it does not intend to operate in all of them at this time. In Khan Yunis, activity is concentrated in an area where it is believed that there is a "gold mine" in which the Hamas leadership is hiding, along with many of the abductees. However, other parts of the city have not yet been dealt with, and the entire city of Rafah has also been left out of the war, including the Philadelphi Route, which is still used to smuggle weapons and goods from Sinai.
The Israeli government has trapped itself between contradictory commitments: those given to the Israeli public, according to which there is no time limit and that the war will continue as long as necessary, until a decision is made, and those given to countries around the world, first and foremost the administration in Washington, according to which the campaign is now moving into a new, less intensive phase, as President Biden declared yesterday.
Soldiers in the Gaza Strip, photo: IDF Spokesperson
The government will argue that this is a necessary change for legitimacy purposes that does not indicate a change in the goals of the war, but it is required to explain to the Israeli public exactly how it intends to defeat Hamas in the new format of activity, when it is clear that dealing with Rafah (and the other refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip) cannot be carried out in the framework of raids, and requires much larger forces and a nature of activity that contradicts the commitment given to the Americans.
In the south we are waiting for the news
Moreover, the absence of a decision is liable to delay the intention to return most of the residents of the south to their homes. From the outset, it was clear that their demand for zero threats was unrealistic, because there would always be someone who would launch rockets from Gaza, but the scope of the threat that would remain now – before a decision was made – would cause many to prefer temporary solutions, as long as they did not return to live in an area they perceived as dangerous. It is reasonable to assume that even an arrangement in the north, if achieved, will not satisfy the residents' demands, because apart from declarations, it is doubtful whether it will provide a real solution to the problem of Radwan forces on the fence.
Once again, it has been proven that it is better to avoid bombastic statements, which are difficult to back up with actions. Hamas is far from decisive, and Israel must act within a complex set of considerations, which is now further complicated by the debate at the International Court of Justice in The Hague over South Africa's demand to declare genocide taking place in Gaza.
The prime minister, who only a few weeks ago claimed that those who could not withstand American pressure could not fulfill their duties, received a lesson from Washington in the borders of the sector that is also relevant for the continuation of the war. He would do well to convey a similar lesson to his ministers, some of whom embroil Israel on a daily basis in irresponsible statements and actions.
Switching between stages also raises some other issues. The decline in the intensity of the war (certainly if the campaign in the north "closes"), and the release of most of the reservists, make it possible to begin an orderly examination of the October 7 offensive and the events that preceded it. The IDF has already undertaken to do so in a series of professional investigations, but the time is ripe for the establishment of a state commission of inquiry headed by a Supreme Court justice.
The change in the nature of the campaign will also undoubtedly lead to a lively debate in the political arena. Ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, who entered an emergency government to help in the war, will now be required to step down, and the pressure to hold elections on a shortened schedule will certainly increase. He will receive support from various organizations of reservists, who intend to launch a public campaign to fulfill the responsibility of those involved in the failures that led to the Black Sabbath.
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