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Standoff in Putin's favor? Wrong – there is a path to victory for Ukraine

2024-01-15T13:08:00.071Z

Highlights: Standoff in Putin's favor? Wrong – there is a path to victory for Ukraine. Ukraine needs many things to be able to break out of the current stalemate. Ukraine has made significant progress by denying Russia control of the sea and airspace over and around its territory. But is this enough for Kiev to win? For many Western observers, victory does not seem possible when wave after wave of Russian troops is crushing Ukraine's defenders. Perhaps the Russian army can be defeated by taking of Ukraine's fight in new ways.



Status: 15.01.2024, 13:54 PM

By: Foreign Policy

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The warship "Novocherkassk" of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in front of the port city. © Ulf Mauder/dpa

Why the conventional wisdom that the Ukraine war is a stalemate in Russia's favor is wrong.

  • Ukraine has made significant progress in the war
  • Ukraine needs many things to be able to break out of the current stalemate
  • Kiev has a real path to victory in the Ukraine war
  • This article is available in German for the first time – it was first published by Foreign Policy magazine on January 8, 2023.

Kyiv – Ukraine's daring attack on a large Russian warship in occupied Crimea in the early hours of December 26 was another episode in Kyiv's strategy to wrest control of the Black Sea from Russia. Since most of its ships have been expelled from its home port of Sevastopol, the Russian Black Sea Fleet can no longer find a safe haven anywhere on the Crimean peninsula. All ports there are now vulnerable.

The Institute for the Study of War backs this up with data showing that the number of Russian naval ships in the port of Sevastopol steadily declined between June and December 2023; in contrast, the number of ships in Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland further east increased steadily. While Russia is doing everything it can to attack Ukraine's infrastructure, it is exposing it to a possible Ukrainian attack with the risky deployment of ships and submarines armed with Kalibr missiles in the Black Sea. This is a tacit admission that Russia can no longer rely on the ports and launch pads of Crimea.

Ukraine's success is due to domestically produced missiles and drones, sometimes launched on Zodiac boats or jet skis. The most effective attacks, however, came from the air, where Ukraine used its Soviet-era fighter jets to shoot down both domestically made and NATO-supplied missiles. These attacks were carried out under the protection of Ukraine's modern air defenses – including newly supplied foreign air defenses – which regularly shoot down most Russian missiles and drones destined for Ukrainian targets.

Ukraine has made significant progress in the war

Thus, Ukraine has made significant progress by denying Russia control of the sea and airspace over and around its territory, thereby preventing the Russian navy and air force from operating with impunity. But is this enough for Kiev to win? For many Western observers, victory does not seem possible when wave after wave of Russian troops is crushing Ukraine's defenders. Ukraine's strategy of denying Russia the free use of its sea and airspace may work, but as things stand, it cannot defeat the Russian army on the ground, nor can it fend off every missile that hits civilian targets.

In much of the West, the prevailing opinion is that Ukraine is losing the ground war and that there is no path for the country to win as Russia brings Ukrainian civilians to their knees. Kiev could just as easily call for a ceasefire and ask for peace.

The problem with this scenario is that it means defeat not only for Ukraine, but also for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. It would encourage both Russia and China to pursue their political, economic and security goals undeterred – including the conquest of new territories in Eastern Europe and Taiwan.

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But is the conventional wisdom correct - or does Ukraine's skillful success at sea and in the air indicate that a different outcome is possible? Perhaps the Russian army can be defeated by taking advantage of Ukraine's readiness to fight in new ways. If you ask a US military expert, the key to the withdrawal of the Russians lies in relentless and precise air strikes, well coordinated with the maneuvers of the combined forces on the ground. While the Ukrainians are admirably using the weapons at their disposal to attack Russian forces both strategically, as in Crimea, and operationally, as in combating command and logistics targets, there has been no sign of success at the tactical level. In order to achieve a tactical breakthrough on the ground front that leads to operational and strategic success, they need to become more effective from the air.

For aerial power to be decisive in 2024, the Ukrainian Armed Forces need to create temporary windows of local air superiority in which to focus their firepower and maneuverability. Since the Ukrainians have successfully closed their airspace to Russia at points of their choosing, such time windows are possible with the means already at their disposal. More and better weapons tailored to this scenario would make them more successful on the entire front with Russia.

Ukraine needs many things to be able to break out of the current stalemate

General Valery Zaluzhnyi, the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, admits that the Ukrainian Armed Forces need air superiority, the ability to break through mine obstacles, better battery defense capabilities and more means of electronic warfare in order to break out of the current stalemate favored by Russia and return to maneuverable warfare in which Ukraine has an advantage. Specifically, he argues for three key components. First, armed UAVs capable of coordinating attacks with artillery with real-time reconnaissance (this could include appropriately armed Turkish-made TB2s, MQ-1C Gray Eagles, MQ-9 Reapers, or custom-made cheap and light UAVs capable of using the necessary weapons). Secondly, armed UAVs to suppress enemy air defenses, as well as simulators for medium-range surface-to-air missiles to deter Russian pilots. And thirdly: unmanned vehicles for breaking through and clearing mines.

Although new technologies, this combination of capabilities is reminiscent of the method used by the U.S. and allied NATO forces in West Germany during the Cold War to counter the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior ground forces, protected by layered air defenses. The Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) was designed to synchronize attack helicopters, artillery and close air support by combat aircraft, ensuring a constant barrage on the enemy in the event of an attack by the ground forces. Pooling NATO assets in this way should give the Alliance's forces the mass, maneuverability and flexibility they need to overcome numerical superiority, avoid a war of attrition, and escape the kind of bloody carnage that characterizes the current stalemate in Ukraine.

In the case of Ukraine, a modernized JAAT would include, among other things, armed UAVs with Maverick and Hellfire missiles, loitering ammunition, precision-guided artillery shells, and long-range long-range missiles fired from aircraft. These systems would be coordinated in an electromagnetic environment designed by Ukrainian operators to dominate local airspace, saturate the battlefield with ammunition, and clear mines to pave the way for a ground attack. This updated JAAT – let's call it electronic or eJAAT – would create a bubble of local air superiority that would spread as the combined forces advance under the protection of that bubble.

Given Russia's willingness to accept significant losses, the eJAAT could be even more effective in defense: a massive use of firepower against advancing troops by an eJAAT could lead to an overwhelming defeat of the attackers and open up the possibility for Ukraine to take strategic advantage of the sudden turn of fate.

Kiev has a real path to victory

Zaluzhny has publicly stated that "the decisive factor will not be a single new invention, but the combination of all existing technical solutions." Like all good commanders, Zaluzhny is painfully aware that the 2023 campaign did not work as well as he had imagined. Nevertheless, and to their advantage, the Ukrainians have clearly demonstrated their innovative talent, their readiness to use Western methods, and their unconditional will to win. U.S. and European support in working with the Ukrainians to better manage operational complexity and more dynamically combine technology, information, and tactics, coupled with security assistance tailored to the eJAAT approach, would bring movement back to the now static battlefield and give Ukraine a fighting chance.

If Ukraine can achieve the momentum in the ground war that it lost during its failed summer offensive, Kiev has a real path to victory. This path will lead through the capabilities demonstrated by Ukraine at sea and in the air, combined with the application of a sophisticated combination of techniques on the ground. This will be a path to victory not only for Ukraine, but also for the United States and its allies.

About the authors

Rose Gottemoeller is a lecturer at Stanford University, a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, former NATO Deputy Secretary General, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State. Twitter: @Gottemoeller

Michael Ryan is a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy and a former career officer in the U.S. Air Force.

We are currently testing machine translations. This article has been automatically translated from English into German.

This article was first published in English in the magazine "ForeignPolicy.com" on January 8, 2024 - as part of a cooperation, it is now also available in translation to IPPEN readers. MEDIA portals.

Source: merkur

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