Ukraine is experiencing its second winter of war against Russia.
Since the launch of the invasion of Ukraine on February 20, 2014, Vladimir Putin has tirelessly sent his troops to increase his conquests.
However, the winter period seems to suspend the fighting.
General Winter procrastinates.
If Russian or Ukrainian advances are limited, another form of military engagement continues: deep strikes.
Like last year, the Russian army is firing projectiles (often drones or missiles) at energy infrastructure.
“
Moscow is today seeking to improve the physical and psychological effects of its strikes on Ukraine and the West by taking into account the weaknesses of the Russian army
,” notes Dimitri Minic, researcher at IFRI’s Russia/NEI Center. *.
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Nevertheless, the Russian army learned from its mistakes and perfected these shots.
It now uses various types of munitions: “
Lurking munitions, hypersonic, ballistic, cruise, anti-aircraft missiles
,” lists Dimitri Minic, who emphasizes that these are used “
in a better thought-out and sequenced manner
.”
From now on, waves of drones precede those of more expensive missiles.
They target, like last year, “
the energy network and residential areas
”, and now more “
the structures of the military-industrial complex
”.
In addition, the strike zones are located both at the rear and near the front line.
This method, which mainly aims to affect Ukrainian industrial structures, was already used by the Russian army last winter, without providing it with any significant advantages.
Why use it?
“
To show that Russia has unlimited stocks of long-range strike means
,” adds Dimitri Minic, and “
that successful Ukrainian attacks will receive more painful responses for the Ukrainians
.”
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This winter, the Ukrainian army, following the failure of its counter-offensive, seems to be moving more towards strike operations.
It successfully carried out commando operations in occupied Crimea, firing against Russian ships, but also against Belgorod, a town a few kilometers from the border.
However, the front line hardly wavered despite its extent of a thousand kilometers.
Its Russian adversary even appears to be on the offensive: it strengthens its hold around Marinka in the Donbass, at Klishchiivka near Bakhmout and advances near the Torske ponds on the outskirts of Koupiansk in the North-East.
The transformation of the military-industrial complex
Winter temperatures can drop to -20° in Ukraine, damaging vehicles and lowering troop morale.
The wear and tear of armored batteries, for example, increased sharply during this period.
Mobility, although essential, is also reduced by the lack of vegetation and therefore camouflage.
Maintenance becomes an even more important military necessity.
This is, however, made more complex by the deep strikes of the two adversaries, which also target logistics centers close to the front.
American ATACMS or Franco-British SCAP/Storm Shadows are proving valuable to the Ukrainian army, thanks to their range of 400 kilometers.
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At the beginning of September, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian president, assured that his country could continue the war through the winter.
It is clear, however, that if the intensity of the shooting continues, large-scale operations are not there.
The Russian army is seasoned in this type of combat, with regular deployments in the Arctic.
This fight is regularly studied by Russian military publications.
The Russian Ministry of the Armed Forces, for example, released a long document detailing the standards necessary for the maintenance of armored vehicles during the winter.
“
We have not really taken stock of the transformation of the Russian military-industrial complex
,” comments General (2S) Olivier Kempf, director of the Vigie.
Moscow has put in the resources: $106 billion has been allocated for 2024, or 6% of GDP and a third of the state budget.
“
As of October 2022, Russia was producing around 40 long-range missiles per month.
Today, it produces more than 100 per month
,” noted the British Royal United Services Institute, in a note entitled “
Ukraine must prepare for a harsh winter
.”
A political question more than a military one
However, some fighting continues on the front line of nearly 1000 kilometers.
“
The
recent assaults at Avdiivka
showed that Russia continued to attack fortified positions with columns of armored vehicles, a costly mistake made repeatedly since the start of the conflict
,” recalls Dimitri Minic.
“
If the Russian army ended up relying on infantry at Avdiivka, that is a lesson it should have learned long ago.
She made the same mistake at Vouhledar in her January 2023 offensive
,” he continues.
Last year, only the Wagner mercenary group seemed to be making progress.
Thousands of men threw themselves against the Ukrainian defenses.
At the cost of 20,000 losses, according to Yevgeni Prigojine, then at their head.
The city was finally taken...in May, after eight months of fierce fighting.
The Russian army, on the other hand, has largely fortified its front with the “
Surovikin line
”.
“
The absence of threats from the Ukrainian army in the winter of 2022-2023,” the RUSI report emphasizes, “allowed Russia to build three vast lines of defense with mines, trenches and obstacles
.”
“
If Ukraine does not continue to put pressure on the Russian line during the winter, the risk is that these defense lines will be widened
,” he warns.
A risk all the more significant as foreign support falters.
All eyes are on Washington, and the future presidential election.
European industrial capacities, despite political declarations on “
the transition to a war economy
”, have not yet produced results.
Tank deliveries are few, munitions are not arriving in large quantities, and the promised F-16s have not yet been delivered.
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For the Kremlin, waiting seems a reasonable strategy.
Withstand Russian attacks, progress methodically, and closely monitor the growing weariness of Western opinions.
Russia continues to establish its influence in the occupied and annexed territories, as evidenced by the reconstruction of the city of Mariupol, almost completely razed after the fighting.
A film is even being filmed in the ruins.
Should Ukraine, following a failed counter-offensive, launch major assaults at the risk of considerable losses?
Should the Russian army, comfortably fortified, wait until spring and rely on American dispersion, busy avoiding an explosion in the Middle East?
Seasonal conditions naturally influence the course of combat, through changes in the terrain.
However, the use of military tools by political forces depends above all on strategic objectives to be achieved.
And it seems that both armies have an interest in letting the winter pass without suffering heavy losses.
*Dimitri Minic also has a doctorate in the history of international relations from Sorbonne University and a specialist in Russian political-strategic culture.
He is notably the author of
Russian Strategic Thought and Culture
, published by the Maison des sciences de l'Homme.