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Two systems and a headache

2020-10-04T02:50:48.365Z


Tension between China and Taiwan is at peak levels after several incursions by Beijing planes in the vicinity of the island


In the sand, just the right distance from the water so as not to get wet, couples in wedding suits photographing their big day;

Entire families get their feet wet, not wanting to go deeper into the waves;

groups of children play to build castles.

Red national flags flying with yellow stars: National Day has just been celebrated.

This beach in the city of Xiamen is like so many others along the Chinese coast, but its name, proclaimed from the street in red ideograms several meters high, sends an unmistakable message: “One Country, Two Systems, One Only China".

The recipient is a group of islands on the other side of the bay, the Kinmen, surrounded by anti-landing barricades and over which the red, blue and white-sun flag of Taiwan flies.

There is a minimum distance between both territories, barely two kilometers.

Between both flags, a maximum potential for conflict.

And these weeks, the risk has shot up again.

The separation between Xiamen, of 3.7 million inhabitants, and Kinmen, of 130,000 residents, is one of those anomalies left by history: when the Chinese civil war resulted in the founding of the People's Republic and the flight of the army of the Kuomintang nationalist to Taiwan, the communist troops never took those islands, known then in the West as Quemoy and that during the 1950s and 1960s were constantly bombarded from the mainland.

Years of rapprochement between the two sides of the Strait during the tenure of President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang in Taiwan multiplied the ties between these tiny islands and the mainland.

Kinmen receives tens of thousands of Chinese tourists a year;

Since 2018, the continent has supplied 30% of its tap water.

Until the pandemic interrupted transport between the two, Xiamen and its neighbor communicated by ferry 44 times a day.

“Of course, one day we will be completely unified.

That's very clear, ”agrees Mr. Xu, a sunglasses salesman on Xiamen Beach, who, perhaps inadvertently, repeats Beijing's official statements that unification is“ inevitable ”.

A few meters away, a man in blue overalls walks with a loudspeaker among the groups of tourists, encouraging them to look at Kinmen ("Taiwan, see Taiwan up close"!) Through a spyglass, at the modest price of 10 yuan ( 1.2 euros) for five minutes.

China considers Taiwan an inalienable part of its territory, and has never renounced force to achieve this.

During Ma's tenure, she bet on the route of seduction.

An increase in economic and tourist exchanges that over time - he reasoned - would make the population and the political class support unification under the formula "One Country, Two Systems" that was already applied to Hong Kong.

Today, the commercial relationship exceeds 150,000 million dollars;

In 2018, more than 2.66 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan.

The strategy seems to have paid off in Kinmen: its residents are among the Taiwanese with a more favorable view of China.

There, the Kuomintang, in favor of stronger ties with Beijing, systematically wins each electoral call.

In the rest of the territory, the results are much more questionable;

the rejection of "One Country, Two Systems" is blunt, especially in light of how that principle has fallen apart in Hong Kong.

The triumph of the president Tsai Ing-wen, of the Progressive Democratic Party, in 2016 and, above all, her crushing re-election last January with the promise of keeping the distance with Beijing have turned the tables.

The island boasts of its democratic credentials and its population consolidates its distance from China: more than 80% declare that they feel Taiwanese and not Chinese.

Relations between Beijing and Taipei have worsened, while ties between Beijing and Washington have deteriorated.

While the United States and Taiwan wink each time with more rapture - the White House is considering new arms sales, and some fifty legislators defend the signing of a trade agreement - Xi Jinping's government fears that the Tsai government wants formally declaring independence, the greatest anathema to China.

And China increasingly brings out its growing military might, while increasing the presence in the area and in the South China Sea of ​​US vessels.

It has intensified its military maneuvers in the vicinity of the island, admitting for the first time that they are directed against possible pro-independence fads in Taiwan.

In September, following a visit from a senior US State Department official, its planes made continuous incursions into what Taipei considers its airspace.

After its fighters crossed it, Beijing has declared the median over the strait non-existent, the line that unofficially marks the border and which both armies have tacitly respected.

Stronger action - perhaps the seizure of distant Pratas islets in southern Taiwan - is no longer totally unimaginable, experts conjecture.

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu has assured the Legislative Yuan, the island's parliament, that Taiwan is China's next target, and the incursions pose a "serious threat" to peace and stability in the strait.

In Beijing, Vice Minister Wang Yang maintains that independence in Taiwan "is a road to nowhere."

For China, and for its Communist Party, the "Taiwanese problem" is an existential question.

"It represents the unresolved issue of the civil war, and therefore implies the legitimacy and survival of the Party,"

Paul Heer, a former senior East Asian official of US intelligence

, has written in

The National Interest

.

Unification - by whatever means - before the first centenary of the People's Republic is celebrated in 2049 would mean, in the eyes of Beijing, the recovery of the last territory lost during its "century of humiliation" at Western hands.

In addition to national pride, Taiwan represents a key piece on Asia's geostrategic chessboard.

The "unsinkable aircraft carrier", as General Douglas McArthur described it, holds the key to the exit to the China Sea: it is the lock of the first chain of islands - governed by capitals related to the United States - that stands in the way of the access of the Chinese fleet to the Pacific.

And vice versa: a Taiwan on the side of Beijing could impede the passage of US aircraft carriers, interrupt the Japanese sea lanes or be used as a base to launch attacks against enemy positions.

Analysts believe that, for the moment, it is unlikely that China will opt for the military route to unleash a conflict with Taiwan that would drag the United States: the military, human and international cost would be too high.

The Ministry of Defense itself on the island recognizes that, for the moment, there are no signs of mobilization in sight.

The United States, required by law to come to the assistance of its ally, has no appetite for unleashing open conflict either.

More likely - and not a little dangerous, in Taipe's eyes - is a massive cyberattack, which could have catastrophic consequences for an economy as dependent on technology as the Taiwanese, home to manufacturers such as Asus or Acer.

"But with the increased activity of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) there is a risk that the situation could escalate, putting both the Government of Taiwan and the new US Administration to the test," said Philippe Le Corre, of the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRI) in Paris, in a video conference this week.

Given what is at stake, the tension will continue, at least, until the November elections in the United States.

And, since the growing hostility towards China is something Republicans and Democrats share, probably further afield.

President Tsai still has almost four years in office.

"China has real options, a calculated risk record during Xi Jinping's tenure, deep concern about the future direction of US-Taiwan relations, and a dearth of kinder realistic alternatives to 'seduce' given the rejection of the 'One country, Two systems', in Taiwan.

This unique combination of factors makes an escalation likely, though not certain, ”wrote Mathieu Dûchatel, Asia director at the Montaigne Institute, in an analysis.

In front of Kinmen, on the beach, families took advantage of the holiday week for National Day and a day without clouds.

The man in blue overalls continued, tirelessly, his promotional tours of the spyglass: "Taiwan, see Taiwan, see Taiwan up close!"

Military imbalance

China's military incursions into the vicinity of Taiwan are not just a warning.

They also allow the Chinese People's Liberation Army its army to obtain valuable data on the Taiwanese forces, including their speed and reaction capacity.

"The operations, aimed at gathering intelligence data, on the forces of Taiwan, the United States and Japan, including their submarine activities, the deployment of their troops and the locations of their military installations, will prepare the Army for a possible battle in the future. ”Admitted the Global Times newspaper, owned by the Communist Party.

The missions also have an objective of attrition: every time the Chinese planes exceed the median over the strait, the Taiwanese fighters must go out to intercept them, something that carries a high economic cost, consumes the useful life of the planes and tires their pilots. constantly on the alert.

"Every time the communist planes harass Taiwan, our air force must fly over the sky, and it is extremely costly," lamented the island's prime minister, Su Tseng-chang. Protected by US power and its weapons - In the last decade, Washington has sold it close to 20 billion euros in defense equipment — Taiwan has a much lower strength than China, the second country in the world for military spending.

The island has just 23 million inhabitants and has about 290,000 soldiers, a tenth of the 2.1 million troops of the Chinese Army.


Source: elparis

All news articles on 2020-10-04

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