Israel's strategic situation on the eve of the beginning of the new civil year is good, but fragile and full of challenges.
"Good" - because despite the events of the past year, Israel ends 2021 when its political position is strong, its economy strong and stable, its military strength is unquestionable and it continues to enjoy the fruits of its political achievements, the image of its overall security strength and advantages as a start-up nation and technological innovation.
"Fragile" - given the large number of explosive issues, the connections between them and the broad implications of each.
Of course, above all, the issue of the Iranian nuclear issue: the approach to the decisive point and the growing tension around it, on the political field and on the security level.
Shmulik Almani
"Multiple challenges" - this description, which regularly characterizes Israel's general situation, this time also embodies the difficulty of following the principles of priority set in the past, due to the need to be gentle and over-centralized, from the strategic level to the operational level.
A challenge in itself is decision-making in relation to some of the issues within the Israeli system, given the differences of opinion around the negotiating table.
The cohesion of society in Israel is a necessary condition for its national resilience.
This is true at all times, and it is easy for the tests that the political-security reality may call for us.
The tensions in Arab-Jewish relations in mixed cities since the events of the Wall Guard, and the sense of frustration and declining personal security in the face of weakening governance and increasing serious crime in the Arab sector, have created new cracks and deepened previous ones - products of internal polarization.
The scene of the last murder in Jaffa.
The amount of weapons in the sector - huge,
The situation in this matter requires a change of attitude, and placing the treatment of this among the first goals of the government for the coming year.
Existential threat to Israel
What is the purpose?
Where should the efforts be directed?
First, the establishment of the State of Israel as a Jewish, democratic, strong, secure and prosperous state.
This is the overarching goal that should guide the state's efforts, and be a compass for setting concrete goals for its planning and implementation bodies, in all areas.
This formulation reflects a desire to stick as far as possible to the practical level, but it does not obviate the important and always required discussion of the big questions: identity, vocation and vision.
Second, to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold.
As mentioned, at the forefront of Israel's challenges towards 2022 is the effort to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state, or a threshold state.
In its simplest definition, a “threshold state” is a state that has the technology and operational capability to build nuclear weapons, but has not yet done so.
Works at a nuclear reactor in Iran // Photo: AP,
Why is the nuclear program so important to Iran that it is willing to risk paying unbearably heavy prices?
The answer to this can be summed up in two words: survival and vision.
Iran is striving for nuclear weapons to secure the Ayatollahs regime from external military intervention to overthrow it.
The survival of the regime is the guarantee that from a historical point of view the Islamic Revolution will not be a passing episode.
Regime survival is also the main instrument for achieving its ambitious vision.
Nuclear weapons, or even the status of a threshold state, could allow Iran freedom of action in its subversive moves and plans to establish Iranian hegemony in the region.
It will be able to exercise proxy forces under the auspices of the significant deterrence that will be added to it, and will enjoy improved global status and increased bargaining power on various issues.
The presence of nuclear weapons in Iran's hands is an existential threat to Israel.
It should not be assumed that at any time and in any scenario Iran will conduct itself rationally, and that profit and loss considerations will always prevent it from directly harming Israel.
Israel's government for cancerous growth and frequent threats of its destruction reflect a pattern and a deep stance towards it.
It does not take a wild imagination to sketch a scenario in which a severe internal unrest in Iran, which would lead the leadership to assess that the regime is nearing its end, would create a temptation, just before the fall, to activate its nuclear weapons, "mortally die with the little devil."
"There will be no escape from the use of military force against the regime."
Demonstration in London against the Iranian regime's harassment of Ahuaz // Photos: GettyImages,
But even without the threatening scenario of dropping a bomb, the threat to Israel is unbearable.
The status of a nuclear state will allow Iran to mobilize its proxy forces to carry out massive conventional attacks against its rivals, without fear of a military response to it.
Iran will be able to watch from the sidelines safely, and watch its emissaries crush its rivals with the continuous firing of thousands of missiles.
This can be true of Hezbollah, the Houthis and the various Iranian-backed militias.
Also, the transformation of Iran into a nuclear state or a threshold state will lead to a nuclear arms race in the entire region.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other countries will not stand in the way.
The sheet is too short to describe the breadth of the implications of such a process.
Quiet and stability are not included in the menu.
Thus, one should not agree with an approach ready to contain a nuclear Iran.
Israel must insist on measures that will prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state.
The pressure is still effective
An agreement is a means, not an end!
It is relevant only if it includes commitments, steps and mechanisms that ensure the achievement of the goal.
Otherwise - it is likened to a drug that is not suitable for the disease: it is paid a price, it instills false hopes of healing and eliminates efforts to find alternatives, and in the end - the suffering continues, both from the disease and the side effects.
Nuclear talks in Vienna, Photo: AFP
Iran has no reason to rush to reach agreements, and especially not to restrictions and substantive measures of the kind required.
A credible military option and heavy economic pressure can be a compelling argument.
It is difficult to find an example of a political nuclear program that was dismantled without pressure or coercion.
True, the pressure has so far not brought Iran to a breaking point, but that does not attest to its effectiveness.
The measures taken have not been exhausted, and the possibility of a change of government in the US has brightened the horizons for the Iranians and given them hope. To him, as a switch to closing the door to hope.
The dialogue between Israel and the United States should continue, in all channels, on all issues and in relation to all scenarios, for the immediate term and the longer term. In doing so, Israel should maintain its freedom of action and freedom of expression. Manage it in the media.It is not right to volunteer information to our enemies.
Elimination of the Axis of Evil
Another challenge at the beginning of 2022 is the expulsion of Iran from Syria.
The political-security campaign to prevent Iran from establishing itself has achieved results.
Without relinquishing it, the chances of a political settlement, which will lead to the complete elimination of Shiite Axis forces from this country, must be assessed.
Such a series must go through an American-Russian agreement, joined by the Sunni states and Turkey.
Against the background of tensions in US-Russia relations, it seems that Syria in particular can provide the two with an opportunity to present a common achievement: a diplomatic solution to a complex and bloody conflict.
Iranian force in Syria in civil war, Photo: IP
What will the arrangement include?
Seeing Israel at the heart of the settlement, the commitment to the exit of foreign forces that entered Syria after 2011 (a definition that includes Iran and its envoys), mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the crossings and borders, preventing the establishment of Islamist terrorist elements and maintaining the 1974 separation agreements.
The author served as a National Security Adviser and Chief of Staff for National Security between 2021-2017. Currently serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
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