The inconvenience is due to two reasons: first, the culture that was exposed in the unit, as a result of the work of the commission of inquiry headed by Maj. Gen. (Res.) Noam Tibon.
Lack of professionalism, non-compliance with basic orders and procedures, lack of reporting and coordination at all levels - these are just some of the findings of the investigation, which directly contributed to the tragic outcome.
Although the investigation only examined this specific event, it is likely that if this is the reality that has been revealed, it is much more ingrained and profound.
Apparently, this corrupt conduct took place over time in many other events, which did not come to consciousness just because they ended without casualties.
And if so - and as mentioned, it is likely to be so - what does this say about the degree of internal control in the Walnut unit, and what is known about what is happening in it in the commando brigade in charge of it, in the 98th Division and the Central Command?
And is this the case in other units as well, with an emphasis on the brother-battalions of Walnut, Magellan and Cherry?
Walnut unit fighters in training, Photo: Oren Cohen
Therefore, the decision of Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi to stop training in favor of "Genesis Procedures", as he defined it, is correct and self-evident. But the IDF must not be content with this: it must make sure that the various units - with an emphasis on those who are convinced that the wheel was invented by them - do indeed turn every stone;
If that does not happen, the next event is just around the corner.
The second reason for the discomfort stems from the personal conclusions.
There is an inconceivable gap between the result - two officers killed in an elite unit - and the relatively dairy conclusions, which are concentrated in the junior officer only.
Worse, there is a marked mismatch between the sharp conclusions in Tibon's investigation and the decisions that Kochavi made.
These are outstanding commanders, but in order to shock an organization fundamentally, following an event that is fundamentally shocking, it is sometimes necessary to take drastic measures - even if it means ousting an outstanding officer, such as the commander of the unit under which this chain of failures and failures occurred.
The fact that the brigade and division commanders - excellent officers by all accounts - came out even without a comment in their personal file is surprising, to say the least.
Maj. Gen. Noam Tibon, Photo: Gideon Markowitz
The chief of staff may have avoided this so as not to shock the unit, which lost two company commanders in the incident, and another company commander who was dismissed (in addition to the unit commander and the firing officer, who were also dismissed). Tough, who has already known crises in the past, and with proper management and backing would have successfully faced even tougher decisions.
On the sidelines, Tibon's report is of further importance: he waves aside the argument made by political elements (and also in some districts in the IDF), as if Elharrar and Aharon were the first to be killed in the struggle for sovereignty in the Negev.
Tibon clarifies that this is nonsense that has no reference in the field: if all the necessary steps had been taken, the two officers would have survived.
Sovereignty in the Negev is another matter, which certainly requires a more firm and orderly response than is given to it today.
But even here, the IDF should not make concessions to itself. If Walnut had kept the weapons as required, he would not have been stolen and the officers in the unit would not have gone on proactive trips in search of thieves and equipment.
Sometimes, things are that simple.
If the IDF is also able to re-instill them in soldiers, there is a chance that something healthy will emerge from the unnecessary incident in Walnut.
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