After a long deliberation, the Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Aviv Kochavi, published his commanding decision regarding the responsibility of the commanders of the Walnut Unit for the serious accident in which two company commanders were killed, in a bilateral firing of our forces.
Along with the decision to remove the chain of command, it is worth emphasizing the significance of the command step taken by the Chief of Staff towards the SMGD: it was a basic training, and certainly not one that requires the presence of a battalion commander. Stressed in his judgment that a deputy is a commander for everything.
There is a fundamental difference between an accident caused directly, by negligence in fulfilling technical operating instructions, and an accident involving a mental failure, the prevention of which requires conduct that is based beyond technical compliance.
This is the difference, for example, between Unit 669, in which two fighters were killed as a result of a cable torn in their lift to a helicopter, and the bilateral shooting accident in the Paratroopers Regiment in southern Lebanon, in which four fighters were killed in the summer of 1993.
In 669 the malfunction involved non-compliance with technical instructions for the maintenance of the cables in the squadron, and were not hidden in the occurrence of mental failures.
In the bilateral shooting accident in the Paratroopers Regiment - in whose investigation team, with Major General Yoram Yair, I took part - already in the first stage, cognitive failures became clear, which were also discovered in other units in the sector.
Due to this, the commanders were not dismissed at the time.
Also in the Walnut incident, alongside procedural failures, there was a failure of consciousness in understanding the operational situation.
Under the influence of some of the military commentators, an expectation was created in the public to place full responsibility and blame on the unit commander, which in their eyes seemed to necessarily lead to nothing less than dismissal.
In contrast, in judicial independence, out of attention to the overall set of considerations to which the IDF High Command is committed, the Chief of Staff chose to take a less severe command step.
He did not take lightly the terrible result and the findings of General Commissioner Noam Tibon, but in his decision to delay the unit commander's promotion for two years, but not to dismiss him - he conveyed a message that punishing commanders is a realistic event far from a regular and almost obvious ritual of sacrificing officers due to public expectations.
Niccolò Machiavelli well characterized the deep connection that existed in the Roman Empire between the achievements of the army and the sensitivity they maintained with respect to the dignity of failed commanders.
And so he explained: "Not only were the Romans less compelled to do good than the members of other republics, but even as they were about to impose punishment on their commanders - they were more lenient and more careful in their dignity than anyone else. They owed him no punishment, on the contrary, they would give him a reward and inform him of honor and value.
"This custom was taken with great discretion, as they believed that it was of great importance that the ministers of the troops could dedicate themselves to their plans in a free spirit and swiftly, and not be distracted by external factors. There will not be found a single man who will have the power to do valiantly heroically ”(Political Correspondence, p. 97).
The Chief of Staff realized this insight as a courageous message to the public and the IDF.
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