Myths are common that prime ministers who found a "dormant" army, lacking an initiative, one whose heads were more concerned with what David Ben-Gurion called "careerism" and less with "securityism" - suddenly enjoyed an alternative "nature reserve" that functioned completely differently and swept the entire army. To.
The first myth of this story is attributed to the 101st unit of Arik Sharon, Danny Matt, Meir Hatzion and their friends.
A unit set up after a series of continuous failures by the IDF, carried out retaliatory actions, and despite its short period of service, created a model of ardent belief in road righteousness, fighting spirit, high standards of execution and striving for contact, and adhered to the entire fire and its fighting values.
The second myth that answers this story is attributed to Operation Defensive Shield.
Until that operation, Prime Minister Sharon was forced to contain terrorist attacks and spread slogans in the spirit of "restraint is power," as he received a tired and bureaucratic army, until he located several brigades who made it clear to him that they were his "Arik Sharonim" in the IDF.
The truth is more complex.
Neither the 101st nor the brigades in the Defensive Wall would have risen spontaneously if they had not known that there were those at the highest level (Ben-Gurion, Arik Sharon) who sent two messages.
The first: an uncompromising expectation of a change in the direction of the security system, and a clarification that the promotions will now be made with exclusive consideration of one parameter: the decision to commit terrorism and military success.
Second: Backup.
The 101st operations, some of which were already controversial at the time, and certainly Operation Defensive Shield, would not have taken place with determination if the warriors had not known that above them were those who would be with them even upon their return, whatever the public or international condemnation of their activities.
Similarly, Naftali Bennett received a security system reminiscent of those who tried in vain to use Ben-Gurion and Arik Sharon: cumbersome, untrained, unskilled, and most importantly - one headed by those who, to say the least, do not take the initiative.
The army is headed by a chief of staff who has been addicted to public relations since his tenure - initiated "Tanush Tnufa" (his flagship program), which is in fact a campaign he called by a variety of names from the seminary of his image consultants such as "Lethal Army", "Victory Workshop" and more .
Only in practice he abolished more than any chief of staff who had promoted the entrepreneurial options to him and assembled the army into a stationary technological model devoid of deterrent or decisive capabilities.
Prime Minister Bennett, who at the time claimed that IDF fighters were "more afraid of the IDF than Sinwar," of doing an act by Ben-Gurion or Sharon. And risk-taking.
There are other officers in the IDF at the intermediate command level today. He must locate them and build his 101st. Talk to them, strengthen them and rebuild the army's spirit with them. .
If he does not do so, we will receive more of the same authority, laxity and avoidance: more officers worrying about "sit and do not do", worrying about pensions and "the main thing to end a term in peace" without commissions of inquiry and without furthering the goal: security.
Were we wrong?
Fixed!
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