The fact that there are no magic formulas to win over those who would like to destroy democracy does not mean that there are not some better ideas than others about how to do it.
And the first is not to accept their diagnoses as valid.
Among concerned democrats there has been a commonplace of late that democracies are very fragile, a view that is certainly shared by their enemies and thus encouraged to weaken them further.
Of course, democracy has many weaknesses, in some countries more than in others, and as all human construction is contingent, that is, in the same way that it was created with great effort and overcoming not a few resistances, it could disappear.
But the discourse that insists on its fragility tends to underestimate its resistance.
Indeed, 2022 has been a bad year for autocrats: Putin's aggression is being pushed back by those he considered weak;
Xi's health authoritarianism has proven incompetent;
Iran's despots have been challenged by the youth;
Trump's candidates lost the elections, like Bolsonaro, while Petro and Boric won, to mention the most relevant.
The assaults in January (in 2021 in the US, in 2023 in Brazil) on the institutions have not resulted in a weakening of democracy, but rather in its strengthening.
In neither of the two countries have the accusations of electoral fraud had the result that the complainants wanted and institutional normality has been imposed.
We will see how the situation in Brazil evolves, but from the outset it is very possible that it will benefit Lula and allow him to win over a sector of conservatives who do not approve of violence.
We can already know the effect that the assault on the Capitol in January 2021 has had on American democracy.
Democracy has not been weakened, but the Republican Party and especially Trump and his candidates.
Republicans in the House of Representatives had great trouble choosing the president, which portends that they will also have great trouble building an opposition majority even on issues they can't agree with Democrats.
The profiles of the Republican winners are not a guarantee of their unified behavior when it comes to passing laws.
Conversely, if Biden is smart, he can create voting majorities with non-Trump moderate Republicans.
From this point of view, Biden is arguably in a better position than Obama, whose failures in the midterm elections, twice in a row, derailed his entire agenda.
How to assess the progress of the far-right parties in Europe and the threat they can represent for democracy?
I know that this opinion goes against the current of militant anti-fascism and what the extreme right would like for themselves, but I think its dangers are overestimated.
If the US and Brazilian assaults were carried out by people who thus satisfied their desire to sit in the president's office or take selfies, what to think of an attack on the Bundestag in which they planned to use crossbows, of some challenges to the European Union that are moderated when there are subsidies involved or a cultural combat in which in the end it is about bulls or the size and profusion of the flag?
Does anyone remember the military plot in France that intended to take the Elysée with halberds and maces to end 5G, compulsory vaccination and gay marriage?
We could mention the recent demonstration of the extreme right in Madrid, called to prevent the Sánchez government from ending up destroying democracy and where banners were seen encouraging the expulsion of the separatists (!) or they wondered if somewhere in Spain it was still possible to learn Spanish.
In the end it will turn out that the extreme right is more seedy than dangerous.
Someone might remember the tensions caused by the so-called illiberal democracies of Hungary and Poland, which are still very worrying cases that will have to be managed harshly and skilfully.
Now, what would the illiberal drift of these countries be like if they were not within the European Union?
In fact, the EU, to which so much criticism is directed, rightly or wrongly, is an institutional framework that moderates, conditions and protects the democracies it houses.
Before Brexit, there were several far-right parties that proposed leaving the euro and even the EU in their programs.
Whether it was for the punishment of others or to facilitate their electoral success, these claims were softened and even completely disappeared.
In Italy, it often happens that the fiercest critic of the government in power quickly achieves enormous popularity, wins the (usually early) elections, and then, just as quickly, loses popularity again because reality does not allow him to keep his promises.
The government falls and another comes to captivate the masses (with some technocratic intervals induced by Europe, like Monti, Draghi, to bring order).
The fact that the EU has committed 191 billion euros to Italy over the next six years will prevent Meloni from straying too far from orthodox politics.
All this is not a model of democratic exemplarity and good governance, but it does indicate that the famous checks and balances of liberal democracy have not stopped working entirely (now to a large extent at a European level).
Democracy neutralizes the danger posed by extremism quite well.
Exaggerating the fragility of democracy is a discourse that coincides with what its enemies want us to believe.
Inflaming the rhetoric against them can serve to cover up one's mistakes, but let's not lose sight of the fact that it is the type of hyperbole that indirectly benefits them.
The construction of procedures and systems that moderate and neutralize excess is not as epic as the anti-fascist combat, but it is exactly what is least convenient for extremists and, for that very reason, what most reinforces democracy.
Daniel Innerarity is Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of the Basque Country (UPV) and the European University Institute, in Firenze.
Copyright La Vanguardia, 2023