Israel entered the current conflict in the Gaza Strip almost with no choice, following last week's Islamic Jihad rocket attack and in the face of perceived erosion of deterrence. The elimination of senior members of the organization in the successful opening blow achieved the main objective of the operation.
Subsequently, the defense efforts, combined with Iron Dome and responsible conduct by the home front, thwarted jihad's attempts to change the balance in its favor. However, Operation Shield and Arrow was not intended to bring about a fundamental change in the Gaza issue, but only to buy another period of relative security quiet.
A fundamental change in the situation in Gaza requires a deep, broad and protracted operation, which involves prices for which it is doubtful whether Israel is worth paying.
Gunfire from the Gaza Strip, photo: AFP
The alternative to such an operation is the familiar "round concept." The disadvantages of the concept are many and clear, but in order to realize its main advantage – the temporary quiet it provides – it is essential to conduct a systematic, low-profile campaign under the cover of this quiet to halt the armament of terrorist elements.
* In order to keep the next round away, it is essential to halt the buildup in Gaza
* After the ceasefire goes into effect, who knows how many, in its familiar style in the Middle East, senior jihadists and Hamas figures will emerge from the protected hiding places in Gaza. Those who did not "merit" to be included in the list of martyrs of this round. They will tour the ruins, take pictures in the open next to a waving flag of their organization, and give their familiar speeches about the steadfastness in the face of the attacks of the Zionist enemy and about "the blow of our fighter, which sowed fear and panic at every corner."
While they will conduct the cognitive campaign, senior members of the military wing will deal with lessons learned, re-staffing positions in the organization, and equipping and preparing for the next round. At the same time, without waiting for orders and in almost automatic action, one of the critical mechanisms for the success of terrorist organizations will once again function beneath the surface: the mechanism for manufacturing weapons.
IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy assessing the situation in the Gaza Division. It is impossible to schedule a thwarting for political purposes, photo: IDF Spokesperson
The armament efforts will increase and the pace will accelerate, in order to replenish the stocks and enable in the next round: much more fire, which will reach farther, and will be more lethal and accurate. Most of the weapons and ammunition used in the fighting against Israel are manufactured inside the Gaza Strip, using means and materials transferred to it, from Israel or Egyptian territory.
In some cases, these are dual-use means, that is, materials that have civilian and military uses. Israel permits their entry for legitimate civilian uses, and they are taken by terrorist elements and converted for use by the local military industry.
Israel's policy regarding the Gaza Strip must determine the balance between conflicting considerations and interests: on the one hand, Israel aspires to enable economic welfare and a response to the humanitarian needs of Gaza's residents, which can also increase the price of loss in entering a confrontation with it, thus delaying the next round. Therefore, it is ready to allow the introduction of such measures. On the other hand, it seeks to make it difficult for terrorist organizations to grow stronger, which leads it to avoid introducing means that could be used for this purpose.
However, the decision-making process in this area is complex and may give preference to quiet in the immediate term, at the expense of the interest in preventing armament, in light of the many challenges involved in this effort: First, in light of the ammunition stocks of the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, the attempt to prevent their buildup sometimes seems futile. Second, due to the difficulty of supervising the introduction of such substances, and third, due to the "brewing frog" syndrome – when the threat increases moderately and over time, there is no sense of urgency regarding it. Fourth, there is sometimes a tendency to fall in love with relative quiet, which is combined with a desire to reduce the arenas of operation in which operational attention is required.
Jihad terrorists killed at the beginning of the operation in Gaza, photo: Arab networks
Precisely for this reason, the decision on a ceasefire should be accompanied by the establishment of strict rules and monitoring and monitoring mechanisms to stop the arming of terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the defense establishment should define halting the buildup and damaging its quality components as a central goal for the "campaign between the systems" and be tasked with presenting a comprehensive, systematic and measurable action plan in this area.
At the same time, it is essential to tighten the policy of granting permits for the entry into Gaza of raw materials and dual-use means, and to demand that Egypt adopt this policy also with respect to what is transferred from Gaza into Gaza.
At the same time, there is a need to formulate a comprehensive plan, in accordance with the economic reality in Gaza and the arrangements to which Israel has committed, to harm the production system of terrorist organizations – it must be comprehensive, measurable, and take advantage of opportunities to damage sites and assets belonging to these systems.
Quiet is essential for us to free up our resources for other challenges, to maintain a healthy routine, to grow and thrive. The organizations in Gaza need it to improve their preparations for the next conflict. The more we invest in routine in curbing the buildup, the further away we will be from the next round and reduce its intensity when it comes.
The writer is the head of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem. Prior to that, he served as National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council and served at the top of the Israel Security Agency.
Wrong? We'll fix it! If you find a mistake in the article, please share with us